

Report by the Clerk & Chief Executive

POLICE RESTRUCTURING

Introduction

As a result of HMIC Dennis O'Connor's recent report "*Closing the Gap*" (about the discrete area of police work known as "Protective policing services") and the Home Secretary's 'police structures' speech on 19th September 2005, police forces and authorities were invited to assess and make proposals for reducing by merger the number of forces in England and Wales.

This is required to occur through their incorporation into "Strategic" police forces, having a prescribed minimum of at least 4,0000 officers. If effected, this could be the biggest change to policing structures for over three decades, but only 12 weeks have been allowed to resolve its future form. This police authority has to date still declined to state a preferred option for any Cumbrian merger, principally on the grounds of inadequate information.

Today's meeting precedes a deadline for option identification set by government (23rd December 2005); the date by which it is finally expected to do so, conclusively.

Recommendation

Members are recommended to endorse and adopt the position and reasons for that position set out in the APA (Association of Police Authorities) statement of 7th December 2005 by declining to state any preferred option by 23rd December 2005.

Background

The HMIC ("O'Connor") report "*Closing the Gap*" was commissioned by the Home Office in April 2005 and published on 16th September (following an earlier HMIC report on policing capacity and capabilities called "*Mind the Gap*"). The Home Secretary's resultant 'police structures' speech was made to Chief Constables and Chairs of Police Authorities on 19th September 2005 and followed by his formal letter of invitation to them of 22nd September 2005.

As a matter of law, every Police Authority has legal duties (within its own force area) to ensure its Constabulary's capacity and levels of resilience in Protective Policing Services reach the prescribed standard. As a matter of law, every Police Authority is put on notice by the O'Connor report of potential shortfalls in those standards of efficiency and effectiveness.

This Authority therefore acknowledges an urgent issue requiring immediate attention. Whatever other outcomes may follow, executing changes and improvements to assure future protective policing service provision in Cumbria is surely inescapable. However, the O'Connor report has never – in the short time since its release - been subject of any detailed, objective review or critique; and neither have any alternative ways of remedying

any perceived shortcomings been examined in any depth. This Police Authority therefore has a parallel duty – along with those of efficiency and effectiveness - to make sure that integrity, both of its review and whatever decision-making processes are followed towards whatever solutions are adopted, is not put at risk simply through very short timescales currently being requested by government for resolution of this issue.

Because of the short timetable set, a joint process of consultation by the Police Authority and the Constabulary with stakeholders and the public in Cumbria has perforce taken place even whilst different options for change were still being assessed. This approach has not therefore been staged in a logical order but twin-tracked, in parallel. In effect, option analysis and consultation have run together, not one as a result of the other. (In other circumstances, a Police Authority minded for change or given notice from the Home Office about requirements for change would surely have commissioned work on options first, and consulted after).

Legal position on merger

Parallel invitations for proposals for merger were issued by the Home Secretary in September, to forces and authorities alike. They should adopt a methodology commissioned by government from Leeds University and supplied to forces in early/mid October for self-assessing potential mergers. However, legally, it is only Police Authorities who can apply for voluntary merger, under **s.32 Police Act 1996**, not forces.

The **Police Act 1996** also allows the Home Secretary to impose merger without any need for further legislation. It is a moot point whether the spirit of the Act was intended to enable compulsory mergers upon a Home Secretary's will, but APA guidance states:

“Amalgamations - Legislative and Parliamentary Procedures

1. *Under the Police Act 1996 (sections 32- 34), the Home Secretary already has sweeping powers to amalgamate forces and to make appropriate transitional arrangements using secondary legislation (orders). There are two possible approaches which each entail different procedures.*

- ***Voluntary amalgamations*** - the police authorities concerned request the Home Secretary to amalgamate their forces. **NB** Such a request can only be made by police authorities – not forces.

The Home Secretary simply lays an appropriate order before parliament – this order is subject to “negative resolution” – it would not be subject to a debate in either House unless a motion is laid against it by an MP or Peer.

- ***Imposed amalgamations***: the Home Secretary can impose an amalgamation if he considers it expedient in the interest of efficiency or effectiveness.

In this case, the Home Secretary has to issue a formal notice setting out the proposed alterations and giving reasons for it to:

- *The police authorities concerned;*

- All local authorities (county, district, unitary, metropolitan district) in the areas concerned; and
- any other person he considers appropriate.

*Each of the above then has a **statutory four-month period** in which to make any objections. If any such objections are made, the Home Secretary must then give a further notice saying whether or not he accepts the objections and, if he does not, his reasons.*

The Home Secretary can then proceed to make an order for the amalgamations (which may differ from that proposed in the original notice) but these must be subject to “Affirmative Resolution” that is a debate and vote in both Houses of Parliament.

Whilst this approach does mean that there would be parliamentary debate on each and every order for amalgamation, it should be noted that the last time an “affirmative resolution” order was voted down was in 1969”.

Options selection rules

The terms of the Home Office’s regional focus; the rules set; and its complete reliance on the ‘Closing the Gap’ report effectively self-selected Cumbria’s options as either:

- A merger with Lancashire; or
- A merger with Lancashire and some other force(s) in the north-west.

Specific limitations imposed by the Home Office included:

- New forces to be confined within existing government office boundaries (Therefore, no opportunity for e.g. exploring other options with bordering forces like Northumbria, North Yorkshire, or Durham).
- No subdivision of local government boundaries
- No subdivision of present force areas
- New forces to have a minimum of 4000 officers (or 6000 including staff)

The role of other forces and authorities in the north-west also played a part. Inevitably, one authority and force’s decision has an effect on the options of others in the region.

Since this programme first began, in September 2005, the Constabulary project team has diligently and reliably delivered each stage of the self-assessment and merger option identification project on time, according to deadlines set by the Home Office and in close liaison with the Authority. The Authority itself has to date as consistently declined to endorse any preferred option for merger, whilst at the same time stating its regret, all other aspects being equal, that the ‘stand-alone’ status of Cumbria Constabulary was already one option being denied under Home Office prescribed terms.

By 28th November 2005, Cumbria Police Authority was adopting this position of not endorsing any option for merger upon the express recommendation of their Chief Constable, because of the lack of definite information and the changing nature of the information that was available (even since the Authority’s 27th October and 10th November meetings). This important matter is before this meeting again because of the Home Secretary’s stated expectation authorities submit to him by the end of this week

their final preferred option for a voluntary merger, in the form of an express request of him made under the terms of **s.32 (3) (a) Police Act 1996**.

Timescale for the options selection process

16 th September	Publication of HMIC <i>Closing the Gap</i> report
19 th September	Announcement by Charles Clarke that the present structure is “ <i>not fit for purpose</i> ”
26 th September	Police Authority meeting
October	MORI Poll carried out
w.c 10 th October	Home Office guidance (<i>‘Toolkit’</i>) on restructuring received:
14 th October	Cumbrian MPs e-mailed 1st briefing note /letter on merger
19 th October	Commencement of Police Authority consultation with stakeholders: return date 27 th October (and after)
28 th October	Letter to Home Office from Police Authority, asking that a stand-alone option be considered
28 th October	Constabulary submits initial work on the analysis of options and indication of a preferred option: (Cumbria/Lancashire/Merseyside) to the Home Office
9 th November	Home Office narrows options down to 2 for the north-west
10 th November	Police Authority meeting
23 rd November	Association of Police Authorities (APA) advises police authorities not to select an option at this stage
28 th November	Special Cumbria Police Authority Meeting (Chief Constable’s advice there is insufficient information available to advise the Authority properly on a preferred option – Police Authority decides to reserve its position).
30 th November	Constabulary submits further information to Home Office on ‘work in progress’ on the Option Analysis – ‘OBC Outline Business Case’ – but no formal indication from either Constabulary or Authority as to a preferred option
15 th December	<i>Police Authority Meeting</i>
23rd December	<i>Home Office deadline for forces to provide refined business cases for merger and formal requests for voluntary merger from Authorities</i>

Difficulties presented by timescale

Whether locally or nationally, the abbreviated structures debate has limited the Authority's ability to follow what could be described as normal consultative paths. It has attracted much criticism as a result. The requirement to select an option before Christmas, with work on the detail of the options going on right up to the last minute, and acknowledged by government as likely to be needed after submission, has limited the Authority's opportunities to stand back, reflect, and critically assess the implications of its options.

Many Police Authority Members have received papers outside statutory time limits. This is not a criticism of anyone but simply because the up-to-date position kept changing and timings for assessment reports were so tight. Additionally, the Police Authority has not been able to consult with local people and stakeholders about fully refined options that offer definite shape and structures.

Members may be harbouring concerns about the timescale's effect on their ability to:

1. Test the assumptions of the brief from the Home Office
2. Engage stakeholders and the public on the issue of creating strategic police forces
3. Receive sufficient detail on the options for Cumbria
4. Consider the full implications of merger with regard to:
 - The structure of the new force and police authority resulting
 - The framework for accountability
 - The benefits and drawbacks from the process

Members have properly asserted their wish to weigh very carefully the full implications not only of issues where the Authority and Constabulary have already worked very closely together; but also of highly significant implications from Cumbria Constabulary forming part of a larger force in the north-west, which still cannot be assessed yet.

Alternative options for change with regard to greater harmonisation of working practices, (e.g. IT systems and provision of back-office functions at a regional level) could be explored further as part of a more thorough consultative process. Otherwise, ignoring hitherto-unexplored ways of assuring 'Protective Policing services' (within the police force area to whose boundaries this Authority's duties of efficiency and effectiveness are by law currently confined) must risk missing better/cheaper solutions to these problems.

Consultation

It has been difficult to consult with the public and stakeholders meaningfully when possible options for change were so unclear.

As a result:

- Authority consulting with the public, partners and stakeholders at a time when it was not fully informed itself;
- Consultation did not ask for opinions on the detail of actual options (options mooted unavoidably hypothetical);
- Of those surveyed by MORI, the majority oppose merger;
- No informed debate possible yet on council tax effects;

- Options available were self-selected, with limited opportunity for influence from any stakeholder in their determination, due to:
 - Requirement for a minimum of 4,000 officers (as per *Closing the Gap*)
 - Administrative boundary limitations.
- The Authority asked for 'stand-alone' to be allowed as an option; the Home Office declined in its letter of 9th November, advising constabularies and authorities not to pursue options it deems unsuitable (including Cumbria's);
- Availability of a full analysis of the pros and cons of a 'stand-alone' option may have helped inform members further on the case for or against merger

Additional time to consult may address these, and also such relevant facts as (e.g.):

- One MP is still to be formally engaged with in the consultation process (appointment anticipated shortly)
- Two out of the seven councils in Cumbria have not yet issued a position statement about policing structures.

Local accountability structures –'governance'

The word "police" comes from the Greek '*polis*' ("of the city") and so emphasises the key role in British society of our police as a local civic institution; not mere detached deliverers of deterrence; peace and order; or formalised retribution for crime; coming in from outside then departing, job done.

When the first police forces were set up in the early nineteenth century, under Act of Parliament, nine days were spent debating their constitutional status and form. The idea of a state police force, for instance, or anything approaching that scale, was one particular concept rejected during that debate whose avoidance has been a traditional feature of British constitutional arrangements for preserving public order ever since.

In Cumbria as elsewhere, the public are citizens and not mere passive consumers of policing services. Their support for and co-operation with policing is key to its operating at all, but there has been limited opportunity to define for them what any new structures for local accountability or answerability would look like and little evidence to date of realistic ideas from the Home Office about new accountability structures, short of general anticipation that new 'strategic' police authorities will come into existence as a concept.

Cumbria Police Authority has not received any guarantees on future governance structures. The Association of Police Authorities has published a discussion paper on possible future modes of public accountability but (that new strategic police authorities will perforce result in reduced police authority member representation for Cumbria) presently appears unavoidable. If so, there will be inevitable dilution of democratic or local control as the centre of policing power for Cumbria shifts beyond the county – risking a policing structure remote from public and local political reach. If true, this could affect public support.

There has been no proper Parliamentary debate of these proposals to date, but government will rely heavily on the 'Neighbourhood Policing' concept (where Cumbria Constabulary is so strong) surviving intact as the best way to preserve localism in policing after merger, with some provision likely in the forthcoming 'Safer Communities Bill' to provide for the accountability of the new Strategic Police Authorities.

Further implications of merger

Who will pay the cost of these changes? Government has to date indicated they will be borne locally, if necessary by borrowing.

The financial implications of merger are a matter best left to a separate report (see Treasurer's) but merger of any human organisation has obvious potential to be fraught with other, serious and often unexpected, difficulties; beyond the simple monetary.

Structural change on this scale is not within the working memory of most officers and staff, whilst the actual task of merger itself should not be underestimated. The scale of work and effort in any merger is immense, just at a time when government is rightly anxious to ensure that enhanced threats from terrorism and serious & organised crime should be met with enhanced police effectiveness.

The Police Authority is the legal employer of large numbers of police staff, under the direction and control of its Chief Constable. Like other police authorities, it has publicly stated its real concern to safeguard as best it can the interests of its staff under any changes which follow. The same sincere intention applies to all in the office of constable.

Since the picture is built out of a mass of compelling detail, sweeping statements about merger should generally be avoided. However, some actuarially-measurable benefits of merger are perhaps being given too much emphasis, without enough attention also given to equally-real costs potentially in view for individuals, local economies, or the actual policing service being provided; and their effect on the comparative quality and overall nature of the new organisation eventually produced after all that.

Public sector reorganisations have a chequered history in this country but lessons may have been learned from the experiences of merger in other services, notably Health. The Police Authority may additionally wish to seek reassurances direct from government about the mechanical method and potential effects of any merger.

Conclusion

This Police Authority is not alone in wishing to reflect carefully on all the implications of the process set in train by the Home Office; including their potential cost to the taxpayer and how effective public governance and accountability/answerability could be achieved with a bigger force. All Authorities are in a similar dilemma and the scale and vigour of this debate nationally has grown very considerably in the weeks since it was first announced. Like any issue there is a wide span of opinions, but the duty of this authority is to focus on real information and achieving best outcomes for the public in its area.

In making any decision on merger, the Police Authority may wish to receive further information on key areas of the debate and satisfy itself about concerns relating to the impact on the public. This is especially required in the face of known opposition and consistent reservations being expressed about the effects of merger, along with matching lack of clarity on the financial effects of these proposals or how future police accountability to their local populations will be achieved.

Members will be anxious that the Home Secretary understands that this Authority is genuinely determined to support him in any initiative which will deliver better policing both for the country and for Cumbrians, but that in this venture it appears neither the precise problem nor the best solution have yet been identified with sufficient proximity. The Authority is neither withdrawing from the debate nor declining to assist, simply wishing to assure the quality and appropriateness of its eventual responses.

All Police Authorities face the same dilemma, which is why their national representative body, the Association of Police Authorities, held its latest summit meeting of Authority Chairs and Chief Executives on the matter in London on 7th December 2005.

The following documents are attached to this report:

1. Letter **6.12.05**: Home Secretary, Rt.Hon. Charles Clarke MP, to Bob Jones, APA;
2. Letter **7.12.05**: Bob Jones, APA to Home Secretary, Rt.Hon. Charles Clarke MP (including APA position statement).

These documents show the APA's current approach, one which members are recommended to adopt locally on the basis of: (i) the interests of policing in Cumbria; and (ii) police authorities nationally adopting a more coherent and cohesive approach towards assisting the Home Secretary and the police service generally successfully address undoubted problems alerted to in "*Closing the Gap*".

Clive Alcock
Clerk and Chief Executive

9th December 2005.

Background documents

- Police Act 1996
- HMIC Reports: "*Mind the Gap*" and "*Closing the Gap*"

Race and Diversity Implications: None specifically identified to date.

Human Rights Act Implications: Under the right to life, members of the public are entitled to the assurance of Protective (and other) Policing services designed and delivered to a reasonable standard adequate to protect that right.

different for each option, and this will of course be a key factor in the final decision.

- 2.5 Any final decision to pursue a merger would ideally be supported by information which it has not been possible to provide within the Home Office timescales, or for which national guidance is awaited:
- Detailed design of the merged force with greater cost appraisal
 - In depth forecasting of the future protective services environment
 - Funding streams
 - Police Authority structures
 - Precept harmonisation
 - National scheme to manage staff changes.

3. DETAIL

3.1 Background

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) published *Closing the Gap* on 16th September 2005. It explored whether the present police structure is sufficiently robust to handle the whole spectrum of protective services, while simultaneously tackling volume crime. HMIC concluded that the "current 43 force structure is no longer fit for purpose" and that "in the interests of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing it should change". The Home Secretary strongly agreed with HMIC's conclusions and wrote to Chief Officers and Chairs of Police Authorities on 22nd September to set out his requirements to take this matter forward.

The required process for forces and Police Authorities is:

- Submission to the Home Office of an initial analysis of options, including a short-list of options for further examination and identification of a preferred option at this stage, by **midday 28th October**.
- Home Office quality assurance, followed by their recommendation of options for further examination on **9th November**.
- Submission to the Home Office of work in progress on a collaborative regional cost-benefit analysis of short-listed options, and identification of a preferred option at this stage by **30th November**.
- Home Office quality assurance and feedback in **early December**.
- Submission to the Home Office, by Police Authorities, of a validated and refined final business case, including where appropriate a formal request for voluntary merger, by **23 December**.

On 28th October Cumbria Constabulary submitted an outline business case to the Home Office, presenting the initial assessment of options for merging with other forces. It was based on high-level research and analysis, expert advice, stakeholder engagement and public consultation. While it focused on policing in Cumbria, all supporting work had been coordinated with other North West forces. The outline case recommended three options for further examination:

- Cumbria merged with Lancashire
- Cumbria merged with Lancashire and Merseyside (the preferred option at that initial stage)
- Cumbria merged with Lancashire, Merseyside and Cheshire.

Cumbria Police Authority wrote to the Home Secretary on 28th October reserving its position on the three options given the information available at that early stage, and stating a preference that Cumbria Constabulary remain unchanged.

The Home Office wrote to North West forces and Police Authorities on 9th November, recommending that the following options be pursued:

- Three strategic forces: Lancashire and Cumbria
Cheshire and Merseyside
GMP stand alone
- Two strategic forces: Lancashire, Cumbria and Merseyside
Cheshire and GMP

The Home Office recommended that the Cumbria, Lancashire, Merseyside and Cheshire option be discounted because only one force and authority in the region supported its development. Further, it presented concerns in relation to geography and infrastructure links. The Home Office also recommended that the Cumbria stand alone option be discounted, because it found that this option did not meet criteria on size of force and was unlikely to deliver sufficient capacity and capability to meet the requirements for provision of protective services to national standards.

On November 28th the Cumbria Police Authority considered work in progress towards this business case. The Police Authority agreed with the Chief Constable that there was insufficient information at this stage to determine and include a preferred option in the November submission to the Home Office. The decision was deferred until the meeting of 15th December 2005.

3.2 Cost Information

The Home Office has now quality assured work on costs and savings, and feedback is expected by 13th December. Work continues with Lancashire Constabulary and Merseyside Police to interrogate and validate the data, which is also expected to be complete by this date. Additional cost and savings information will be provided to the Police Authority meeting of 15th December.

3.3 The Case for Changing Cumbria Constabulary

While there is a strong desire to retain Cumbria Constabulary as it stands, this is not feasible given the resources required to position its protective services to meet future challenges. Even if it were possible to secure sufficient resources for protective services, the level of engagement in essential activities is such that long term expertise would be difficult to maintain, and therefore compliance with national standards would always be at risk.

While neighbourhood policing is a strong performing area, it is always threatened by abstractions in dealing with the protective services environment.

Additionally, in the HMIC Baseline Assessment, some of the Constabulary's support services were not assessed as performing well. Furthermore, the current and future resourcing demands, at a time of a threatening financial future, presents an increasing challenge and difficult agenda to manage as a stand alone Constabulary.

3.4 Merger with Lancashire - Risks and Benefits

Merger with Lancashire crosses the capacity threshold and provides an alliance with a force assessed as one of the best forces in the country. Regional experts suggest that it presents less risk to performance during the transition. However, it is uncertain whether this option provides sufficient capability and capacity to enable adequate protective services in the long term and the benefits and efficiencies that could be achieved by a larger merger of forces would diminish.

3.5 Merger with Lancashire and Merseyside - Risks and Benefits

Merger with Lancashire and Merseyside would provide for much bigger capacity with an assumption of greater efficiencies, and a much better match with criminal markets. Protective services experts endorse this option. However, the costs of change are significantly higher. Support service experts are concerned about the risk to current performance presented by the scale of change in this option.

3.6 Information Required to Complete Options Assessment

The business case has been produced in less than 50 working days. Within this time the project team has achieved a significant breadth of information, including:

- Research into best practice guidance

- Unprecedented sharing, comparison and analysis of protective services, performance and organisational information with other North West Forces
- A comprehensive picture of public, partner and political and staff association and union opinion
- The expert views of all local and regional specialists in 7 core disciplines.

It was not however possible to secure the following regional information within the available timescales:

- Detailed design of the merged force - this requires proper consideration using best value principles and consultation with multiple stakeholders in each force and Police Authority
- Actual cost and savings forecasts – this requires the detailed design of each merged force and a clear information on staff change management schemes
- In depth forecasting of the future protective services environment – this is a new area for development.

Further information has not yet been provided by the Home Office:

- Funding streams
- Police Authority structures and governance arrangements
- Precept harmonisation arrangements
- National scheme to manage staff changes.

Such information would ideally be included in any final decision to merge with another force.

Michael Baxter
Chief Constable

POLICE STRUCTURES REVIEW

BUSINESS CASE

**Assessment of options for North West policing structures
For discussion by Police Authority 15th December**

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1: Context Setting

1.1 Introduction

This paper sets out an assessment of risks, benefits and indicative costs of options for changing police force structures in the North West. It has been produced at the request of the Home Secretary, who requested that Police Authorities submit cases in a specified format to the Home Office by 23rd December 2005.

The paper describes the drivers and context for the police structures review and records the discounting processes that determined the short-list of options. It explains the stakeholder consultation that has informed the risks and benefits analysis. Work to establish and validate information on costs, risks and benefits, both locally by Cumbria Constabulary and with other North West forces, is described and incorporated into the assessment.

Finally, the paper sets out the limitations to the information available and the detailed analysis that it has not yet been possible to complete.

The Home Office has quality assured work on costs and savings and feedback is expected by 13th December. Work continues with Lancashire Constabulary and Merseyside Police to interrogate and validate the data, which is also expected to be complete by this date. Additional cost and savings information will subsequently be added to this paper.

Background

Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) published *Closing the Gap* on 16th September 2005. It explored whether the present police structure is sufficiently robust to handle the whole spectrum of protective services, while simultaneously tackling volume crime. The protective services provided by the police are:

Serious and Organised Crime
Public Order
Critical Incident Management
Civil Contingencies and Emergency Planning
Strategic Roads Policing
Major Crime
Counter Terrorism and Allied Matters

HMIC concluded that the "current 43 force structure is no longer fit for purpose" and that "in the interests of the efficiency and effectiveness of policing it should change". The Home Secretary strongly agreed with HMIC's conclusions and wrote to Chief Officers and Chairs of Police Authorities on 22nd September to set out his requirements to take this matter forward.

The required process for forces and Police Authorities was:

- Submission to the Home Office of an initial analysis of options, including a short-list of options for further examination and identification of a preferred option at this first stage, by midday 28th October.
- Home Office quality assurance, followed by recommendation of options for further examination on 9th November.
- Submission to the Home Office of work in progress on a regional cost-benefit analysis of short-listed options and identification of a preferred option at this stage by 30th November.
- Home Office quality assurance and feedback on 13th December.
- Submission to the Home Office, by Police Authorities, of a final business case by 23rd December.

This was an extremely challenging timetable and was accompanied by detailed Home Office requirements for the methodology and reporting. The process required rapid gathering and analysis of specialist and cost data and stakeholder views and an unprecedented level of information sharing and cooperation by North West forces.

On 28th October Cumbria Constabulary submitted an outline business case to the Home Office, presenting the initial assessment of options for merging with other forces. It was based on high-level research and analysis, expert advice, stakeholder engagement and public consultation. While it focused on policing in Cumbria, all supporting work had been coordinated with other North West forces. The outline case recommended three options for further examination:

- Cumbria merged with Lancashire.
- Cumbria merged with Lancashire and Merseyside (the preferred option at this initial stage).
- Cumbria merged with Lancashire, Merseyside and Cheshire.

Cumbria Police Authority wrote to the Home Secretary on 28th October reserving its position on the three options, given the information available at that early stage and stating a preference that Cumbria Constabulary remain unchanged.

The Home Office wrote to North West forces and Authorities on 9th November, recommending that the following options be pursued:

Option 1: Three strategic forces: Lancashire and Cumbria
Cheshire and Merseyside
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) stand-alone

Option 2: Two strategic forces: Lancashire, Cumbria and Merseyside
Cheshire and GMP

On 1st December, the Constabulary submitted to the Home Office work in progress on its assessment of these two options, with no favoured option identified at that stage.

This paper will support the final stage of the Home Office process, following the addition of indicative costs and savings figures, which are work in progress at the date of this paper.

1.2 Context

The context in which this option appraisal has been carried out is set out below. As well as local context, information includes key elements for Lancashire and Merseyside.

1.2.1 Political

Cumbria was created as an administrative area in 1974, covering the traditional counties of Cumberland and Westmorland, plus the Furness part of Lancashire and part of Yorkshire. However, the name "Cumbria" has been used for the region for centuries and people in the area exhibit a strong sense of shared identity and interest. The exception is people born or brought up in the Furness area, who sometimes prefer to refer to its traditional county of Lancashire.

Cumbria Constabulary has a long history. Cumbria was one of the first places in the country to have a police force, with Carlisle City Police founded in 1827. Cumberland & Westmorland Constabulary was first formed in 1856. It merged with the Carlisle City police in 1963 and took the name Cumbria Constabulary in 1967. Cumbria Constabulary is made up of three Basic Command Units (BCUs) that reflect the local district boundaries.

In 2004 Boundary Committee proposals to merge Cumbria and Lancashire were met with public opposition and were successfully challenged by the Police Authority. Cumbria and Lancashire Police Authorities have each recently agreed a collaboration strategy.

Cumbria is a shire county and has four Labour MPs in mainly urban areas, with one Liberal Democrat and one Conservative in mainly rural areas. Cumbria has a strong countryside lobby, recently active on both hunting and fuel price issues. That said, Cumbrian politics often demonstrate a detachment from national agendas, focussing more on local issues.

Lancashire is one of the most populous and urbanised shire counties in Britain. The constabulary is made up of six BCUs, called divisions, plus a headquarters division providing operational support. Lancashire has twelve Labour and three Conservative MPs. The British National Party (BNP) has established a foothold through local elections in the east of the county, which has been the source of significant tension and public disorder.

Lancashire is strong in historical associations and synonymous with industry and commerce. Preston is its administrative capital and home to the University of Central Lancashire (the seventh largest university in the country), which also has strong connections with a number of colleges in Cumbria.

Merseyside is a metropolitan area comprising five local authorities (Liverpool, Sefton, Wirral, St Helens and Knowsley), the largest of which is the City of Liverpool. The force structure reflects the local boundaries and is made up of six BCUs, one in each metropolitan borough and two in Liverpool – North and South. Merseyside is an urbanised area with 15 Labour MPs and one Liberal Democrat.

1.2.2 Economic

Cumbria is the only county in the UK experiencing economic decline and its decline is among the worst in Europe. The West Coast and Barrow have experienced enormous job losses in traditional maritime and heavy industries during the last decade and the uncertain future for the nuclear industry presents a significant threat. South Lakeland has likewise experienced major job losses in the financial, food and pharmaceuticals sectors. Rural areas still feel the effects of Foot and Mouth. Tourism is one of the major industries of the county, which results in a significant population increase to the county each year (15.77 million visitors in 2004) and employed 25,909 people in 2004 (full time equivalent). The North West Development Agency is fully engaged in the protection and development of Barrow and the West Coast and the government has established and chairs the West Cumbria Strategic Forum. Following the devastating storms in Carlisle in January 2005, the Deputy Prime Minister has championed the Carlisle Renaissance project.

Lancashire has a strong and diverse economic base, underpinned by long urban and industrial tradition. Tourism brings an influx of visitors to resorts such as Blackpool, Lancaster and Morecambe and to the Pennine foothills. The strong possibility of a major overhaul of the gambling laws may result in Blackpool becoming a 'Las Vegas' style resort by the end of the decade. On a regular basis, the main political parties hold their major conferences in Blackpool, which requires intensive policing resource.

The Merseyside economy is one of the fastest growing in the country, having the 5th highest Gross Value Added (an indicator of total economic output/wealth generated by the local economy). Over the past 5 years, more than 43,000 jobs have been created and the number of businesses grew by 2% between 2004 and 2005, which is twice the national rate. Merseyside is the subject of European Community 'Objective One Status' thereby having the ability to draw down over £1 billion over the current lifetime of the scheme. Liverpool has been selected to become European Capital of Culture in 2008, which will most likely result in further regeneration and development. Other current projects include Europe's biggest regeneration scheme to transform the city centre, a new arena, conference and exhibition venue on the waterfront and a proposed tram system. The Merseyside maritime sector is of national and international significance, employing 14,000 people in 920 companies with an annual turnover of £1.5 billion. Merseyside is the home of regular premier league football matches, plus other major events such as the Open Golf Championship and the Grand National.

1.2.3 Social

Cumbria is one of the most sparsely populated counties in England (a population of 494,800 distributed over 2,268 square miles). Two of the county's largest settlements, Carlisle and Barrow-in-Furness, account for only 15% and 12% of the total population respectively, while only 19 others have a population of more than 2500. Cumbria is experiencing social decline on a scale unique in the UK. It faces the challenges of poor health and housing, social exclusion and isolation and the outward migration of young people. The county has one of the lowest visible minority ethnic populations in the country.

Lancashire has a resident population of 1.4 million distributed over 2,000 square miles, with a minority ethnic population of 6.6%, which has increased significantly since the last census in 2001. The minority ethnic population is predominantly Asian

and is clustered around the old mill towns in East Lancashire and Preston. Blackburn and Darwen has one of the highest ethnic populations (22.1%) outside London. Lancashire is also experiencing a steady increase in the number of asylum seekers and the force works with Immigration Service closely. There is substantial growth in illicit drugs and the force tackles drugs related criminality using a range of approaches in partnership with other agencies.

Merseyside has a population of just less than 1.5 million over 253 square miles. The population is currently increasing slightly after years of decline, reflecting the increased desirability of the city centre residential areas. The make up of the county is enormously diverse economically, racially and culturally. Merseyside has the oldest Chinese community in Great Britain and over 60 different languages are spoken. In addition, the city has a high number of asylum seekers. The student population has also increased (by 12%) and is now over 50,000.

1.2.4 Technical

Cumbria's geographic size, sparsity and mountainous landscape form a barrier to communications technology e.g. mobile phone coverage, radio coverage and networking. Currently, Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) is being introduced and Airwave radio system is being rolled out. The Constabulary uses national standard police information systems. Call handling and dispatch are centralised functions, with a satellite in West Cumbria.

Lancashire was the pilot force for the introduction of Airwave and ANPR is extensively used on each division and throughout the motorway network. The Constabulary has developed its own IT framework for intelligence, which includes real-time briefing of frontline officers and a gateway to a wide range of crime and intelligence systems. Each Division has its own call handling and dispatch.

Merseyside is currently equipping all police vehicles with ANPR and by the end of this year, 100 vehicles will be operational. In April 2005, the force installed first generation mobile data in Matrix/Operational Support Group vehicles and vehicles in one BCU. The force's intention is to enable more direct user input. Merseyside is implementing the Niche Record Management System (RMS) across all of its BCUs by November 2005, for Case and Custody. RMS also has potential of having a single system for all processes involved in operational policing. Call handling and dispatch are centralised.

1.2.5 Environment

Cumbria is one of the largest counties in England, covering 2,268 square miles. It has natural boundaries along the Irish Sea to the west, the Pennines to the east, the Solway Firth to the north and Morecambe Bay to the south.

While Cumbria enjoys some of the most attractive landscapes in the country, the mountains and lakes are significant geographic barriers to travel and communications. Cumbria suffers from an inadequate rail and road network, although the major M6 motorway passes through the county. Some of the road network crosses high altitudes and is subject to adverse weather conditions.

Lancashire covers an area of approximately 2,000 square miles. The geography varies from the West Coast, with its large agricultural areas and tourist resorts, to moorland farming areas in the east. The County has a significant transportation network, with five major motorway links. It also accommodates the busy ports of Heysham and Fleetwood, together with the main West Coast railway line. There has also been a steady increase in air traffic, with the expansion of Blackpool Airport.

The risk profile of Lancashire in terms of hazardous industry, transport operations and natural threats is quite significant. Lancashire has the highest concentration of nuclear installations in the UK and eight top tier chemical plants, the significant transportation network and off-shore gas rigs.

Merseyside covers an area of approximately 250 square miles. It is an urbanised area, with approximately 49% of its non-tidal land in urban use. Of this land, 28% is residential and 10% is industrial and commercial, with a further 11% used as urban green space. The remaining non-urban land is under a number of uses including agriculture, woodland, public open space and nature conservation areas.

Liverpool has World Heritage city status and has 2,500 listed buildings and 250 public monuments. The Port of Liverpool is the 7th largest in the UK and is working on a new terminal to accommodate the largest container ships, doubling the port's capacity, as well as a new Cruise Liner facility. Projected passenger growth for Liverpool's John Lennon Airport is expected to rise to 5.8m passengers per year and by 2008 there will be 6.5m passengers per year or 18,000 daily.

1.2.6 Legal and Logistical

Cumbria's large geographical size, its poor road network and its sparsity cause significant travel times and costs in delivering policing.

Merseyside's rapid commercial expansion and cultural initiatives will increase demand for policing services.

The M6 corridor is recognised as an important route in the North West and Scotland criminal markets.

1.2.7 Service Performance

Cumbria is one of the safest places to live in the country. Cumbria Constabulary's strongest area of performance is in the citizen focus domain, in which it has recently been assessed as excellent and improved. It secures some of the highest rates of user satisfaction and public confidence in the country. The Constabulary enjoys excellent links with the communities it polices. The Constabulary's performance in the local policing domain is also graded good.

Cumbria Constabulary's Performance Assessment shows it to be at least fair and stable or improving in all other policing domains. Its HMIC Baseline Assessment grades performance in all policing services but one as fair or good. The exception is Tackling Level 2 criminality, for which Cumbria has recently received a poor grade.

In 2004, HMIC identified Lancashire as one of the best performing forces in the country. Lancashire's Performance Assessment shows that it is at least fair and stable or improved in all policing domains. Its HMIC Baseline Assessment grades performance in all policing services as good or excellent. The constabulary received an excellent grading for use of resources and investigating crime. Lancashire has higher levels of recorded crime than Cumbria, but trends show consistent reduction.

Merseyside's Performance Assessment shows that it is at least fair and stable or improved in all policing domains. Its HMIC Baseline Assessment grades performance in all policing services as good, with the exception of forensic management which is rated as fair and improved. Class A drug supply offences have reduced by 10%, although the level of serious violence and robbery recorded crime in Merseyside is substantially higher than Cumbria.

1.2.8 Media Coverage and Public Opinion

There has been a high level of local media interest on the subject of proposals to merge Cumbria Constabulary with another force since August. Coverage has focused on the risk of job losses in support functions, of policing resources being diverted to urban areas and opposition to merger from local politicians.

A specially commissioned MORI telephone survey of Cumbrian residents has found that:

- 72% of the public are satisfied with local policing as it is.
- 58% of the public are opposed to the merger of Cumbria Constabulary with another force.
- 67% feel that the proposed strategic forces will give local people less say about decisions on local policing.
- 53% of the public feel policing services will get worse following a merger.

The areas of biggest public concern are police officers being moved out of Cumbria (21%) and the geographical area being too big (16%). More details on public consultation in Cumbria are included in section 3.

Lancashire Constabulary has carried out a survey of its residents, which found that:

- 73% are currently either very or fairly confident in Lancashire Constabulary.
- 48% believe that merging with another force is a good idea, 29% are not in favour.
- 87% of residents think that the current levels of policing in their neighbourhood should be protected in the event of a merger.
- The majority of respondents feel that a larger force would provide better protective services across the board than are currently provided, in particular 69% think that tackling serious and organised crime will get better.

Merseyside has yet to carry out any public consultation.

1.3 Drivers for Change

Drivers for Change: National and Regional

The primary driver for change is the recently published HMIC report *Closing the Gap*. This report forecasts a future policing environment characterised by:

- Widespread enterprising organised criminality.
- Proliferating international terrorism and domestic extremism.
- A premium on intelligence, expertise and smart use of capacity.

HMIC's analysis finds that such criminal markets are becoming increasingly widespread. It finds that unless the gaps in policing are closed, "it is only a matter of time before these vulnerabilities are exposed, rendering the public unnecessarily at risk".

The report shows the need to continue tackling volume crime and developing community engagement, but also to tackle new complex, volatile threats to individuals, neighbourhoods and businesses. HMIC found that very few forces in England and Wales meet the required standards of policing to meet all these challenges. No new funding is available to close the gap. HMIC concludes that more integrated policing is needed above BCU level and that the establishment of strategic forces offers the best long-term solution.

Drivers for Change: Cumbria

The policing services which tackle serious and organised crime and terrorism are known collectively as protective services. HMIC's recent inspection of Cumbria Constabulary's protective services shows that the Constabulary does not perform as well in this area as the other forces in the region. This is because the Constabulary has limited capacity to invest in protective services. The Constabulary is not currently in a position to maintain permanent and appropriately sized protective services teams with the necessary IT, which in turn restricts the full development of processes and structures. For example, in its 2004/5 Baseline Assessment, HMIC highlighted that Cumbria Constabulary has no dedicated major incident team, surveillance team or dedicated analytical capability for protective services. While the Constabulary has a history of successfully investigating major crimes and handling major emergencies, these incidents have drawn significant resources away from local policing and impacted performance in other areas.

Cumbria Constabulary's performance in other service areas is good and stable overall and its performance in citizen focus is assessed as excellent and is the best in the country. However, Lancashire and Merseyside are two of the top performing forces in the country and have been assessed higher than Cumbria in four of seven service areas. The table below summarises recent performance assessments of Cumbria, Lancashire and Merseyside forces. It indicates a potential for improvements to four policing functions in Cumbria: investigation, promoting safety, providing assistance and resource use.

Performance Area	Cumbria		Lancashire		Merseyside	
	Grade	Direction	Grade	Direction	Grade	Direction
Reducing Crime	Good	Stable	Fair	Stable	Good	Stable
Investigating Crime	Good	Stable	Excellent	Improved	Fair	Stable
Promoting Safety	Fair	Stable	Good	Improved	Fair	Stable
Providing Assistance	Fair	Improved	Good	Improved	Fair	Improved
Citizen Focus	Excellent	Improved	Fair	Stable	Good	Stable
Resource Use	Fair	Improved	Excellent	Improved	Good	Improved
Local Policing	Good	Stable	Good	Improved	Fair	Stable

A lesser driver for change is the need to continuously improve Cumbria Constabulary's efficiency. The Police Service Efficiency Strategy requires Cumbria Constabulary to make 3% efficiency savings each year, half of which must be in real cash terms. The Constabulary has progressively improved its efficiency for five years and all material savings within its current configuration have already been made. In order to continue making savings, the Constabulary must consider innovative options, such as collaborative support services.

A final driver for change is the deteriorating financial position of the Authority, following a national review of grant funding and the anticipated adoption of any one of the four options put forward for consultation. The Authority's Medium Term Financial Forecast to 2008-09 suggests that significant budget savings will be required. It may therefore be necessary to use efficiency savings to meet budget shortfalls, meaning that they will not be reinvested in policing. While the Constabulary is currently considering options to make savings, it is already apparent that these will increasingly impact its current performance levels.

1.4 Concluding Observations

Cumbria Constabulary has a long and excellent record of working as an integral part of Cumbria's communities. The Constabulary and Authority recognise the need to consider options to secure extra capacity to tackle emerging threats from serious and organised crime and terrorism. However, analysis of options must take into account the geographic and economic challenges in Cumbria and the significant differences in the Lancashire and Merseyside environments.

2: Stakeholder Engagement

2.1 Approach

2.1.1 Approach to Stakeholder Identification and Engagement

Cumbria Constabulary and Police Authority have worked jointly to identify and engage stakeholders. Given the timescales involved, a prioritised approach has been taken. A core group of stakeholders was judged critical and were contacted in person where feasible:

Core Stakeholders	Key Methods of Engagement
The public	MORI telephone survey of 1,000 residents Community Liaison Forum x 6 Press releases
Criminal justice and local government partners	Meetings of Chief Executives with senior Constabulary and Authority representatives Involvement in Executive Panel Presentation to Cumbria County Council Special meeting hosted by Chief Constable
Staff associations and unions	Meetings with local project team
Cumbria Constabulary police officers and staff	Regular e-briefings to all staff "Truth Board" questions and answers service Personnel helpline
Local Members of Parliament	Meetings with senior Constabulary and Authority representatives
Other North West forces	Regional meetings at Chief/Chair level Regional project team Regional cost, risk and benefit assessments
Constabulary senior managers	Involvement in Expert and Executive Panels Involvement in risks and benefits assessments Senior Management Forum meeting

The Expert Panel comprised protective services specialists, who considered current protective services performance and the improvements or otherwise that might result from the options for change. The Executive Panel involved senior representatives

from the Constabulary, Authority and partners; it reviewed overall organisational performance and the potential improvements or reductions which the options for change might cause.

Cumbria Police Authority contacted other external stakeholders in Cumbria by letter, with a written questionnaire attached. These included Town and Parish Councils, persons representing or closely connected to BME groups, community leaders and community groups. 456 stakeholders were contacted in this way during October and 43% responded.

The Cumbria Strategic Partnership has received a verbal and written briefing from the Chief Constable in meetings and members were also invited to attend a specially arranged meeting, hosted by the Constabulary, in early November.

The objectives of the engagement activities were twofold. The first was to provide information on the police structures review, its aims, process and timelines. The second objective was to secure a reliable picture of stakeholder views to inform risks and benefits assessments.

External stakeholders in Cumbria have been asked a set of common questions about identity, degree of support for the change options and the expected overall impacts of change. Partners have further been asked to forecast how the options might affect their organisation and services. Internal and regional stakeholders have had the opportunity to raise any issues of concern to them about each of the structural options.

2.1.2 Constraints and Opportunities for Further Engagement

Given the time constraints, it has not been possible to interview Chief Executives of all partners e.g. health and emergency services. Further engagement already planned includes:

- Regular local project team meetings with staff associations and unions.
- Regular e-briefings to all staff.
- “Truth Board” questions and answers service and Personnel helpline.
- Presentations by the Chief Constable to District Councils.

Stakeholder engagement will continue as a key feature of further information gathering and analysis.

2.2 Police Stakeholder Engagement

2.2.1 Police Stakeholder Identification

Core Stakeholders	Method of Engagement
Police officers and staff (All)	Regular e-briefings “Truth Board” questions and answers service Personnel helpline

Core Stakeholders	Method of Engagement
Protective Services Specialists •Chief Superintendents •Superintendents •Chief Inspectors and Detective Chief Inspectors	Written briefings Involvement in Expert Panels Involvement in risk and benefits assessments
Constabulary senior managers •BCU and Operational Support Commanders •Directors	Written briefings Involvement in Expert and Executive Panel Involvement in risk and benefits assessments Senior Management Forum meeting
Regional Chief Officers Regional Project Leads Regional senior managers	Regional meetings at Chief/Chair level Regional project team Regional cost, risk and benefit assessments

2.2.2 Police Stakeholder Engagement in Option Appraisal

Core Stakeholders	Engagement Focus
Police officers and staff (All)	Keep informed of work to date, findings, the way forward Reassurance
Protective Services Specialists •Chief Superintendents •Superintendents •Chief Inspectors and Detective Chief Inspectors	Keep informed of work to date, findings, the way forward Identify impact on protective services of options, associated risks and benefits
Constabulary senior managers •BCU and Operational Support Commanders •Directors •Chief Officers	Keep informed of work to date, findings, the way forward Identify impact on organisation of options, associated costs, risks and benefits
Regional Chief Officers Regional Project Leads Regional Senior Managers	Keep informed of local work to date, findings, the way forward Reach broad consensus on impact of options, associated costs, risks and benefits

2.2.3 Challenges and Issues

It has not been possible, within the timescales, to properly engage both colleagues in other North West Forces and the Police Authority in the establishment of policing principles and configuration for each of the two proposed strategic forces. For this reason, Cumbria Constabulary and Police Authority have worked locally on these principles to secure local consensus.

2.3 External Agency and Public Engagement

2.3.1 External Agency and Public Stakeholder Identification

Core Stakeholders	Method of Engagement
Staff associations and unions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Chief Police Officers Staff Association •Black Police Association •Superintendents' Association •Police Federation •Unison 	Written briefings and feedback Meetings with local project team Observer at Executive Panel and Police Authority meetings (Unison, Federation) Senior Management Forum meeting
The public	MORI telephone survey (1,000 people) Community Liaison Forum x 6 Press releases
Criminal justice and local government partners	Written briefing Meetings of Chief Executives with senior Constabulary and Authority representatives Involvement in Executive Panel Presentation to Cumbria County Council Special meeting hosted by Chief Constable
Other partners	Cumbria Strategic Partnership briefings Special meeting hosted by Chief Constable
Local Members of Parliament	Written briefing Meetings with senior Constabulary and Authority representatives
Parish Councils Town Councils Persons representing BME groups Community leaders and community groups	Letter and written questionnaire

2.3.2 External Agency and Public Stakeholder Engagement in Option Appraisal

Core Stakeholders	Engagement Focus
Staff associations and unions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Chief Police Officers Staff Association •Black Police Association •Superintendents' Association •Police Federation •Unison 	Keep informed of work to date, findings, the way forward Identify options' impacts on staff, associated risks and benefits

Core Stakeholders	Engagement Focus
The public	Keep informed of work to date, findings, the way forward Identify options' impacts on community identities, public trust and confidence
Partners Parish Councils Town Councils Persons representing BME groups Community leaders and community groups	Keep informed of work to date, findings, the way forward Identify options' impact on criminal justice and community safety, public trust and confidence, associated risks and benefits Involvement of partners in Executive Panel
Local Members of Parliament	Identify options' impact on criminal justice and community safety, public trust and confidence, associated risks and benefits

2.3.3 Challenges and Issues

One Member of Parliament for Cumbria has not yet been interviewed.

All staff associations and unions emphasised the difficulties of assessing staff impacts before detailed configurations have been developed for each of the proposed strategic forces. The following concerns were raised:

- Potential for job losses (Superintendent's Association and Unison).
- Potential for relocation of police officers (Superintendent's Association and Police Federation).
- Extremely low police staff morale with staff seeking to leave the Constabulary (Unison).

The Constabulary has committed to continue open and regular communication throughout options analysis and any future implementation process.

Consultation with the public, community groups and leaders has identified both strong opposition to any merger and a strong preference for merger with Lancashire if change is unavoidable. This has formed a key element in decision-making and so the key findings are detailed below:

- "Representative bodies" are town and parish councils.
- "Individuals" are community leaders and respondents from community groups.
- "Key stakeholders" are partners.
- "MORI" refers to 1,000 surveyed Cumbrian residents.

While comparisons of the MORI telephone survey, face-to-face interviews by the project team and written surveys must be treated with caution, some clear themes emerge.


Awareness of Merger Proposals

Most external stakeholders and residents have heard of the police structures review; MORI observed that public awareness was relatively high compared to other similar

initiatives. This may not be surprising given the degree of local media coverage of proposals for merging Cumbria Constabulary. However, only partners know more than a little about it.

Q Before today, how much, if anything, would you say you knew about the proposals to merge Cumbria with one or more other forces?

Awareness of Proposals



Source: Police Authority Consultation

Support for Merger Proposals

The greatest opposition to the proposals is from representative bodies, at 74%. This group admitted to being the least knowledgeable about the restructure of the Police Service.


The MORI survey found residents' support for the idea of Cumbria merging with at least one other police force in the region is fairly low, with about a quarter (26%) supporting the proposal. Nearly three in five (58%) oppose it, including 43% who strongly oppose. Opposition is strong within all sub-groups of the population, the only exception being younger people aged between 18 and 24; over half of younger residents (53%) say they support the idea.

MORI noted that opposition towards Cumbria merging with other forces is in the context of strong identity within the County of Cumbria and high satisfaction with the area as a place to live. Its previous research has shown that people generally tend to favour services to be delivered at a local level.

The group most strongly in support of the proposals is partners with three out of five (60%) supporting the restructure and only 14% in opposition. This group had the greatest knowledge of the proposal beforehand.

Q Based on what you currently know, do you support or oppose the proposal that Cumbria should merge with at least one other police force in this region?

Level of Support for proposals




Level of Support for Specific Options

Three quarters of partners, parish and town councils, community leaders and community groups support a merger with Cumbria and Lancashire; there is little support for other options. The MORI public survey results show that opposition exceeds support for nearly all the proposed options, except for Cumbria merging with Lancashire, where opinions are equally divided. MORI concluded that merging with Lancashire is the least unpopular alternative because it is the county within the region that people in Cumbria are most familiar with and are most favourable towards.

Level of support for individual options

Q How strongly do you support or oppose each option?



Base: 1,000 respondents. Fieldwork dates: 14-23 October 2005

Source: MORI


Perceived effects of proposals

Most external stakeholders considered that policing in Cumbria would get worse as the result of a merger. 81% of respondents from town and parish councils believed a worse service would be delivered if merger took place, with only 2% believing it would improve.

More than half of residents (53%) think that policing of their area would get worse if Cumbria merged with another police force and only 15% think it would improve. More than half of residents (56%) could not think of a single benefit from a merger.

Partners are the most optimistic of all the groups with a quarter (24%) believing a merger would improve the policing of the area and only 17% believing it would deteriorate.

Perceived effect on local policing



External stakeholders expect the following drawbacks from any merger:


- Distant leadership.
- Control over policing resources being outside the county.
- Local people having less say over policing in Cumbria.
- Police officers being moved out of Cumbria to other parts of a merged force.
- Support jobs in Cumbria being lost, with economic consequences.
- Risk of change to BCU structures.

67% of residents feel that the proposed strategic forces will give local people less say about decisions on local policing. The other biggest areas of public concern are police officers being moved out of Cumbria (21%) and the geographical area being too big (16%).

Partners are generally more supportive of the proposal to merger and believe the main benefits would be an improved ability to deal with serious crime and terrorism

and to draw on more resources, whilst identifying that control and local say over policing will move outside the county.

Perceived Benefits - Key Stakeholders



MORI concluded that whichever option is finally decided upon, a merger with other police forces would be met with considerable scepticism among local residents. It advised that the challenge for Cumbria Constabulary and Cumbria Police Authority will be to communicate to residents the reasons why a particular option is chosen and alleviate their concerns about the effect of a merger.

2.4 Police Authority Engagement

2.4.1 Police Authority Stakeholder Identification

Cumbria Police Authority Chair, Vice Chair, Chief Executive and Treasurer have been personally involved in the progress of the police structures review. The full Police Authority has been involved through seminars and consideration of the outline business case and an update report.

2.4.2 Engagement in Option Appraisal

The Police Authority Chair is a member of the local project team. The Chair and senior Police Authority staff attended weekly update meetings with the local project team. They worked with the Constabulary to identify stakeholders, design the questionnaires and carry out interviews. Police Authority members and senior staff attended Community Liaison meetings. The Chair, Vice Chair, Chief Executive and the Treasurer were members of the Executive Panel. The full Police Authority has attended 2 special seminars and in formal Authority meetings has considered the outline business case (27th October), the work in progress business case (28th November) and final business case (15th December).

2.4.3 Challenges and Issues

The Police Authority has written to the Home Secretary expressing concern at the timescales for the police structures review. These have meant that Police Authority members had less than seven days to consider some written reports. The Police Authority has also expressed concern that the critical questions of governance (including Police Authority structures), funding for the costs of change and precepts have yet to be addressed by the Home Office Police Structures Central Support Team.

Cumbria Police Authority is mindful of the public response to proposals for merger in Cumbria. It has been particularly concerned that any proposals intended to improve protective services do not diminish the excellent citizen focus of policing services in Cumbria. It wants to be confident that the future budget requirements and funding streams will be sufficient for the two options to meet both set-up costs and support the required investment in protective services, whilst maintaining current levels of neighbourhood policing. It is also concerned to ensure that any decision will not impact adversely on council taxpayers in Cumbria.

The Authority considers that the funding of set-up and transitional costs would ideally be met by government grant, however early indications are that this may not be possible. It therefore required that any case for voluntarily merging with another forces or forces be sufficient to justify borrowing to meet the set-up costs, if Government determine that these should be covered by capitalisation directives and met by borrowing.

Cumbria Police Authority has acknowledged that it has the highest council tax in the North West region at £155.43. Assuming that a new Authority would levy its precept evenly across the area of a merged force, residents in lower taxed areas could see council tax rise without any visible improvements in service. Cumbria Police Authority acknowledges that any harmonisation of council tax may have to be achieved over several years and will require government regulations to achieve this.

The Association of Police Authorities has recommended that no authority pursue voluntary merger before the Home Secretary resolves the following issues:

- An appropriate timescale for proper community consultation coupled with satisfactory arrangements for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny.
- Funding and financial issues.
- Governance and accountability arrangements.

Political Opposition

Some local councils have passed motions which state their clear opposition to any merger:

- Cumbria County Council.
- Carlisle City Council.
- South Lakeland District Council (disappointed that no change is not an option).

Local members of parliament have also publicly expressed concern about the proposals. Local political concerns are centred on the potential loss of jobs in support

services in Cumbria and the significant potential impact that this may have on the fragile local economy. Other concerns include the impact of a merger with urban areas on the successful local policing style in Cumbria and the perception that police officers may be redeployed to urban areas.

2.5 Concluding Observations

Information from stakeholders has been a key consideration in risks and benefits assessments. Stakeholder engagement will continue a key feature of further investigation and analysis.

3: Option Identification and Discounting

3.1 Approach

3.1.1 Approach to Option Identification

The HMIC study *Closing the Gap* provides evidence to support the formation of strategic forces. The Home Secretary has made clear his presumption against any proposal where new force areas would subdivide an existing force area between two or more new forces. The Home Office also required that new force areas should not cross government office regional boundaries.

Accordingly, collaborative, lead force and federated approaches to improving protective services were discounted. Only options for strategic forces within the North West region boundaries and reflecting current force borders were considered.

Cumbria only borders Lancashire Constabulary in the region and so an assumption was made that Cumbria and Lancashire would need to be joined in all options, to secure logical geographic boundaries. HMIC has provided evidence that only forces exceeding 4,000 police officers have sufficient capacity to meet national standards in both protective services and neighbourhood policing. The North West regional project team therefore identified all permutations that joined Cumbria and Lancashire and delivered strategic forces of over 4,000 officers.

Cumbria Constabulary has 1,260 officers and so was discounted as an option for a strategic force at this stage.

3.1.2 Options Identified

The structural options joining Cumbria and Lancashire and delivering strategic forces of over 4,000 officers were:

		Police Officers	Staff	Officers Plus Staff
1	Cumbria, Lancashire	4,846	2,625	7,471
	Cheshire, GMP, Merseyside	14,665	6,758	20,670
2	Cumbria, Lancashire	4,846	2,625	7,471
	Cheshire, Merseyside	6,546	3,524	10,070
	GMP	8,119	3,662	11,781
3	Cumbria, Lancashire	4,846	2,625	7,471
	Cheshire, GMP	10,326	4,880	15,206
	Merseyside	4,339	2,306	6,645
4	Cumbria, Lancashire, Cheshire	7,053	3,843	10,896
	GMP, Merseyside	12,458	5,968	18,426

5	Cumbria, Lancashire, Cheshire	7,053	3,843	10,896
	GMP	8,119	3,662	11,781
	Merseyside	4,339	2,306	6,645
6	Cumbria, Lancashire, Merseyside	9,185	4,931	14,116
	GMP, Cheshire	10,326	4,880	15,206
7	Cumbria, Lancashire, GMP	12,965	6,287	19,252
	Cheshire, Merseyside	6,546	3,524	10,070
8	Cumbria, Lancashire, Cheshire, Merseyside	11,392	6,149	17,541
	GMP	8,119	3,662	11,781
9	Cumbria, Lancashire, Cheshire, GMP	15,172	7,505	22,677
	Merseyside	4,339	2,306	6,645
10	Regional structure	19,511	9,811	29,322

Other forces in the region assessed options outside this range. As these do not directly involve Cumbria and were subsequently discounted, they are not considered in this paper.

3.1.3 Stakeholder Engagement in Option Identification

Given the timescales, it was not possible to formally engage stakeholders in identifying the options.

3.2 Elimination of Options

3.2.1 Elimination of Unfeasible Options Prior to Initial Analysis

The North West regional project team carried out the first stage of discounting options, in round table discussions. This group included representatives from all forces in the region and involved:

- Assistant and Deputy Chief Constables.
- Protective services specialists of Superintendent and Chief Inspector ranks.
- Strategic development specialist police staff and police officers.

Options that included Merseyside remaining as a stand-alone force were discounted because the 4,000 police officers threshold was only just met. This provided only minimum capacity for protective services, with insufficient future-proofing or contingencies for changing demand. This eliminated options 3,5 and 9.

		Police Officers	Staff	Officers Plus Staff
3	Cumbria, Lancashire	4,846	2,625	7,471
	Cheshire, GMP	10,326	4,880	15,206
	Merseyside	4,339	2,306	6,645
5	Cumbria, Lancashire, Cheshire	7,053	3,843	10,896
	GMP	8,119	3,662	11,781
	Merseyside	4,339	2,306	6,645
9	Cumbria, Lancashire, Cheshire, GMP	15,172	7,505	22,677
	Merseyside	4,339	2,306	6,645

Options that joined Merseyside and GMP together in a sub-regional structure were discounted, because this would lead to one force being significantly bigger than the other in the region. This regional imbalance would obstruct effective intelligence sharing and joint working. It would lead to unevenness in funding, which would become focussed around urban hubs. This eliminated options 1 and 4.

		Police Officers	Staff	Officers Plus Staff
1	Cumbria, Lancashire	4,846	2,625	7,471
	Cheshire, GMP, Merseyside	14,665	6,758	20,670
4	Cumbria, Lancashire, Cheshire	7,053	3,843	10,896
	GMP, Merseyside	12,458	5,968	18,426

Option 7, which joined Cumbria, Lancashire and GMP, was similarly discounted because it would lead to one force being significantly bigger than the other in the region.

		Police Officers	Staff	Officers Plus Staff
7	Cumbria, Lancashire, GMP	12,965	6,287	19,252
	Cheshire, Merseyside	6,546	3,524	10,070

The North West regional project team findings were considered and approved at a meeting of the Chief Constables and Police Authority Chairs. They concluded that, in addition to the previously identified shortcomings, options to merge Cumbria, Lancashire and Cheshire would not support operational effectiveness, because Lancashire does not share a border with Cheshire.

Chief Constables and Police Authority Chairs also discounted Option 10, the regional structure, for the following reasons:

- a. At nearly 6,300 square miles the geographic size of North West regional force would prevent effective and efficient operations and command.
- b. With over 29,000 staff the span of command would be too great to effectively drive the organisation and performance improvement.
- c. Given the size of a regional force, visible leadership would be almost impossible to achieve (particularly in the most northern rural areas).
- d. Inclusion of both major urban conurbations in a force would lead to polarisation around these hubs, to the exclusion of rural areas.
- e. Inclusion of both major urban conurbations in a force would drive asset stripping of policing in the counties.

- f. Assuming that population numbers would determine the number of Police Authority members from each county in a merged force, inclusion of both major urban conurbations in a force would lead to under-representation and disengagement of rural areas.
- g. The regional option would require the most complex change of all options, presenting the greatest risk of net cost and disruption to services.

		Police Officers	Staff	Officers Plus Staff
10	Regional structure	19,511	9,811	29,322

3.2.2 Options for Initial Analysis

After discounting, three options remained for the structure of strategic forces in the region. The Chief Constables and Police Authority Chairs agreed that these were the options that would be assessed. When considering these options, Cumbria Constabulary assessed only the strategic forces that they would join. The following options for Cumbria were taken forward to the protective services, organisational and cost assessments during October 2005:

	Police Officers	Staff	Officers Plus Staff
Cumbria, Lancashire (2)	4,846	2,625	7,471
Cumbria, Lancashire, Merseyside (6)	9,185	4,931	14,116
Cumbria, Lancashire, Cheshire, Merseyside (8)	11,392	6,149	17,541

3.2.3 Elimination of Options by Outline Business Case

The Outline Business Case was submitted to the Home Office on 28th October. It recommended that no further options be discounted at this early stage.

The early analysis found that the Cumbria and Lancashire option could be expected to provide for some protective and other service improvements, to resonate best with communities and to involve the least complex change. However, a risk was identified that this option might not provide sufficient capacity to meet protective service challenges over a longer time horizon.

The Cumbria, Lancashire, Merseyside and Cheshire option was assessed as providing the greatest capacity and the biggest improvements in protective services. Significant risks were identified, by excluding Cheshire from the Manchester part of its criminality and by isolating Greater Manchester Police in the region. Further, the geographic size and complexity of this strategic force was flagged as a possible barrier to realising performance benefits.

The Cumbria, Lancashire, Merseyside option was assessed as improving capacity, capability and match to criminal geography, which would enable a step improvement in protective services and overall performance. It was judged an appropriate

configuration to support other strategic forces in the region. At this very early stage in the process, this was considered the preferred option.

The analysis acknowledged that some key information had not been available, including full stakeholder engagement and reliable costs and savings analyses. It concluded that further investigation was essential for all three options.

Cumbria Police Authority wrote to the Home Secretary on 28th October reserving its position on these three options, given the information available at that early stage and stating a preference that Cumbria Constabulary remain unchanged. This reintroduced an option that had earlier been discounted.

3.2.4 Elimination of Options Following Home Office Quality Assurance

The Home Office reviewed the outline business cases received from the North West region and briefed Ministers on the strengths and weaknesses of the various scenarios. In doing so, it took into account the arguments put forward in each force and Police Authority submission. It also considered the national perspective and the need to create a balanced and resilient landscape for policing throughout England and Wales.

The Home Office recommended that the Cumbria, Lancashire, Merseyside and Cheshire option be discounted. Although it met criteria on size of force, only one force and authority in the region supported its development. Further, it presented concerns in relation to geography and infrastructure links.

The Home Office also recommended that the Cumbria stand-alone option (recommended by Cumbria Police Authority) be discounted. It found that this option did not meet criteria on size of force and was unlikely to deliver sufficient capacity and capability to meet the requirements for provision of protective services to national standards.

Following Home Office advice and taking into account the resources that would be required to investigate options that were likely to be unfeasible, Chief Officers and Police Authorities agreed that these options should be discounted.

3.2.5 Options for Regional Cost Benefit Analysis

In early November, the options for further cost benefit analysis were confirmed by the Regional Project Team as:

Option 1: Three strategic forces:	Lancashire and Cumbria Cheshire and Merseyside GMP stand-alone
Option 2: Two strategic forces:	Lancashire, Cumbria and Merseyside Cheshire and GMP

These options meet the HMIC criteria on size of force and demonstrate the potential

capacity to provide protective services to national standards without adverse impact on policing services at the neighbourhood level.

3.2.6 Stakeholder Engagement in Discounting Options

Given the timescales, it was not possible to formally engage Cumbrian stakeholders in discounting unfeasible options prior to the initial assessment. Reliance was placed on the knowledge and expertise of specialists from across the region.

Partners, members of the public, community leaders and groups, staff associations and unions, senior managers and the Police Authority in Cumbria have had the opportunity to comment on options for change during October and November.

3.2.7 Challenges and Issues

GMP wrote to the Home Office early in November, stating its intention to assess only the GMP stand-alone option (Option 1), but that it would continue to support the regional work assessing both options. While other forces preferred to compare both Options in the cost, risk and benefit assessment, GMP's decision to discount Option 2 has raised questions over its feasibility.

3.3 Concluding Observations

The option discounting process has involved experts at local, regional and national levels. It has also reflected the interests of internal and external stakeholders from across the region, through each force's outline business cases and Police Authority submissions. It has arrived at two options that, while recognising the region's geographical size and complexity, provide for appropriate capacity, a balanced regional structure and effective command and governance.

4: Current Position and Option Appraisal

4.1 Approach

4.1.1 Options Assessed

Following the discounting process detailed in Section 3, two options were assessed:

Option 1: Three strategic forces:	Lancashire and Cumbria Cheshire and Merseyside GMP stand-alone
Option 2: Two strategic forces:	Lancashire, Cumbria and Merseyside Cheshire and GMP

4.1.2 The Project Teams

The regional project team comprised senior representatives from each force in the region and was chaired by the Assistant Chief Constable (Organisational Development and Partnerships) from Cumbria. It included Chief Officers, protective services, local policing and support service specialists. This team led and coordinated the regional cost, risk and benefit assessments, which was delivered by a virtual taskforce made up of each force's local project teams. It worked closely with the regional representative of the Home Office Police Structures Central Support Team.

The local project team in Cumbria Constabulary comprised Assistant Chief Constable (Organisational Development and Partnerships), a Chief Superintendent with 30 years experience, the Director of Strategic Development, a finance manager and an office manager. The Police Authority Chair took part in the team as an observer. Police Authority officers led external stakeholder engagement. The team received a high level of support from the Head of Communications and Marketing.

4.1.3 Initial Assessments for Outline Business Cases

The initial assessment process closely followed detailed Home Office Guidance, provided on 7th October. It began with joint information sharing across the region. Key sources of information included:

- HMIC protective services and Baseline assessments.
- Police Standards Unit performance assessments.
- ACPO Level 2 Policing review.
- Strategic Threat Assessments.
- Force profile information.
- The Home Office Business Planning Tool and other cost information.

Each force and Authority began stakeholder consultation and carried out initial estimates of costs and savings for each change option.

Expert Panels were established in each force, made up of local protective services specialists. The Expert Panels assessed the current performance of protective services in their force and forecast the protective services performance arising from each of the options for change. The full range of protective services was included:

Serious and Organised Crime
Public Order
Critical Incident Management
Civil Contingencies and Emergency Planning
Strategic Roads Policing
Major Crime
Counter Terrorism and Allied Matters

Executive Panels were also established in each force, made up of Chief Officers and senior managers, Police Authority representatives and partner representatives. The Executive Panels assessed the current overall performance of forces and forecast the expected overall organisational impacts of each of the structural options.

All of the panels applied the same detailed criteria to the assessments, provided by the Home Office, under the following headings:

Capacity
Capability
Performance
Criminality
Geography
Co-terminosity
Identity
Governance
Economics
Risk

The protective service and organisational assessments of each force provided detailed information about each option's risks and benefits for the outline business case, submitted by each force at the end of October. The resulting analyses have been shared around the North West region and have been absorbed into this business case as appropriate.

4.1.4 Regional Risks and Benefits Assessment

The regional risks and benefits assessment has built on the initial assessments by individual forces. It evaluated the ability of each structural option to deliver three core policing responsibilities simultaneously:

1. **Delivering protective services to national standards.**
2. **Developing neighbourhood policing to national standards.**
3. **Securing an affordable strategic and support infrastructure.**

The regional project team identified seven areas requiring regional assessment as part of developing a business case for change:

1. Protective services.
2. Neighbourhood policing.
3. Human Resources and Training.
4. Information and Communication Technology.
5. Finance and Resources.
6. Criminal Justice.
7. Governance (Authority structures/ ACPO structures/ merged force structures).

The risks and benefits associated with work streams 1-6 were identified by regional panels of senior managers from the relevant professions, facilitated by members of the regional project team. The Constabulary's senior managers have validated them. This approach provided a genuinely regional perspective, allowed misunderstandings to be corrected and assumptions to be shared.

Work on governance focussed on securing local consensus on high level principles for the Authority, Chief Officer and organisational structures of the proposed merged forces.

4.1.5 Regional Financial Assessment

Home Office Costing Guidance was received on 10th November. A meeting of North West region finance directors and managers on 14th November considered this guidance, alongside the available time and information. It determined a regional method and assumptions for a indicative costing exercise, which are broadly in line with the guidance, support completion of the Home Office toolkit and meet the Home Office requirement to **“communicate as far as possible the general order of magnitude of any additional costs and efficiency gains.”**

The region agreed to use the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy benchmark costs and statistics for 2005/6. Cumbria, Lancashire and Merseyside force finance staff have worked cooperatively to produce the indicative costings for both of the strategic forces involving Cumbria. They identified anomalies in the 2005/6 statistics and so have applied 2004/5 data as appropriate.

Constraints

The national terms and conditions for personnel change management during police force mergers have not yet been developed and these are a key factor in calculating the costs of change. A national scheme is awaited and reasonable assumptions have been made in the meantime.

Forces are configured differently and spend their money differently, this leads to a risk that costs comparisons may not always compare like with like. For example, Cumbria and Lancashire Constabularies' "supplies and services" figures are significantly different; in Cumbria IT services are largely outsourced and are shown as supplies and services, while in Lancashire IT is mainly provided in-house and so is not shown under this heading. Finance experts have attempted to minimise these differences by jointly scrutinising base data.

Costing must be carried out on an estimated and indicative basis until the structure, staffing, estate and infrastructure of the merged forces is firm. Costs will therefore be estimates until any implementation phase is significantly progressed. However, the methodology applied is sufficiently robust to show the general magnitude of costs and savings, as required. A contingency provision has been made to reflect the risks and uncertainties attaching to these high level estimates.

The Home Office has quality assured work on costs and savings and feedback is expected by 13th December. Work continues with Lancashire Constabulary and Merseyside Police to interrogate and validate the data, which is also expected to be complete by this date. Additional cost and savings information will subsequently be added to this paper, before submission to the Home Office on 23rd December.

Assumptions for Savings

The indicative costing exercise must necessarily make a number of high-level assumptions about the future structure of the Police Authority and Constabulary of the proposed strategic forces. The detailed assumptions about what savings might be achievable have been designed and agreed by the regional finance directors. The main areas of assumed saving are:

- Management and support service salary costs, from combining functions in a merged force.
- Supplies and services costs, based on the increased purchasing power of a bigger organisation.

Assumptions for Costs

Detailed assumptions about the likely costs of merging forces have also been designed and agreed by the regional finance directors. The main costs relate to integrating IT systems and harmonising personnel pay and conditions.

4.2 Current Position Appraisal

4.2.1 Configuration of Current Position

Cumbria Constabulary's strategic aim is **to inspire trust and confidence in its policing services, so that the people of Cumbria feel safe, satisfied and reassured**. The Constabulary's policing style is based on community responsiveness and partnership working.

The Constabulary operates local policing through 19 local policing teams organised within three Basic Command Units that are coterminous with partners and reflect natural geographic barriers. An Operational Support department operates all protective services from Headquarters in Penrith. While budgets have a high level of devolvement, the support infrastructure is largely centralised to secure strong governance and efficiency.

The Chief Constable has a deputy and two assistants, one operational and one organisational. The Police Authority has 17 members and is also based at Police Headquarters.

4.2.2 Current Position Risks

Delivering Protective Services to National Standards

HMIC has assessed the Constabulary's capability to deal with serious, organised and cross border crime, critical incidents and counter terrorism as poor. Cumbria Constabulary has the lowest capacity and capability on protective services in the North West region.

The Expert Panel in Cumbria, made up of local protective services specialists, also judged that the Constabulary does not meet national standards. It highlighted the low dedicated capacity for protective services in Cumbria, with under-developed systems and processes.

In the 2004/5 Baseline Assessment, HMIC highlighted that Cumbria Constabulary has no dedicated major incident team, surveillance team or dedicated analytical capability for protective services. This review assessed the Constabulary's ability to tackle Level 2 criminality as poor and reported 27 areas for improvement.

The key risks in the current configuration relate to the Constabulary's small capacity. Serious crime and major incidents already disrupt performance in other areas, particularly neighbourhood policing.

Developing Neighbourhood Policing to National Standards

Cumbria Constabulary introduced neighbourhood policing earlier than the national scheme and has excellent performance in terms of citizen focus. However, there are risks to its further development of neighbourhood policing to national standards, which also relate to the Constabulary's capacity.

The primary risk to neighbourhood policing in the Constabulary is that when serious crime and major incidents occur, the Constabulary must abstract resources from local policing teams to address them. This disrupts otherwise strong performance in other areas, particularly neighbourhood policing, for example:

- a) HMIC's 2004/5 Baseline Assessment reported neighbourhood policing in Cumbria as only fair and stable.

- b) Cumbria’s performance is generally not improving compared to Lancashire and Merseyside (except in investigating crime), even where data shows that our current performance is better.
- c) Increases in criminal damage and low-level violent crime in Cumbria.

The Constabulary’s readiness for compliance with national neighbourhood policing standards was recently assessed. While the Constabulary was ready in most aspects, areas for development remain which would ideally be supported by ring-fenced capacity:

- There were no dedicated project teams at BCU level for developing neighbourhood policing at BCU level (a project manager is now in place for the Barrow pilot scheme).
- The project manager for the Constabulary neighbourhood policing programme is not a dedicated resource and project plans are work in progress.
- Community intelligence is captured, but there is no dedicated analytical support and it is not integrated with the National Intelligence Model.
- A policy is required to minimise police officer abstraction from neighbourhood policing.

The Police Authority have made significant investment in local policing teams before being “nominated for capping” by the government, but now, due to current funding constraints, the Constabulary is not in a position to significantly increase the number of police officers or Police Community Support Officers available to neighbourhood policing.

Affordable Support and Strategic Infrastructure

A key risk in current service delivery is the Constabulary’s capacity to successfully drive through the huge changes required by the police reform agenda. National strategies, standards and schemes are being introduced across support functions on a regular basis. The volume and complexity of change has recently necessitated the removal of 17 police officers from BCUs to corporate projects. In particular, following the Bichard Report into the Soham Murders, comprehensive improvements are required to information and technology infrastructure, which will require significant and sustained investment.

HMIC’s Baseline Assessment of the Constabulary’s support services is shown below. While a range of developments has improved support services since HMIC’s visit early in 2005, the bar will be raised again for the 2006 Assessment.

Summary of Judgements	Grade	Direction of Travel
Professional Standards	Not Graded	Not Graded
Criminal Justice Processes	Fair	Stable
Call Management	Fair	Improved
Human Resource Management	Poor	Improved
Training and Development	Poor	Stable
Race and Diversity	Fair	No Direction
Resource Management	Fair	Stable
Science and Technology Management	Fair	Improved
Strategic Management	Good	Stable
Performance Management	Fair	Improved

Other Risks

The Police Service Efficiency Strategy requires Cumbria Constabulary to make 3% efficiency savings each year, half of which must be in real cash terms. The Constabulary has progressively improved its efficiency for five years and all material savings within its current configuration have already been made. In order to continue making savings, the Constabulary must consider innovative options, such as collaborative support services.

Cumbria Police Authority expects a deteriorating financial position, following a national review of grant funding and the anticipated adoption of any one of the four options put forward for consultation. The Authority's Medium Term Financial Forecast to 2008-09 suggests that significant budget savings will be required. It may therefore be necessary to use efficiency savings to meet budget shortfalls, meaning that they will not be reinvested in policing. While the Constabulary is currently considering options to make savings, it is already apparent that these will increasingly impact its current performance levels.

4.2.3 Current Position Benefits

Delivering Protective Services to National Standards

The Expert Panel in Cumbria assessed the baseline position as having a strong fit to community geographies, effective partnership and political links. While the Constabulary has limited dedicated resources for protective services, it has responded effectively to serious crimes (e.g. M6 Shooting, Baby Lara) and to major incidents (e.g. Carlisle Storms).

Developing Neighbourhood Policing to National Standards

Cumbria Constabulary's performance is particularly strong in the citizen focus domain. The Constabulary secures some of the highest rates of user satisfaction and public confidence in the country. It enjoys excellent links with the communities it polices. In recent years, the Constabulary and Police Authority have strived to respond to public requests for increased visibility and have secured appropriate levels of rural policing. The Neighbourhood Policing Readiness Assessment has found that the Constabulary has the majority of appropriate arrangements in place.

The Constabulary has effective partnership links, particularly through the Local Criminal Justice Board, which has achieved significant and above target performance improvements. It is playing an active role in the current development of a potentially powerful Cumbria Strategic Partnership.

Analysis of 2004/5 performance finds Cumbria's detection rates are better than Lancashire and Merseyside and overall they are improving.

Affordable Support and Strategic Infrastructure

The Constabulary has met and exceeded its annual efficiency targets since they were introduced.

Local Criminal Justice Boards figures show that Cumbria is one of the best forces at bringing more offenders to justice in the country and performing better than both Lancashire and Merseyside.

Other Benefits

The public survey carried out for this police structures review shows a very high degree of satisfaction with policing in Cumbria as it is (72%).

4.2.4 Current Position Financial Information

The cost of providing policing services in Cumbria Constabulary is relatively high, as illustrated in the tables below. This is in part driven by the additional costs of policing sparse communities in a geographically challenging environment, but also by the introduction of neighbourhood policing in 2003, ahead of the national initiative.

	2004/05 Band D Precept (£)	2005/06 Band D Precept (£)
Cheshire	97.71	102.60
Cumbria	150.28	155.43
GMP	98.52	105.41
Lancashire	100.70	107.72
Merseyside	110.17	115.68

	Gross Revenue Expenditure 2004/5 (GRE) £000	GRE Per Capita £	Supplies and Services % GRE	Premises % GRE	Transport % GRE	Total % GRE
Cheshire	155,385	1.74	8.4	3.8	2.4	14.6
Cumbria	84,140	1.94	10.8	3.7	2.6	17.1
Lancashire	243,364	1.60	8.4	2.8	2.7	13.8
Merseyside	288,932	1.69	10.5	2.5	2.0	15.0
Average			9.4	3.0	2.4	14.8

4.2.5 Concluding Observations on the Current Position

Cumbria Constabulary has a sound history of good performance at local level, with particular strengths in building public satisfaction and confidence. It is well placed to deliver neighbourhood policing to national standards, although developments are put at risk when local resources are abstracted to deal with serious incidents.

The Constabulary has so far dealt effectively with serious crime, major incidents and the other challenges presented to it. However, given its small size, it does not provide the capacity to successfully meet future increased threats from serious and organised crime and terrorism, without adversely affecting its performance in other services.

A difficult financial environment may also increasingly threaten the Constabulary’s current performance levels.

Summary of Current Position

Core Policing Responsibility	Ability to Meet National Standards
Delivering Protective Services	Red not expected to meet standards
Developing Neighbourhood Policing	Amber could meet standards if risks managed
Affordable Infrastructure	Amber could meet standards if risks managed

4.3 Option 1 (Cumbria and Lancashire) Appraisal

4.3.1 Option 1 Configuration

Option 1 is the merger of Cumbria and Lancashire Constabularies into a strategic force, a possible configuration is noted below for illustrative purposes.

The Police Authority may wish to consider whether a 23 Member Police Authority may be most appropriate for this strategic force, to maximise Cumbrian representation.

An illustrative Chief Officer structure might include:

- Chief Constable.
- Deputy Chief Constable.
- Assistant Chief Constable: partnerships, criminal justice.
- Assistant Chief Constable: territorial operations.
- Assistant Chief Constable: protective services.
- Assistant Chief Officer: personnel and development.
- Assistant Chief Officer: finance and resources.

It may be appropriate to have two Assistant Chief Constables for territorial operations: one for the rural north and one for the more urban south.

During the transition period, it may be appropriate to retain one additional chief officer to oversee the change process.

The policing style of this strategic force should be firmly based on neighbourhood policing. Delegation and devolvement to BCUs would be maximised in a bigger geographical environment.

While protective services would be line managed centrally, it would be necessary and appropriate for these services to operate from satellite hubs across the merged force.

The BCU structures of the merged forces would ideally remain unchanged, to protect co-terminosity with partners.

All appropriate support functions would be devolved to BCUs. The remaining corporate services would be centrally managed, but it will be necessary in some cases to maintain outlying hubs to support quality of service to the front line.

The key data for Option 1 is:

Police Officers	Staff	Officers Plus Staff	Area Sq Miles	Population 000	Total Crime 04/05
4,846	2,625	7,471	4,628	1,988	195,343

4.3.2 Option 1 Risks

Delivering Protective Services to National Standards

Option 1 passes the critical threshold of 4,000 police officers identified by HMIC. However, capacity is seen as a key enabler of effective protective services and this option provides less overall capacity than Option 2. Local and regional protective services experts identified that Option 1 may not provide sufficient dedicated resources to “close the gap” in North West protective services, or to protect local policing. Although the current capacity threshold is passed, experts have raised the question of whether Option 1 would have the capacity to meet any future increases in the threat from serious and organised crime, terrorism and domestic extremism.

Regional coordination will remain a critical success factor in either of the two options. The Expert Panels considered that Option 1 might not support regional collaboration as effectively as Option 2. Regional coordination is less likely to be effective with three strategic forces than with two. Experts have expressed the view that counter terrorism would benefit more from a regional or national approach than either proposed regional structure.

Lancashire Constabulary has sound protective services arrangements, but recognises the need to develop its capacity to meet future demand. Significant investment would be required in protective services to bring the merged force to the same level as Lancashire is now and to provide further development to meet new demands. If the merger did not deliver sufficient efficiency savings to achieve this investment, Lancashire’s existing protective services capability may be diluted across a larger geographical area.

There is a risk that the increased protective services resource of a strategic force would not be deployed, through the National Intelligence Model, in Cumbria. Indeed, experts forecast that resource movement may be necessary between existing force areas to target major crimes and threats. Key areas of protective services demand in Lancashire include:

- a) Risk of race related disorder in the Burnley area.

- b) Blackpool will be developing as a Las Vegas style resort.
- c) Lancashire is experiencing a steady increase in the number of asylum seekers and is working with the Immigration Services .
- d) Lancashire has a significant risk profile in terms of hazardous industry, transport operations and natural threats.
- e) Lancashire has a large number of organised crime groups.

The geographic size of this option was assessed as presenting new risks. Cumbria and Lancashire's sparsity and geography could present logistical challenges to public order policing.

A general risk to developing protective services is that the national performance management regime does not measure their performance. This acts as a disincentive to prioritising this area.

The local and regional panels of protective services experts concluded that, overall, Option 1 presents greater risk than Option 2.

Analysis to date suggests that Option 1 does not fully reflect criminal markets in the North West, because it does not include Merseyside, from which organised crime travels to Lancashire and Cumbria. It has not been possible to carry out in depth forecasting of the future protective services environment within the timescales available.

Developing Neighbourhood Policing to National Standards

Cumbria has excellent citizen focus performance and strong neighbourhood policing. There is a risk that disruption caused by the merger could hinder developments in neighbourhood policing. The public may have less confidence in the new force and communities may be less willing to engage during a transitional period. It will be necessary for partners and other external stakeholders to build new relationships with the strategic force. It may also be necessary to divert resources from the front line to deliver the reorganisation. These could all lead to a short-term fall in local policing performance.

Forces currently have different approaches to neighbourhood policing e.g. identification and engagement of neighbourhoods, intelligence processes, performance management, the number of Police Community Support Officers and deployment practices. These may make change more difficult and slow down improvements to neighbourhood policing.

Stakeholders have raised a concern that merging with a more urban force might diminish Cumbria Constabulary's successful local policing style. The Police Standards Unit assessed Lancashire Constabulary as having fair performance in citizen focus, while Cumbria was assessed as excellent. There is a risk that Option 1 may reduce citizen focus performance.

The regional panel for neighbourhood policing noted that Option 1, having lower capacity than Option 2, might not prevent the abstraction of local policing resources to support protective services operations and other organisational requirements.

Either option would increase the complexity of partnership working at corporate level, due to the greater number of partners. This complexity could form a barrier to effective joined-up working.

There is a risk that the national neighbourhood policing model might move resources away from Cumbria. Levels of crime in Cumbria are significantly lower than in Merseyside and Lancashire.

The development of neighbourhood policing in both options might be put at risk by uncertainty about the long-term availability of government funding for Police Community Support Officers.

Affordable Support and Strategic Infrastructure

The main areas of risk for the support and strategic infrastructure relate to the transition to a merged force.

An important risk, raised in all support work streams, is staffing issues related to the proposed change in force structures. Personnel risks are difficult to assess accurately, because the content of the national change management scheme, covering issues such as redundancy and relocation, is unknown. In addition, personnel risks will be partly determined by the configuration of the strategic forces, which are also unknown. However, the following potential staff risks have been highlighted:

- a) Industrial action due to the combination of restructure, pensions reform, workforce modernisation and the national volunteers campaign.
- b) Expectation of increased staff absence during the transition.
- c) The change process may accelerate retirements, leading to significant pension costs and loss of skills and experience.
- d) Potential for increased grievances and Employment Tribunal actions.
- e) Expected loss of key staff, their experience and knowledge, through resignation, redundancy or reluctance to relocate. A short-term fall in capacity may result.
- f) Reduced motivation, performance culture and corporate compliance.

These risks were judged to be lower for Option 1 than Option 2, due to its smaller geographic size and the lower complexity of change.

The integration of the IT infrastructure is a second major area of risk arising from merger. There are significant differences in force IT infrastructures, including access control, Integrated Command and Control Systems and call handling systems. This is expected to make mergers difficult and costly to achieve. There are also significant differences in force IT service management approaches, e.g. whether services are outsourced, which will further increase integration costs. While all forces are moving to the Airwave radio system, there will be costs to reconfigure the Airwave infrastructure. These transitional risks were judged lower for Option 1 than for Option 2, due to lower change complexity and less differences in IT infrastructure and approach.

Aligning policies and processes is expected to be problematic in any merger. Cultural resistance to embracing new processes and practices is expected. There may also

be reduced clarity in controls and systems during the transition, causing a risk to compliance with essential policies. Significant training costs may be required to harmonise processes. There is a risk that performance may fall in some critical support processes during changeover to new arrangements e.g. file preparation for court. The impact of these risks was also assessed to be lower for Option 1 than for Option 2, due to lesser degree of complexity of the change.

All of the forces have contractual commitments, which it may be necessary to revise as part of implementing a merger. Support services have not identified the contracts or carried out an assessment of the costs and risks of amending or terminating them. Contractual commitments might be a barrier to securing the full benefits of change in the short term.

Support functions face a stretching reform agenda and they are fully engaged in improving their services to the front line. During the transition period, there is a risk that crucial developments will be put on hold. Conversely, there is also a risk that existing forces will continue to pursue local initiatives which may later make any merger more difficult.

Local and regional Directors have also identified permanent risks associated with both options for police structures. These relate to the approach taken to implementing a merged force:

- a) Investing in protective services and securing neighbourhood policing development requires the release of savings from management and support functions. However, support service ability to comply with national standards and strategies and so the overall performance of support functions, would be at risk if cost savings were maximised.
- b) The IT issues in both options are very complex; there is a risk that decisions about the IT infrastructure for a strategic force will be taken to secure the fastest possible merger and will not be properly informed by best value principles. By focussing on easy achievability, opportunities might be missed.
- c) There is a risk in any merger that the strengths of each of the involved forces are not fully recognised and that assumptions of “our way is best” will prevent best practice being adopted.
- d) If the structure of support services in a strategic force is centralised, remote central teams may not have the necessary local knowledge or personal contact to provide high quality services.

Additional permanent risks specific to criminal justice functions were identified. The remoteness of Cumbria's main stations and criminal justice units is considered to drive up resource needs and is a logistical challenge to efficient and effective case building. Local Criminal Justice Board figures show that Cumbria performs better than both Lancashire and Merseyside in every category and is first in England and Wales for confidence in the criminal justice system. There is a risk that criminal justice performance would fall in a merged force.

Other Risks

The structure of Option 1 presents additional risks:

- Greater Manchester Police would not have the opportunity to improve performance through merger, because it would continue to stand-alone.

- Cumbria and Lancashire would be the smallest force in the North West region and one of the smallest in the country and so may not secure a desirable level of regional or national influence.

Funding arrangements for the mergers are as yet unknown. It seems likely that no government funding will be available. It is uncertain whether the government will permit the costs of change to be treated as capital expenditure and allow borrowing. If borrowing is required, it will increase the costs of change.

Cumbria Police Authority and Lancashire Police Authority may each face a deteriorating financial position, following a national review of grant funding and the anticipated adoption of any one of the four options put forward for consultation.

Arrangements for precept harmonisation are not yet known. Cumbria Police Authority has higher council tax than Merseyside and Lancashire, following merger council tax could rise in the majority of households in the merged area, with no initial visible improvement in performance.

There are low levels of public and political support for any merger. Most external stakeholders considered that policing in Cumbria would get worse as the result of a merger. 81% of respondents from town and parish councils believed a worse service would be delivered if merger took place, with only 2% believing it would improve.

Stakeholders have expressed concern that, in either option, decisions about policing in Cumbria may be made by a Chief Constable and Police Authority who are remote from the county. Cumbrian residents and other stakeholders are concerned that they will have less say over local policing in a larger force. The Police Authority is concerned to secure sufficient representation for Cumbrian residents in any new Authority, which may be difficult to achieve in a small Authority of 17, 19 or 21 members. There is a risk of a democratic deficit for residents of Cumbria, who may become disengaged from policing.

Local senior managers have expressed concern that the geographic size and complexity of both options may be too large for effective command. There is a risk of bureaucratic decision-making processes in larger organisations.

There is a risk that a merger might result in support staff job losses in Cumbria. The Constabulary is a major employer and job losses could have significant harmful consequences on the local economy, compounding the low levels of white-collar jobs available in the county and the drift of professionals from it.

There is no best practice model or guidance for managing the merger of forces, which is expected to increase the potential transitional risks and change costs.

It has not been possible to develop detailed configurations for either proposed strategic force. Detailed force configurations will be a key determinant of the costs, risks and benefits.

4.3.3 Option 1 Benefits

Delivering Protective Services to National Standards

Lancashire Constabulary has good performance in protective services, for example it is one of the leaders in using Proceeds of Crime Act legislation. This proposed structure will result in no borders in policing of Morecambe Bay and stretches of the M6. Cumbria Constabulary's specialists expect that Option 1 will provide some improvement in protective services capacity, structures, processes and skills. The regional Expert Panel supported this view, expecting the following benefits in protective services from Option 1:

- a) Implementation may be achieved with limited disruption to protective services' daily business.
- b) Improved resilience of forces in the event of major incidents.
- c) Cumbria and Cheshire may benefit from improved protective services capability.
- d) Improved critical incident management facilities due to economies of scale.
- e) Enhanced exposure, experience and skills of incident and investigation managers.
- f) Shared key resources e.g. mounted and air teams.

However, both local and regional experts considered that the degree of benefit was less for Option 1 than Option 2, primarily because capacity is seen as a key enabler for protective services.

Developing Neighbourhood Policing to National Standards

Lancashire Constabulary is one of the top performing forces in the country. It was recently assessed as ready in every aspect to deploy the national neighbourhood policing model. It has strong performance in reducing crime, promoting safety and providing assistance. Option 1 provides the opportunity to improve policing in Cumbria in these areas, for example:

- a) Lancashire has an excellent record on innovative approaches to drugs policing and reducing acquisitive crime e.g. Tower Project.
- b) Lancashire's SLEUTH system provides for real-time briefing of front-line officers.
- c) Lancashire has arrangements for lay advisors in place.
- d) Lancashire achieved a significant crime reduction for violent crime (13%), all robbery and all drug crime and shows consistent performance improvement in most categories of crime.

The regional panel of neighbourhood policing experts identified the following benefits from Option 1:

- a) Greater opportunity for protective services resources to tackle local problems and improved availability of specialist support to neighbourhood policing.
- b) Potential for consistent and best practice approach to neighbourhood policing across larger areas.
- c) Improved ability of local intelligence to identify serious and organised criminals.
- d) There are similar rural policing issues across both Cumbria and Lancashire.
- e) Co-terminosity with other emergency services improved for Merseyside and Cheshire.

- f) GMP risks and benefits are internalised to GMP.
 - g) Business continuity easily maintained in respect of partnership working.
- Overall, the opportunities presented by Option 1 were judged higher than for Option 2, primarily due to the greater geographic and demographic similarity provided by Option 1.

Affordable Support and Strategic Infrastructure

The main benefit of merged support and service infrastructures was identified as economies of scale in service management, provision and procurement.

The benefits for the provision of support services were judged as dependent on the level of savings required from support services by the merger. They might include:

- a) Technology, while a risk, may also enable process alignment and economies of scale. While there is limited benefit from IT consolidation in itself, there are likely to be significant operational benefits that IT can enable. These have not yet been explored.
- b) Processes might be aligned and improved to achieve best practice, which may improve support service performance in the medium to long term.
- c) Alignment of criminal justice processes across a bigger geographical area is expected to support effective partnership working.
- d) Improved capacity to meet the police reform agenda to improve services and deliver national standard and strategies.
- e) Greater ability to specialise in larger support teams, enabling new and improved services.

Lancashire Constabulary has excellent performance in resource usage and Option 1 provides the opportunity for improved arrangements and performance in this area.

A specific benefit of Option 1 for criminal justice is that the courts system already has strong links between the South of Cumbria and North of Lancashire. For example, Lancashire judges sit in Cumbria and vice versa, South Cumbrian criminal and family cases are heard in Lancaster.

Other Benefits

Lancashire is the North West county with which most people in Cumbria are familiar and feel positively inclined towards. This option is the one most supported by the public, politicians and partners. Three quarters of partners, parish and town councils, community leaders and community groups support a merger with Cumbria and Lancashire.

Partners are broadly supportive of this merger, if BCU structures remain unchanged.

4.3.4 Option 1 Indicative Financial Information

The financial information in this paper provides only an indicative estimate of the orders of costs and savings that might be expected from alternative merger

proposals. Its primary objective is to compare the financial implications of different merger options on a like-for-like basis and this has been achieved by using the national toolkit and common assumptions agreed across the North West region. However these assumptions are set at a very high level and have yet to be validated by detailed analysis of the budgets from which costs and savings are expected to arise. As a result the financial information for either option should not be relied upon to forecast the actual financial impact of implementing it in practice. This will be the subject of more detailed work to be undertaken in the coming weeks.

The Home Office has quality assured work on costs and savings and feedback is expected by 13th December. Work continues with Lancashire Constabulary and Merseyside Police to interrogate and validate the data, which is also expected to be complete by this date. Additional cost and savings information will subsequently be added to this paper.

At this stage of work in progress on indicative costs, Option 1 has been estimated to cost in the region of £21m in set-up costs to merge. There will be approximately £52k recurring costs due to staff terms and conditions harmonisation. Savings are expected to be broadly in the region of £5m per year. This implies net efficiencies may be achievable in less than 5 years.

Given that it has not been feasible to carry out the detailed design of forces within the Home Office process and timelines, it has also not been possible to carry out the required level of cost appraisal. For example, the illustrative Chief Officer structures included in this paper suggest different options for Chief Officer numbers, which would make significant differences to savings.

4.3.5 Concluding Observations for Option 1

Option 1 is expected to deliver improved capacity and capability in protective services. There is a risk that improvements will be insufficient to meet demand, deliver national standards, or prevent resources being abstracted from local policing when major incidents occur.

Developments in neighbourhood policing performance might be disrupted during the transition to any merger and there is a risk that the policing style and resources deployed in Cumbria may change. However, Option 1 provides significant benefit to developing neighbourhood policing to national standards across a strategic force, given strong current performance in Lancashire, shared rural policing issues and the potential to apply best practice.

Support and strategic infrastructure may also be disrupted during a merger and there are risks to support service performance if unsustainable savings are required of them. The main infrastructural benefit expected to arise from Option 1 is increased affordability through economies of scale and shared best practice. This will enable investment in improved policing services (protective services and neighbourhood policing). Work on costs and savings is still in progress, but indicates that net efficiency savings would be possible from this option within 5 years.

Summary of Option 1

Core Policing Responsibility	Ability to Meet National Standards
Delivering Protective Services	Amber could meet standards if risks managed
Developing Neighbourhood Policing	Green expected to meet standards
Affordable Infrastructure	Amber could meet standards if risks managed

4.4 Option 2 (Cumbria, Lancashire, Merseyside) Appraisal

4.4.1 Option 2 Configuration

Option 2 is the merger of Cumbria, Lancashire and Merseyside forces into a strategic force, a possible configuration is noted below for illustrative purposes.

The Police Authority may wish to consider whether a 23 Member Police Authority may be most appropriate for this strategic force, to maximise Cumbrian representation.

An illustrative Chief Officer structure might include:

- Chief Constable
- Deputy Chief Constable
- Assistant Chief Constable: partnerships, criminal justice
- Assistant Chief Constable: territorial operations
- Assistant Chief Constable: protective services
- Assistant Chief Officer: personnel and development
- Assistant Chief Officer: finance and resources.

It may be appropriate to have three Assistant Chief Constables for territorial operations: one for the rural north, one for the urban parts of Lancashire and one for Merseyside. During the transition period, it may be appropriate to retain one additional chief officer to oversee the change process.

The policing style of this strategic force should be firmly based on neighbourhood policing. Delegation and devolvement to BCUs would be maximised in a bigger geographical environment. While protective services would be line managed centrally, it would be necessary and appropriate for these services to operate from satellite hubs across the merged force. The BCU structures of the merged forces would ideally remain unchanged, to protect co-terminosity with partners.

All appropriate support functions would be devolved to BCUs. The remaining corporate services would be centrally managed, but it will be necessary in some cases to maintain outlying hubs to support quality of service to the front line.

The key data for Option 2 is:

Police Officers	Staff	Officers Plus Staff	Area Sq Miles	Population 000	Total Crime 04/05
9,185	4,931	14,116	4,881	3,488	366,189

4.4.2 Option 2 Risks

Delivering Protective Services to National Standards

Local and regional protective services experts identified that Option 2 also may not provide sufficient dedicated resources to “close the gap” in North West protective services, or to protect local policing. Regional coordination will remain a critical success factor in both of the proposed regional structures. Experts have expressed the view that counter terrorism would benefit more from a regional or national approach than either proposed regional structure. However, overall these were judged to be lower for Option 2 than for Option 1.

While both Lancashire and Merseyside forces have relatively strong protective services performance, significant investment would be required in protective services to bring them up to national standards. If the merger did not deliver sufficient efficiency savings to achieve this investment, existing protective services capability may be diluted across a larger geographical area.

There is a risk that the increased protective services resource provided by Option 2 would not be deployed, through the National Intelligence Model, in Cumbria. Indeed, experts forecast that resource movement will be likely between existing force areas to target major crimes and threats. Key areas of protective services demand in Lancashire include:

- a) Risk of race related disorder in the Burnley area.
- b) Blackpool will be developing as a Las Vegas style resort.
- c) Lancashire is experiencing a steady increase in the number of asylum seekers and is working with the Immigration Services.
- d) Lancashire has a significant risk profile in terms of hazardous industry, transport operations and natural threats.
- e) Lancashire has a large number of organized crime groups.

Key areas of protective services demand in Merseyside include:

- a) Growth in the Port of Liverpool and John Lennon airport.
- b) High profile events such as premiership football and the Grand National.
- c) Liverpool has a high number of asylum seekers, with the associated social and policing issues.
- d) Gang related crime including murders.
- e) Liverpool will shortly be Capital of Culture.

The geographic size of this option was assessed as presenting significant problems in mobilising in response to public order incidents. Travel times between key locations in each county are significantly longer for Option 2.

A general risk to developing protective services is that the national performance management regime does not measure their performance. This acts as a disincentive to prioritising this area.

It has not been possible to carry out in depth forecasting of the future protective services environment within the timescales available.

Developing Neighbourhood Policing to National Standards

Cumbria has excellent citizen focus performance and strong neighbourhood policing. There is a risk that disruption caused by any merger could hinder developments in neighbourhood policing. The public may have less confidence in the new force and communities may be less willing to engage during a transitional period. It will be necessary for partners and other external stakeholders to build new relationships with the strategic force. It may also be necessary to divert resources from the front line to deliver the reorganisation. These could all lead to a short-term fall in local policing performance. Option 2 is expected to cause greater risk of disruption, due to the lesser match of the new force with community identities and the greater complexity of the new organisation.

Forces currently have different approaches to neighbourhood policing e.g. identification and engagement of neighbourhoods, intelligence processes, performance management, the number of Police Community Support Officers and deployment practices. These may make change more difficult and slow down improvements to neighbourhood policing.

Stakeholders have raised a concern that merging with a more urban force might diminish Cumbria Constabulary's successful local policing style. The Police Standards Unit assessed Lancashire Constabulary as having fair performance in citizen focus and Merseyside as having good performance, while Cumbria Constabulary was assessed as excellent. There is a risk that Option 2 may reduce citizen focus performance.

The regional panel for neighbourhood policing noted that Option 2, while having greater capacity than Option 1, still might not prevent the abstraction of local policing resources to support protective services operations and other organisational requirements.

Either option would increase the complexity of partnership working at corporate level, due to the greater number of partners. This complexity could form a barrier to effective joined-up working.

There is a risk that the national neighbourhood policing model might move resources away from Cumbria. Levels of crime in Cumbria are significantly lower than in Merseyside and Lancashire.

The development of neighbourhood policing in both options might be put at risk by uncertainty about the long-term availability of government funding for Police Community Support Officers.

Affordable Support and Strategic Infrastructure

The main areas of risk for the support and strategic infrastructure relate to the transition to a merged force.

An important risk, raised in all support work streams, is staffing issues related to the proposed change in force structures. Personnel risks are difficult to assess accurately, because the content of the national change management scheme, covering issues such as redundancy and relocation, is unknown. In addition, personnel risks will be partly determined by the configuration of the strategic forces, which are also unknown. However, the following potential staff risks have been highlighted:

- a) Industrial action due to the combination of restructure, pensions reform, workforce modernisation and the national volunteers campaign.
- b) Expectation of increased staff absence during the transition.
- c) The change process may accelerate retirements, leading to significant pension costs and loss of skills and experience.
- d) Potential for increased grievances and Employment Tribunal actions.
- e) Expected loss of key staff, their experience and knowledge, through resignation, redundancy or reluctance to relocate. A short-term fall in capacity may result.
- f) Reduced motivation, performance culture and corporate compliance.

The range and impact of these risks were judged to be higher for Option 2 than Option 1, due to its larger geographic size and the greater complexity of change. Significant Human Resource and Training resources will be required for change management of this option, in advance of any efficiencies being achieved to support them.

The integration of the IT infrastructure is a second major area of risk arising from merger. There are significant differences in force IT infrastructures, including access control, Integrated Command and Control Systems and call handling systems. This is expected to make mergers difficult and costly to achieve. There are also significant differences in force IT service management approaches, e.g. whether services are outsourced, which will further increase integration costs. While all forces are moving to the Airwave radio system, there will be costs to reconfigure the Airwave infrastructure. These transitional risks were judged bigger for Option 2 than for Option 1, due to greater change complexity and more differences in IT infrastructure and approach. In particular, the greatest degree of difference is between Lancashire and Merseyside IT infrastructures.

Aligning policies and processes is expected to be problematic in any merger. Cultural resistance to embracing new processes and practices is expected. There may also be reduced clarity in controls and systems during the transition, causing a risk to compliance with essential policies. Significant training costs may be required to harmonise processes. There is a risk that performance may fall in some critical support processes during changeover to new arrangements e.g. file preparation for court. The impact of these risks was also assessed to be higher for Option 2 than for Option 1, due to greater complexity of the change.

All of the forces have contractual commitments, which it may be necessary to revise as part of implementing a merger. Support services have not identified the contracts or carried out an assessment of the costs and risks of amending or terminating them. Contractual commitments might be a barrier to securing the full benefits of change in the short term.

Support functions face a stretching reform agenda and they are fully engaged in improving their services to the front line. During the transition period, there is a risk

that crucial developments will be put on hold. Conversely, there is also a risk that existing forces will continue to pursue local initiatives which may later make any merger more difficult.

Local and regional Directors have also identified permanent risks associated with both options for police structures. These relate to the approach taken to implementing a merged force:

- a) Investing in protective services and securing neighbourhood policing development requires the release of savings from management and support functions. However, support service ability to comply with national standards and strategies and so the overall performance of support functions, would be at risk if cost savings were maximised.
- b) The IT issues in both options are very complex; there is a risk that decisions about the IT infrastructure for a strategic force will be taken to secure the fastest possible merger and will not be properly informed by best value principles. By focussing on easy achievability, opportunities might be missed.
- c) There is a risk in any merger that the strengths of each of the involved forces are not fully recognised and that assumptions of “our way is best” will prevent best practice being adopted.

There was concern that in the geographically larger Option 2, if the structure of support services in a strategic force is centralised, central teams may not have the necessary local knowledge or personal contact to provide high quality services.

Additional permanent risks specific to criminal justice functions were identified. The remoteness of Cumbria's main stations and criminal justice units is considered to drive up resource needs and is a logistical challenge to efficient and effective case building. Local Criminal Justice Board figures show that Cumbria performs better than both Lancashire and Merseyside in every category and is first in England and Wales for confidence in the criminal justice system. There is a risk that criminal justice performance would fall in a merged force.

Other Risks

GMP is not pursuing Option 2, a position acknowledged by the Home Office. As a result, this regional structure's feasibility is questionable.

Funding arrangements for the mergers are as yet unknown. It seems likely that no government funding will be available. It is uncertain whether the government will permit the costs of change to be treated as capital expenditure and allow borrowing. If borrowing is required, it will increase the costs of change.

Arrangements for precept harmonisation are not yet known. Cumbria Police Authority has higher council tax than Merseyside and Lancashire, following merger council tax could rise in the majority of households in the merged area, with no initial visible improvement in performance.

There are low levels of public and political support for any merger. Option 2 in particular does not have public, political or partner support.

Stakeholders have expressed concern that, in either option, decisions about policing in Cumbria may be made by a Chief Constable and Police Authority who are remote from the county. Cumbrian residents and other stakeholders are concerned that they will have less say over local policing in a larger force. The Police Authority is concerned to secure sufficient representation for Cumbrian residents in any new Authority, which may be difficult to achieve in a small Authority of 17, 19 or 21 members. There is a risk of a democratic deficit for residents of Cumbria, who may become disengaged from policing.

Local senior managers have expressed concern that the geographic size and complexity of both options may be too large for effective command. There is a risk of bureaucratic decision-making processes in larger organisations.

There is a risk that a merger might result in support staff job losses in Cumbria. The Constabulary is a major employer and job losses could have significant harmful consequences on the local economy, compounding the low levels of white-collar jobs available in the county and the drift of professionals from it.

There is no best practice model or guidance for managing the merger of forces, which is expected to increase the potential transitional risks and change costs.

It has not been possible to develop detailed configurations for either proposed strategic force. Detailed force configurations will be a key determinant of the costs, risks and benefits.

4.4.3 Option 2 Benefits

Delivering Protective Services to National Standards

Lancashire Constabulary has good performance in protective services, for example it is one of the leaders in using Proceeds of Crime Act legislation. Merseyside Police have been developing their protective services through innovative Matrix teams and report that they are in a position to meet national standards. They are already compliant with the Civil Contingencies Act. Cumbria Constabulary's specialists expect that Option 2 will provide a step improvement in protective services capacity, performance and governance. The regional Expert Panel supported this view, expecting the following benefits in protective services from Option 2:

- a) Implementation may be achieved with limited disruption to protective services' daily business.
- b) Improved resilience of forces in the event of major incidents.
- c) Cumbria and Cheshire may benefit from improved protective services capability.
- d) Improved critical incident management facilities due to economies of scale.
- e) Enhanced exposure, experience and skills of incident and investigation managers.
- f) Shared key resources e.g. mounted and air teams.
- g) Greater flexibility to tackle cross-border crime effectively, including the development of new specialist capabilities.
- h) Ports would be policed by one force and Manchester Airport would be linked to GMP, improving security.

Both local and regional experts considered that the protective services benefits are broader and of greater impact for Option 2 than Option 1.

Initial analysis has indicated that Option 2 provides an appropriate match with the structure of criminal markets in the North West. It has not been possible to carry out in depth forecasting of the future protective services environment within the timescales available.

Developing Neighbourhood Policing to National Standards

Lancashire and Merseyside are two of the top performing forces in the country. Lancashire was recently assessed as ready in every aspect to deploy the national neighbourhood policing model. It has strong performance in reducing crime, promoting safety and providing assistance. Merseyside Police has operated neighbourhood policing since 2001 and has 1400 neighbourhood officers (during the past year 150 extra have been recruited and 100 have been released from non-operational duties). It performs strongly in reassurance, where it is graded as excellent and in 2004/5 was the most improved of the three forces. Option 2 provides the opportunity to improve neighbourhood policing in Cumbria.

The regional panel of neighbourhood policing experts identified the following benefits from Option 2:

- a) Greater opportunity for protective services resources to tackle local problems and improved availability of specialist support to neighbourhood policing.
- b) Potential for consistent and best practice approach to neighbourhood policing across larger areas.
- c) Improved ability of local intelligence to identify serious and organised criminals.
- d) Business continuity easily maintained in respect of partnership working.

However, overall, the opportunities presented by Option 2 were judged to be less than Option 1, due to limited geographic and demographic similarities.

Affordable Support and Strategic Infrastructure

The main benefit of merged support and service infrastructures was identified as economies of scale in service management, provision and procurement.

The benefits for the provision of support services were judged as dependent on the level of savings required from support services by the merger. They might include:

- a) Technology, while a risk, may also enable process alignment and economies of scale. While there is limited benefit from IT consolidation in itself, there are likely to be significant operational benefits that IT can enable. These have not yet been explored.
- b) Processes might be aligned and improved to achieve best practice, which may improve support service performance in the medium to long term.
- c) Alignment of criminal justice processes across a bigger geographical area is expected to support effective partnership working.
- d) Improved capacity to meet the police reform agenda to improve services and deliver national standard and strategies. Delivery of some national requirements requires a sufficiently large support department capacity.

- e) Greater ability to specialise in larger support teams, enabling new and improved services.

Lancashire has excellent and Merseyside has good performance in resource usage. Option 2 provides the opportunity for improved arrangements and performance in this area.

A specific benefit of Option 2 is that all three forces are currently seeking to replace the same key IT system. Option 2 may provide an immediate economy of scale.

Other Benefits

Merseyside is currently in receipt of Objective 1 Status funding of £1 billion. While this may be lost following economic development, the growth in Liverpool's economy is expected to provide new funding opportunities. Merseyside may be a beneficiary of the funding formula review.

4.4.4 Option 2 Indicative Financial Information

The financial information in this paper provides only an indicative estimate of the orders of costs and savings that might be expected from alternative merger proposals. Its primary objective is to compare the financial implications of different merger options on a like-for-like basis and this has been achieved by using the national toolkit and common assumptions agreed across the North West region. However these assumptions are set at a very high level and have yet to be validated by detailed analysis of the budgets from which costs and savings are expected to arise. As a result the financial information for either option should not be relied upon to forecast the actual financial impact of implementing it in practice. This will be the subject of more detailed work to be undertaken in the coming weeks.

The Home Office has quality assured work on costs and savings and feedback is expected by 13th December. Work continues with Lancashire Constabulary and Merseyside Police to interrogate and validate the data, which is also expected to be complete by this date. Additional cost and savings information will subsequently be added to this paper.

At this stage of work in progress on indicative costs, Option 2 has been estimated to cost in the region of £44m in set-up costs to merge. There will be approximately £3m recurring costs due to staff terms and conditions harmonisation. Savings are expected to be broadly in the region of £11m per year. This implies net efficiencies may be achievable in more than 5 years.

Given that it has not been feasible to carry out the detailed design of forces within the Home Office process and timelines, it has also not been possible to carry out the required level of cost appraisal. For example, the illustrative Chief Officer structures included in this paper suggest different options for Chief Officer numbers, which would make significant differences to savings.

4.4.5 Concluding Observations on Option 2

Option 2 provides a significant increase in operational capacity. Protective services experts judged Option 2 the most likely strategic force structure to enable delivery of protective services to national standards. Experts indicate that the improved protective services will be deployed to target the greatest threats.

Any merger process may disrupt improvements to neighbourhood policing in the short term. Lancashire and Merseyside have strong performance in neighbourhood policing and a merger would provide some opportunities for good practice sharing. However, the demographic and geographic diversity in this proposed strategic force would act as a barrier to the successful development of neighbourhood policing to national standards.

The disruption to support and strategic infrastructure is expected to be significant for implementation of Option 2. The main infrastructural benefit expected is increased affordability through economies of scale and shared best practice. This will enable investment in improved policing services (protective services and neighbourhood policing). Work on costs and savings is still in progress, but indicates that, despite significant start up costs, net efficiency savings would be possible from this option in between 5 and 10 years.

Summary of Option 2

Core Policing Responsibility	Ability to Meet National Standards
Delivering Protective Services	Green expected to meet standards
Developing Neighbourhood Policing	Amber could meet standards if risks managed
Affordable Infrastructure	Amber could meet standards if risks managed

Concluding Observations

Local and regional risk and benefit analyses have shown that both options might be expected to deliver improved protective services performance. Option 1 is predicted to secure delivery of neighbourhood policing to national standards and has the potential to meet the two other core responsibilities if risks are successfully managed. Option 2 is predicted to secure delivery of protective services to national standards and has the potential to meet the two core responsibilities of policing if risks are successfully managed.

Core Policing Responsibility	Current Position	Option 1	Option 2
Delivering Protective Services	Red	Amber	Green
Developing Neighbourhood Policing	Amber	Green	Amber
Affordable Infrastructure	Amber	Amber	Amber

5: Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Approach

Conclusions and recommendations have been drafted by Cumbria Constabulary to take full account of:

- National and local drivers for police structure review.
- The Cumbrian context and public and other stakeholders' views.
- Risks and benefits for Cumbria and the North West region of each option.
- Cost and savings information available to date and the limitations on the additional information that will be available before submission of this paper to the Home Office.
- Shortcomings in the available information that have been identified by the Police Authority, Chief Officers and experts.

They are reported to Cumbria Police Authority for its consideration.

5.2 Concluding Arguments

The Case for Changing Cumbria Constabulary

While there is a strong desire to retain Cumbria Constabulary as it stands, this is not feasible given the resources required to position its protective services to meet future challenges. Even if it were possible to secure sufficient resources for protective services, the level of engagement in essential activities is such that long-term expertise would be difficult to maintain and therefore compliance with national standards would always be at risk.

While neighbourhood policing is a strong performing area, it is always threatened by abstractions in dealing with the protective services environment.

Additionally, in the HMIC Baseline Assessment, some of the Constabulary's support services were not assessed as performing well. Furthermore, the current and future resourcing demands, at a time of a threatening financial future, presents an increasing challenge and difficult agenda to manage as a stand alone Constabulary.

Merger with Lancashire - Risks and Benefits

Merger with Lancashire crosses the capacity threshold and provides an alliance with a force assessed as one of the best forces in the country. Regional experts suggest that it presents less risk to performance during the transition. However, it is uncertain whether this option provides sufficient capability and capacity to enable adequate protective services in the long term and the benefits and efficiencies that could be achieved by a larger merger of forces would diminish.

Merger with Lancashire and Merseyside - Risks and Benefits

Merger with Lancashire and Merseyside would provide for much bigger capacity with an assumption of greater efficiencies. Protective services experts endorse this option. Support service experts are concerned about the risk to current performance presented by the scale of change in this option.

Information Required to Complete Options Assessment

The business case has been produced in less than 50 working days. Within this time the project team has achieved a significant breadth of information, including:

- Research into best practice guidance.
- Unprecedented sharing, comparison and analysis of protective services, performance and organisational information with other North West Forces.
- A comprehensive picture of public, partner and political and staff association and union opinion.
- The expert views of all local and regional specialists in 7 core disciplines.

It was not however possible to secure the following regional information within the available timescales:

- Detailed design of the merged force - this requires proper consideration using best value principles and consultation with multiple stakeholders in each force and Police Authority.
- Actual cost and savings forecasts – this requires the detailed design of each merged force and a clear information on staff change management schemes.
- In depth forecasting of the future protective services environment – this is a new area for development.

Further information has not yet been provided by the Home Office:

- Funding streams.
- Police Authority structures and governance arrangements.
- Precept harmonisation arrangements.
- National scheme to manage staff changes.

Such information would ideally be included in any final decision to merge with another force.

5.3 Final Recommendation

While there is a strong desire to retain Cumbria Constabulary as it stands, this is not feasible if national protective services standards are to be achieved, developments in neighbourhood policing safeguarded and affordable infrastructure secured.

In relation to the two regional options considered, at the present time with the information available within a very tight schedule, the analysis arising from the costs, risks and benefits assessment indicates a marginal preference for merger with Lancashire only.

However, in the case of protective services, the analysis indicates a stronger preference for merger with both Lancashire and Merseyside.

There is no overwhelming case for either option to be distinguished from the other. It should however be noted that the initial costs of change are significantly different for each option and this will of course be a key factor in the final decision.

Any final decision to pursue a merger would ideally be supported by information that it has not been possible to provide within the Home Office timescales, or for which national guidance is awaited:

- Detailed design of the merged force with greater cost appraisal.
- In depth forecasting of the future protective services environment.
- Funding streams.
- Police Authority structures.
- Precept harmonisation.
- National scheme to manage staff changes.

6: The Way Forward

6.1 Additional Information

Any final decision to pursue a merger would ideally be supported by information, which it has not been possible to provide within the Home Office timescales:

- Detailed design of the merged force with greater cost appraisal.
- In depth forecasting of the future protective services environment.

or for which national guidance is awaited:

- Funding streams.
- Police Authority structures.
- Precept harmonisation.
- National scheme to manage staff changes.

Delivering the local information will require intensive joint working with both Lancashire and Merseyside. Proper consultation must be carried out with all affected stakeholders. It is expected to require several months' work.

Delivering the national information needs will require support from the Home Office, Association of Chief Police Officers and the Association of Police Authorities.

6.2 Issues to be Considered in Implementation

Following final selection of the way forward, it is imperative that change planning is both rigorous and realistic to minimise the disruption to police services. National guidance is a critical success factor to an effective process. All forces involved must carry it out jointly.

It is expected that best practice project management arrangements will be required to successfully deliver force mergers. Regional project management arrangements will be essential to coordinate developments in protective and support services and to drive out all the potential benefits of change. Project teams should be established for each merger, with proper representation of the involved forces. Appropriate resourcing will be essential to the success of the change process.

Project plans for the implementation phase must prioritise continued communication and engagement with both internal and external stakeholders to minimise transitional risks.

6.3 Lessons learned

The key lesson learnt in the production of this business case is that when an issue as momentous as police structures is under review, sufficient time must be allowed to build the necessary relationships to gather information and secure consensus. Contingency must be allowed for the information needs of key stakeholders to emerge and to be addressed.

SECTION 7: STATEMENT OF SUPPORT / SIGN OFF

7.1 STATEMENT OF SUPPORT

The following persons, representing the stated organisations below, have contributed to the process of option assessment and selection and fully support the submission of the preferred option for change as detailed in this report:

Signature:

Name:

Organisation:

Date:

Appendix 1: List of Stakeholders Engaged in the Process

Police Stakeholders

Name	Position	Contact Tel	Option Identification	Option Appraisal	Option Selection
Michael Baxter	Chief Constable	01768 891999	Yes	Yes	Yes
Christine Twigg	Acting Chief Constable	01768 891999	Yes	Yes	Yes
Graham Sunderland	Assistant Chief Constable (Operations)	01768 891999	Yes	Yes	Yes
Neil Rhodes	Assistant Chief Constable (Organisation Development and Partnerships)	01768 891999	Yes	Yes - regional project team Chair, local project team leader	Yes
Jenny Davies	Director Strategic Development	01768 891999	Yes	Yes - member of regional and local project team	No (advisor)
Ron Smith	Chief Superintendent Project Team	01768 891999	Yes	Yes - member of regional and local project team	No (advisor)
Garry Horlacher	Chief Superintendent Operational Support, HQ	01768 891999	No	Yes – involved in risks and benefits identification	No
Jon Rush	Detective Superintendent (Ops) Operational Support, HQ	01768 891999	No	Yes - member of Expert Panel	No
Bob Pallas	Detective Superintendent (Support) Operational Support, HQ	01768 891999	No	Yes - member of Expert Panel	No
Andy Carter	Detective Chief Inspector West Cumbria	01768 891999	No	Yes - member of Expert Panel	No
Keith Churchman	Detective Chief Inspector South Cumbria	01768 891999	No	Yes - member of Expert Panel	No
Paul Duhig	Detective Chief Inspector North Cumbria	01768 891999	No	Yes - member of Expert Panel	No
David Harrison	Detective Chief Inspector (Support) Operational Support, HQ	01768 891999	No	Yes - member of Expert Panel	No
Bill Whitehead	Detective Chief Inspector (Operations) Operational Support, HQ	01768 891999	No	Yes - member of Expert Panel	No
Gary Slater	Performance Inspector West Cumbria	01768 891999	No	Facilitated some assessments by Expert Panel	No
Don Spiller	Chief Inspector CJU HQ	01768 891999	No	Yes - member of Expert Panel	No
Rod Mackay	Chief Inspector Civil Contingencies HQ	01768 891999	No	Yes - member of Expert Panel	No

Name	Position	Contact Tel	Option Identification	Option Appraisal	Option Selection
Steve Halliday	Chief Inspector Communications Centre HQ	01768 891999	No	Yes - member of Expert Panel	No
Mike Thompson	Director of Finance and Facilities HQ	01768 891999	No	Yes – involved in costs, risks and benefits identification	No
Nathan Parry	Director of Information Directorate	01768 891999	No	Yes – involved in costs, risks and benefits identification	No
Graham Noble	Director of Personnel and Development	01768 891999	No	Yes – involved in costs, risks and benefits identification	No
Andrew Dobson	Director of Legal Services	01768 891999	No	Yes – involved in risks and benefits identification	No
Jane Goujon	Chairman of Police Federation J.B.B	01768 891999	No	Yes – involved in risks and benefits identification	No
Heather Thompson	UNISON Secretary	01768 891999	No	Yes – involved in risks and benefits identification	No
Robert Qazi	Chair Black Police Association	01768 891999	No	Yes – involved in risks and benefits identification	No
Margaret Woodhouse-Doig	UNISON Chair	01768 891999	No	Yes – involved in risks and benefits identification	No
David Cooke	Finance Manager	01768 81999	No	Yes - provided cost, risks and benefits assessment information	No

External Agency and Public Stakeholders

Name	Agency / Position	Contact Tel	Option Identification	Option Appraisal	Option Selection
Gillian Bishop	Chief Executive Allerdale District Council	01900 3264423	No	Yes – provided information for risks and benefits identification	No
John Stanforth	Chief Executive Copeland District Council	01946 852585	No	Yes – provided information for risks and benefits identification	No
Ian Bruce	Chief Executive Eden District Council	01769 867468	No	Yes – provided information for risks and benefits identification	No
Charles Leyberg	Acting Chief Crown Prosecutor, CPS	01228 882902	No	Yes – provided information for risks and benefits identification	No

Name	Agency / Position	Contact Tel	Option Identification	Option Appraisal	Option Selection
Simon Evans	Chief Executive H.M.C.S	01228 552920	No	Yes – provided information for risks and benefits identification	No
Mike Maiden	Chief Probation Officer	01228 564620	No	Yes – provided information for risks and benefits identification	No
Jamie Reed M.P	Copeland M.P	01946 62024	No	Yes – provided information for risks and benefits identification	No
Peter Stybelski	Chief Executive Cumbria County Council	01228 606060	No	Yes – provided information for risks and benefits identification	No
Tim Farron M.P	Westmorland and Lonsdale	01539 723 403	No	Yes – provided information for risks and benefits identification	No

All remaining MPs and Chief Executives will be contacted in due course.

Organisations Represented at Chief Constable's Consultation Meeting

Allerdale Borough Council
 Barrow Borough Council
 Copeland Borough Council
 Eden District Council
 South Lakeland District Council
 Cumbria County Council
 Cumbria Association of Local Councils
 Crown Prosecution Service
 Her Majesty's Courts Service
 DAT Coordinator
 Cumbria Youth Offending Service
 Connexions Cumbria Ltd
 Cumbria Fire Service
 Cumbria Ambulance Service

Police Authority Stakeholders

Name	Position	Contact Tel	Option Identification	Option Appraisal	Option Selection
R Watson	Chair	01768 217733	Yes – participated in Regional Chiefs and Chairs Meeting	Yes – member of project team, Police Authority lead in stakeholder engagement process, member of Executive Panel	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
C Alcock	Clerk and Chief Executive	01768 217733	Yes – participated in Regional Chiefs and Chairs Meeting	Yes – involved in stakeholder engagement, member of Executive Panel	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
L Slavin	Vice Chair	01768 217733	No	Yes – involved in stakeholder engagement, member of Executive Panel	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
D Thomas	Treasurer	01768 217733	No	Yes – involved in stakeholder engagement, member of Executive Panel	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
R Cole	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
M Ash	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
A Barry	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
C Egan	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
M Johnson	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
J Lashmar	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
C Moth	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
J Nicholson	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
L Shaw	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority

Name	Position	Contact Tel	Option Identification	Option Appraisal	Option Selection
					meetings
W Smith	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
J Woolley	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
S E Donnelly	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Police Authority meetings
J Mallinson	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Seminars and Police Authority meetings
P M Halfpenny	Member	01768 217733	No	No	Yes – attended Police Authority meetings

Appendix 2 – Initial Options Identified and Discounted Options

Home Office guidance states that there is unambiguous evidence to support the formation of strategic forces. The Home Secretary has also stated that there was a presumption against any proposal where new force areas would subdivide an existing force area between two or more new forces. Similarly new force areas should not cross government office regional boundaries. Accordingly, collaborative, lead force and federated options were discounted. Only options for strategic forces within the North West region boundaries and reflecting current force borders were considered.

Option Identification – Schedule			
Option Title	Brief Description	Rationale for Continuing to full Assessment/Costing	Rationale for Discounting Option
1	Cumbria, Lancashire Cheshire, GMP, Merseyside		This would lead to one force being significantly bigger than the other in the region. This regional imbalance would obstruct effective intelligence sharing and joint working. It would lead to unevenness in funding, which would become focussed around urban hubs.
2	Cumbria, Lancashire Cheshire, Merseyside GMP	Sufficient capacity Recognises geographical size and complexity of the region Balanced regional structure Provides for effective command and governance	
3	Cumbria, Lancashire Cheshire, GMP Merseyside		Merseyside remaining as a stand-alone force was discounted because the 4,000 police officers threshold was only just met. This provided only minimum capacity for protective services, with insufficient future-proofing or contingencies for changing demand.
4	Cumbria, Lancashire, Cheshire GMP, Merseyside		This would lead to one force being significantly bigger than the other in the region. This regional imbalance would obstruct effective intelligence sharing and joint working. It would lead to unevenness in funding, which would become focussed around urban hubs.
5	Cumbria, Lancashire, Cheshire GMP Merseyside		Merseyside remaining as a stand-alone force was discounted because the 4,000 police officers threshold was only just met. This provided only minimum capacity for protective services, with insufficient future-proofing or contingencies for changing demand.
6	Cumbria, Lancashire, Merseyside GMP, Cheshire	Sufficient capacity Recognises geographical size and complexity of the region Balanced regional structure Provides for effective command and governance	
7	Cumbria, Lancashire, GMP Cheshire, Merseyside		This would lead to one force being significantly bigger than the other in the region. This regional imbalance would obstruct effective intelligence sharing and joint working. It would lead to unevenness in funding, which would become focussed around urban hubs.

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Option Identification – Schedule			
Option Title	Brief Description	Rationale for Continuing to full Assessment/Costing	Rationale for Discounting Option
9	Cumbria, Lancs, Cheshire, GMP Merseyside		Merseyside remaining as a stand-alone force was discounted because the 4,000 police officers threshold was only just met. This provided only minimum capacity for protective services, with insufficient future-proofing or contingencies for changing demand.
10	Regional structure		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o At nearly 6,300 square miles the geographic size of North West regional force would prevent effective and efficient operations and command. o With over 29,000 staff the span of command would be too great to effectively drive the organisation and performance improvement. o Given the size of a regional force, visible leadership would be almost impossible to achieve (particularly in the most northern rural areas). o Inclusion of both major urban conurbations in a force would lead to polarisation around these hubs, to the exclusion of rural areas o Inclusion of both major urban conurbations in a force would drive asset stripping of policing in the counties. o Assuming that population numbers would determine the number of Police Authority members from each county in a merged force, inclusion of both major urban conurbations in a force would lead to under-representation and disengagement of rural areas. o The regional option would require the most complex change of all options, presenting the greatest risk of net cost and disruption to services.
Cumbria Stand-Alone	No change to current position	Initially discounted, but from full assessment due to not meet the 4,000 police officer threshold. Cumbria Police Authority wrote to the Home Secretary on 28 th October stating their preference that Cumbria Constabulary be unchanged.	The Home Office recommended that this should be discounted because it does not meet HMIC's criteria on size of force and is unlikely to deliver sufficient capacity and capability to meet the requirements for provision of protective services to national standards.
West Coast Option	Lancashire, Cumbria, Merseyside and Cheshire GMP as a standalone strategic force	Continued to initial assessment on the basis that provided sufficient capacity and an appropriate regional structure.	The Home Office recommended that this should be discounted because although it meets HMIC criteria on size of force, only one force and authority in the region supported its development. Further, it would appear to present concerns in relation to geography and infrastructure links.

Appendix 3 Risk Register

Impact assessment = high, medium, or low

Probability assessment = high, medium or low

Option 1: Cumbria and Lancashire

Risk No	Title	Description (Summary) including date/timecales for impact	Impact	Probability	Cost (if known)	Comments	Contingency Identified
1	Protective services capacity	May not provide sufficient dedicated resources to "close the gap" in North West protective services or meet future demand.	H	M			Contingency planning for risks is an implementation issue
2	Protective services regional coordination	Regional coordination is less likely to be effective with three strategic forces than with two.	H	H			
3	Counter terrorism	Counter terrorism would benefit more from a regional or national approach than either proposed regional structure.	M	H			
4	Investment in protective services	If the merger did not deliver sufficient efficiency savings to achieve significant investment in protective services, existing capability may be diluted across a larger geographical area.	H	M			
5	Protective services deployment	Protective services resource in a strategic force may not be deployed, through the National Intelligence Model, in Cumbria.	L	M			
6	Public order policing	Cumbria and Lancashire's sparsity and geography could present logistical challenges to public order policing.	M	M			
7	Protective services performance management	The national performance management regime does not measure protective services performance. This acts as a disincentive to prioritising this area.	L	H			
8	Protective services match to criminal markets	Analysis to date suggests that Option 1 does not fully reflect criminal markets in the North West.	M	H			
9	Protective services future environment	Detailed forecasting of the future protective services environment in the North West has not been carried out.	M	H			

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Risk No	Title	Description (Summary) including date/timecales for impact	Impact	Probability	Cost (if known)	Comments	Contingency Identified
10	Neighbourhood policing disruption – public engagement	The public may have less confidence in the new force and communities may be less willing to engage during a transitional period.	M	M			
11	Neighbourhood policing disruption – partner engagement	It will be necessary for partners and other external stakeholders to build new relationships with the strategic force.	M	H			
12	Neighbourhood policing disruption – resources	It may be necessary to divert resources from the front line to deliver the reorganisation.	L	M			
13	Neighbourhood policing disruption – different practices	Forces currently have different approaches to neighbourhood policing which could slow developments.	M	H			
14	Neighbourhood policing – local style	Merging with a more urban force might diminish Cumbria Constabulary's successful local policing style.	M	M			
15	Citizen focus performance	There is a risk that Option 1 may reduce citizen focus performance (Lancashire and Merseyside have lower performance assessments).	H	M			
16	Neighbourhood policing abstractions	Capacity might not be sufficient to prevent the abstraction of local policing resources to support protective services operations and other organisational requirements.	H	H			
17	Complex partnership working	Increases in the complexity of partnership working at corporate level, due to the greater number of partners, may hinder effective joined-up working.	H	M			
18	Neighbourhood policing deployment	The national neighbourhood policing model might move resources away from Cumbria to other parts of a strategic force.	H	H			
19	PCSO funding	Uncertainty about the long-term availability of government funding for Police Community Support Officers may hinder developments in neighbourhood policing.	M	M			
20	Industrial action	Industrial action may take place due to the combination of restructure, pensions reform,	H	M			

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Risk No	Title	Description (Summary) including date/timecales for impact	Impact	Probability	Cost (if known)	Comments	Contingency Identified
		workforce modernisation and the national volunteers campaign.					
21	Staff absence	Expectation of increased staff absence during the transition.	M	M			
22	Retirements	Change may accelerate retirements, leading to significant pension costs and loss of skills and experience.	M	M			
23	Grievances and ETs	Change may trigger increased grievances and Employment Tribunal actions.	M	M			
24	Loss of key staff	Merger may cause loss of key staff, their experience and knowledge, through resignation, redundancy or reluctance to relocate. A short-term fall in capacity may result.	H	M			
25	IT infrastructure	Significant differences in force IT infrastructures, including access control, Integrated Command and Control Systems and call handling systems, will make change costly and difficult.	H	M			
26	IT service management	Significant differences in force IT service management approaches e.g. whether services are outsourced will make change costly and difficult.	M	H			
27	Airwave	Merger will incur costs to reconfigure the Airwave infrastructure.	M	H			
28	Process change - cultural	Cultural resistance to embracing new processes and practices is expected.	M	H			
29	Process change - training	Significant training costs may be required to harmonise processes.	M	H			
30	Transitional reduction in controls	There may be reduced clarity in controls and systems during the transition, causing a risk to compliance with essential policies.	M	M			
31	Support process disruption	There is a risk that performance may fall in some critical support processes during changeover to new arrangements e.g. file preparation for court.	H	H			
32	Contractual	Support services have not identified the contracts or carried out an assessment of the costs and risks of amending or terminating them. Contractual commitments might be a barrier to	M	H			

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Risk No	Title	Description (Summary) including date/timecales for impact	Impact	Probability	Cost (if known)	Comments	Contingency Identified
		securing the full benefits of change in the short term.					
33	Infrastructure development - paralysis	During the transition period, there is a risk that crucial developments will be put on hold.	M	M			
34	Infrastructure development - inappropriate	There is a risk that existing forces will continue to pursue local initiatives which may later make any merger more difficult	M	M			
35	Infrastructure - capacity	Support service ability to comply with national standards would be at risk if cost savings were maximised.	H	H			
36	IT – decision-making	Decisions about the IT infrastructure for a strategic force may be taken to secure the fastest possible merger and not secure best or grasp opportunities.	H	M			
37	Recognising strengths	The strengths of each of the involved forces may not be fully recognised and assumptions of “our way is best” might prevent best practice being adopted.	M	H			
38	Centralised infrastructure	Remote central teams may not have the necessary local knowledge or personal contact to provide high quality services.	M	H			
39	Cumbria case building	The remoteness of Cumbria’s main stations and criminal justice units is considered to drive up resource needs and is a logistical challenge to efficient and effective case building.	M	M			
40	Criminal justice performance	Cumbria performs better than both Lancashire and Merseyside in criminal justice. There is a risk that criminal justice performance would fall in a merged force.	H	M			
41	GMP stand alone	Greater Manchester Police would not have the opportunity to improve performance through merger, because it would continue to stand-alone.	L	H			
42	Size of force	Cumbria and Lancashire would be the smallest force in the North West region and one of the smallest in the country and so may not secure a desirable level of regional or national influence.	L	H			

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Risk No	Title	Description (Summary) including date/timecales for impact	Impact	Probability	Cost (if known)	Comments	Contingency Identified
43	Funding	Funding arrangements for the mergers are as yet unknown.	H	H			
44	Financial position	Cumbria Police Authority and Lancashire Police Authority may each face a deteriorating financial position, following a national review of grant funding and the anticipated adoption of any one of the four options put forward for consultation.	H	H			
45	Council Tax	Arrangements for precept harmonisation are not yet known. Following merger council tax could rise in the majority of households in the merged area, with no initial visible improvement in performance.	M	H			
46	Public and political opposition	There are low levels of public and political support for any merger.	H	H			
47	Remote decision-making	Decisions about policing in Cumbria may be made by a Chief Constable and Police Authority who are remote from the county.	H	M			
48	Democratic deficit	Sufficient representation for Cumbrian residents in any new Authority may be difficult to achieve in a small Authority of 17, 19 or 21 members.	H	M			
49	Span of command	Geographic size and complexity of both options may be too large for effective command.	H	M			
50	Bureaucracy	There is a risk of bureaucratic decision-making processes in larger organisations.	M	H			
51	Economic	The Constabulary is a major employer and job losses could have significant harmful consequences on the already weak local economy, compounding the low levels of white-collar jobs available in the county and the drift of professionals from it.	H	H			
52	Change management	There is no best practice model or guidance for managing the merger of forces, which is expected to increase the potential transitional risks and change costs.	M	M			
53	Lack of detailed modelling	It has not been possible to develop detailed configurations for either proposed strategic force.	H	H			

Option 2: Cumbria, Lancashire, Merseyside

Risk No	Title	Description (Summary) including date/timecales for impact	Impact	Probability	Cost (if known)	Comments	Contingency Identified
1	Protective services capacity	May not provide sufficient dedicated resources to “close the gap” in North West protective services or meet future demand.	H	L			Contingency planning for risks is an implementation issue
3	Counter terrorism	Counter terrorism would benefit more from a regional or national approach than either proposed regional structure.	M	H			
4	Investment in protective services	If the merger did not deliver sufficient efficiency savings to achieve significant investment in protective services, existing capability may be diluted across a larger geographical area.	H	M			
5	Protective services deployment	Protective services resource in a strategic force may not be deployed, through the National Intelligence Model, in Cumbria.	L	H			
6	Public order policing	Cumbria and Lancashire’s sparsity and geography could present logistical challenges to public order policing.	M	M			
7	Protective services performance management	The national performance management regime does not measure protective services performance. This acts as a disincentive to prioritising this area.	L	H			
8	Protective services future environment	Detailed forecasting of the future protective services environment in the North West has not been carried out.	M	H			
9	Neighbourhood policing disruption – public engagement	The public may have less confidence in the new force and communities may be less willing to engage during a transitional period.	M	H			
10	Neighbourhood policing disruption – partner engagement	It will be necessary for partners and other external stakeholders to build new relationships with the strategic force.	M	H			
11	Neighbourhood policing disruption – resources	It may be necessary to divert resources from the front line to deliver the reorganisation.	L	M			

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Risk No	Title	Description (Summary) including date/timecales for impact	Impact	Probability	Cost (if known)	Comments	Contingency Identified
12	Neighbourhood policing disruption – different practices	Forces currently have different approaches to neighbourhood policing which could slow developments.	M	H			
13	Neighbourhood policing – local style	Merging with a more urban force might diminish Cumbria Constabulary's successful local policing style.	M	H			
14	Citizen focus performance	There is a risk that Option 1 may reduce citizen focus performance (Lancashire and Merseyside have lower performance assessments).	H	M			
15	Neighbourhood policing abstractions	Capacity might not be sufficient to prevent the abstraction of local policing resources to support protective services operations and other organisational requirements.	H	M			
16	Complex partnership working	Increases in the complexity of partnership working at corporate level, due to the greater number of partners, may hinder effective joined-up working.	H	H			
17	Neighbourhood policing deployment	The national neighbourhood policing model might move resources away from Cumbria to other parts of a strategic force.	H	H			
18	PCSO funding	Uncertainty about the long-term availability of government funding for Police Community Support Officers may hinder developments in neighbourhood policing.	M	M			
19	Industrial action	Industrial action may take place due to the combination of restructure, pensions reform, workforce modernisation and the national volunteers campaign.	H	H			
20	Staff absence	Expectation of increased staff absence during the transition.	M	H			
21	Retirements	Change may accelerate retirements, leading to significant pension costs and loss of skills and experience.	M	H			
22	Grievances and ETs	Change may trigger increased grievances and Employment Tribunal actions.	M	H			
23	Loss of key staff	Merger may cause loss of key staff, their experience and knowledge, through resignation,	H	H			

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Risk No	Title	Description (Summary) including date/timecales for impact	Impact	Probability	Cost (if known)	Comments	Contingency Identified
		redundancy or reluctance to relocate. A short-term fall in capacity may result.					
24	IT infrastructure	Significant differences in force IT infrastructures, including access control, Integrated Command and Control Systems and call handling systems, will make change costly and difficult.	H	H			
25	IT service management	Significant differences in force IT service management approaches e.g. whether services are outsourced will make change costly and difficult.	M	H			
26	Airwave	Merger will incur costs to reconfigure the Airwave infrastructure.	H	H			
27	Process change - cultural	Cultural resistance to embracing new processes and practices is expected.	M	H			
28	Process change - training	Significant training costs may be required to harmonise processes.	M	H			
39	Transitional reduction in controls	There may be reduced clarity in controls and systems during the transition, causing a risk to compliance with essential policies.	M	M			
30	Support process disruption	There is a risk that performance may fall in some critical support processes during changeover to new arrangements e.g. file preparation for court.	H	H			
31	Contractual	Support services have not identified the contracts or carried out an assessment of the costs and risks of amending or terminating them. Contractual commitments might be a barrier to securing the full benefits of change in the short term.	M	H			
32	Infrastructure development - paralysis	During the transition period, there is a risk that crucial developments will be put on hold.	M	M			
33	Infrastructure development - inappropriate	There is a risk that existing forces will continue to pursue local initiatives which may later make any merger more difficult	M	M			
34	Infrastructure - capacity	Support service ability to comply with national standards would be at risk if cost savings were maximised.	H	H			

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Risk No	Title	Description (Summary) including date/timecales for impact	Impact	Probability	Cost (if known)	Comments	Contingency Identified
35	IT – decision-making	Decisions about the IT infrastructure for a strategic force may be taken to secure the fastest possible merger and not secure best or grasp opportunities.	H	M			
36	Recognising strengths	The strengths of each of the involved forces may not be fully recognised and assumptions of “our way is best” might prevent best practice being adopted.	M	H			
37	Centralised infrastructure	Remote central teams may not have the necessary local knowledge or personal contact to provide high quality services.	H	H			
38	Cumbria case building	The remoteness of Cumbria’s main stations and criminal justice units is considered to drive up resource needs and is a logistical challenge to efficient and effective case building.	M	M			
39	Criminal justice performance	Cumbria performs better than both Lancashire and Merseyside in criminal justice. There is a risk that criminal justice performance would fall in a merged force.	H	M			
40	Funding	Funding arrangements for the mergers are as yet unknown.	H	H			
41	Financial position	Cumbria Police Authority and Lancashire Police Authority may each face a deteriorating financial position, following a national review of grant funding and the anticipated adoption of any one of the four options put forward for consultation.	M	H			
42	Council Tax	Arrangements for precept harmonisation are not yet known. Following merger council tax could rise in the majority of households in the merged area, with no initial visible improvement in performance.	M	H			
43	Public and political opposition	There are low levels of public and political support for any merger.	H	H			
44	Remote decision-making	Decisions about policing in Cumbria may be made by a Chief Constable and Police Authority who are remote from the county.	H	H			
45	Democratic deficit	Sufficient representation for Cumbrian residents in any new Authority may be difficult to achieve	H	H			

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Risk No	Title	Description (Summary) including date/timecales for impact	Impact	Probability	Cost (if known)	Comments	Contingency Identified
		in a small Authority of 17, 19 or 21 members.					
46	Span of command	Geographic size and complexity of both options may be too large for effective command.	H	H			
47	Bureaucracy	There is a risk of bureaucratic decision-making processes in larger organisations.	M	H			
48	Economic	The Constabulary is a major employer and job losses could have significant harmful consequences on the already weak local economy, compounding the low levels of white-collar jobs available in the county and the drift of professionals from it.	H	H			
49	Change management	There is no best practice model or guidance for managing the merger of forces, which is expected to increase the potential transitional risks and change costs.	M	M			
50	Lack of detailed modelling	It has not been possible to develop detailed configurations for either proposed strategic force.	H	H			
51	Regional support for option	GMP is not pursuing this option, which raises questions about its feasibility.	H	H			

Appendix 4 Benefits Register

Impact Assessment = High, medium or low

Probability assessment = high, medium or low

Option 1: Cumbria and Lancashire

Benefit No	Title	Description (Summary) and time scale for realisation	Impact	Probability	Cost	Relevant Category (direct financial, indirect financial, non financial quantifiable, non financial un-quantifiable)	Key Milestones to Realisation
1	Protective services capacity and capability	Improvement in protective services capacity, structures, processes and skills.	H	M		NFQ	(Implementation issue)
2	Protective services continuity	Implementation may be achieved with limited disruption to protective services daily business.	M	H		NFQ	
3	Major incidents resilience	Improved resilience of forces in the event of major incidents.	H	M		NFQ	
4	Critical incident management	Improved critical incident management facilities due to economies of scale.	M	M		NFQ	
5	Experience and skills	Enhanced exposure, experience and skills of incident and investigation managers.	H	M		NFU	
6	Shared specialist resources	Shared key resources e.g. mounted and air teams.	M	H		DF	
7	Improved local policing performance	Lancashire has strong performance in reducing crime, promoting safety and providing assistance. Performance may improve in these areas.	H	H		NFQ	
8	Specialist support to neighbourhood policing	Greater opportunity for protective services resources to tackle local problems and improved availability of specialist support to neighbourhood policing.	M	M		NFU	
9	Neighbourhood policing best practice	Potential for consistent and best practice approach to neighbourhood policing across larger areas.	H	H		NFQ	

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Benefit No	Title	Description (Summary) and time scale for realisation	Impact	Probability	Cost	Relevant Category (direct financial, indirect financial, non financial quantifiable, non financial un-quantifiable)	Key Milestones to Realisation
10	Local intelligence	Improved ability of local intelligence to identify serious and organised criminals.	H	M		NFU	
11	Rural policing	There are similar rural policing issues across both Cumbria and Lancashire.	H	H		NFU	
12	Economies of scale	Economies of scale in service management, provision and procurement.	H	H		DF	
13	Technology opportunities	Technology may enable process alignment and economies of scale.	M	M		NFU	
14	Support process alignment	Processes might be aligned and improved to achieve best practice, which may improve support service performance in the medium to long term	M	M		NFQ	
15	Criminal justice processes	Alignment of criminal justice processes across a bigger geographical area is expected to support effective partnership working.	L	M		NFU	
16	Support services improvements	Improved support service capacity to meet the police reform agenda to improve services and deliver national standard and strategies.	H	L		NFQ	
17	Support services specialisation	Greater ability to specialise in larger support teams, enabling new and improved services.	L	M		NFU	
18	Resource usage performance	Lancashire Constabulary has excellent performance in resource usage and Option 1 provides the opportunity for improved arrangements and performance in this area.	H	H		NFQ	
19	Courts links	The courts system already has strong links between the South of Cumbria and North of Lancashire.	M	H		NFU	
20	Least unpopular option	Lancashire is the North West county with which most people in Cumbria are familiar and feel positively inclined towards. This option is the one most supported by the public, politicians and partners.	H	H		NFQ	

Option 2: Cumbria, Lancashire, Merseyside

Benefit No	Title	Description (Summary) and time scale for realisation	Impact	Probability	Cost	Relevant Category (direct financial, indirect financial, non financial quantifiable, non financial un-quantifiable)	Key Milestones to Realisation
1	Protective services capacity and capability	Improvement in protective services capacity, structures, processes and skills.	H	H		NFQ	(Implementation issue)
2	Protective services continuity	Implementation may be achieved with limited disruption to protective services daily business.	M	H		NFQ	
3	Major incidents resilience	Improved resilience of forces in the event of major incidents.	H	H		NFQ	
4	Critical incident management	Improved critical incident management facilities due to economies of scale.	M	H		NFQ	
5	Experience and skills	Enhanced exposure, experience and skills of incident and investigation managers.	H	H		NFU	
6	Shared specialist resources	Shared key resources e.g. mounted and air teams.	H	H		DF	
7	Improved local policing performance	Lancashire has strong performance in reducing crime, promoting safety and providing assistance. Merseyside has strong performance in reassurance. Performance may improve in these areas.	H	M		NFQ	
8	Specialist support to neighbourhood policing	Greater opportunity for protective services resources to tackle local problems and improved availability of specialist support to neighbourhood policing.	M	H		NFU	
9	Neighbourhood policing best practice	Potential for consistent and best practice approach to neighbourhood policing across larger areas.	H	M		NFQ	
10	Local intelligence	Improved ability of local intelligence to identify serious and organised criminals.	H	M		NFU	
12	Economies of scale	Economies of scale in service management, provision and procurement.	H	H		DF	
13	Technology opportunities	Technology may enable process alignment and economies of scale.	M	M		NFU	

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Benefit No	Title	Description (Summary) and time scale for realisation	Impact	Probability	Cost	Relevant Category (direct financial, indirect financial, non financial quantifiable, non financial un-quantifiable)	Key Milestones to Realisation
14	Support process alignment	Processes might be aligned and improved to achieve best practice, which may improve support service performance in the medium to long term	M	M		NFQ	
15	Criminal justice processes	Alignment of criminal justice processes across a bigger geographical area is expected to support effective partnership working.	L	M		NFU	
16	Support services improvements	Improved support service capacity to meet the police reform agenda to improve services and deliver national standard and strategies.	H	L		NFQ	
17	Support services specialisation	Greater ability to specialise in larger support teams, enabling new and improved services.	L	M		NFU	
18	Resource usage performance	Lancashire Constabulary has excellent performance in resource usage and Merseyside has good performance: opportunity for improved arrangements and performance in this area.	H	M		NFQ	
19	Financial position	Merseyside currently receive European Community funding, and expects new funding opportunities from developments in Liverpool. It is expected to be a beneficiary of the grant formula review.	M	M		IF	