

CUMBRIA POLICE AUTHORITY

Policing Plan and Best Value Committee

14 June 2005

Agenda Item 9

**BEST VALUE REVIEW
EMPOWERED BASIC COMMAND UNITS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT**

A report by the Chief Constable

SUMMARY

The attached report summarises the findings of the Best Value review, and sets out the resulting recommendations for improvement made by Best Value Board, with minor amendments requested by Chief Officers Group (COG) to assist their successful implementation.

RECOMMENDATION

That the committee approves Best Value Board recommendations, and the minor amendments by Chief Officers Group (*indicated in italics*), as follows:

Recommendation 1

That the Constabulary adopts an operating framework for BCUs:

- a. With clear chief officer ownership
- b. Based on corporate agreement with commanders and directors
- c. Regularly reviewed via the Boards
- d. Kept up to date by a nominated point of contact
- e. Commanders and Directors can request changes
- f. BCUs will have their structure and staffing levels agreed during the annual planning process.

Recommendation 2

That the effectiveness of the service levels identified in the operating frameworks will be monitored as part of performance review process.

Recommendation 3

That a simple resource allocation model be piloted in July 2005, refined and implemented as appropriate:

- a. Minimum staffing and supervisory levels identified in the Operating Framework will be considered.

- b. Operations Board will consider other variables to ensure adequate resource to achieve required performance. Variables include:
 - impact of sparsity and crime figures (figures provided by Management Information Services)
 - impact of strategic priorities
 - impact of government initiatives
 - impact of inspection/assessment results
 - comparative performance in BCU families
 - availability of external funding
 - affect on staff motivation if resources require significant reallocation.
- c. Operations Board will recommend the final allocation to Chief Officers Group.
- d. The formula will be applied by Management Information Services and will be reviewed annually.
- e. The formula will be applied annually. Operations Board will look at the results for the preceding three years to identify trends and to even out minor fluctuations (thereby avoiding unnecessary changes).

Recommendation 4

Each BCU will develop a patrol plan based on the Merseyside Model. The model factors in time for crime investigation, visibility and response to calls for service.
(Separated from Recommendation 3 for clarity).

Recommendation 5

That the Constabulary's target setting process should remain as it is and that, during BCU performance review, Chief Officers will take into account the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership and Local Strategic Partnership performance targets, as some of these may not be aligned with the BCUs' targets

Recommendation 6

That the operating frameworks' effectiveness should be reviewed after twelve months.
(Amended from 6 months to increase usefulness)

Recommendation 7i

The Head of Operational Support should remain as Chief Superintendent.

Recommendation 7ii

Operational Support should remain as one directorate, but functions within Crime Support and Crime Operations should be restructured to have intelligence separate from Operations.

Recommendation 8

Produce a business case to Chief Officers Group for CAPUs to be managed by Operational Support, (retaining locally sited units).

Recommendation 9

Corporate decisions will be made on the allocation of SIOs to major investigations and the resource criteria will be managed through Operational Support.

COG amended from the recommendation below:

Devolve management of major crimes, and establish arrangements to provide support through mutual aid on agreed criteria. Establish a rota for SIOs. ACC Operations, in discussion with the SIO, should decide additional BCU resource required for major investigations and the support to be provided by HQ.

Recommendation 10

The corporate management of CSIs will be from Operational Support with CSIs being locally based.

Recommendation 11

Produce a business case to COG to increase the number of MSG Inspectors by one within constabulary resources, to ensure that there is one for each geographical area – North, South and West.

Recommendation 12

12i A business case to be submitted to COG to consider an increase in staff together with a succession plan to form a cadre of individuals to be available in case of emergencies.

COG amended from the recommendation below:

Carry out police succession planning for CIU, providing training to officers outside the team on the understanding that they would join it for 5 years when needed. Arrange secondments of the trainee officers to CIU. Absorb the additional cost of this arrangement via the OS budget.

12ii Increase standard charges for files and reinvest in staff.

Recommendation 13

Maintain the status quo in CIU management.

DETAILS

Please see attached report.

Michael Baxter
Chief Constable

Best Value Reviews

Report to Policing Plan and Best Value Committee

Empowered Basic Command Units
& Operational Support



Cumbria Constabulary

June 2005

GLOSSARY

BCU	Basic Command Unit
MSG	Mobile Support Group
OS	Operational Support
TSG	Tactical Support Group
PPAF	Police Performance Assessment Framework
PSU	Police Standards Unit
HQ	Headquarters
MSF	Most Similar Forces
NIM	National Intelligence Model
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
TCG	Tasking and Coordination Group
CIU	Collision Investigation Unit

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 *Purpose of Report.*

This report summarises the findings of the Best Value review of Empowered BCUs and Operational Support, and sets out the resulting recommendations for improvement made by Best Value Board.

1.2 *What the reviews are aiming to achieve.*

The stated aim of the Empowered BCU review is -

To identify the most effective way the Constabulary could empower BCUs so that they may be best placed to improve their performance.

The stated aim of the Operational Support review is:

To identify the most effective way in which the Operational Support department can contribute to the organisation's objectives by supporting BCUs and, by addressing corporate responsibilities and functions, which are currently outside BCUs' activities.

The reviews seek to identify an enabling framework for the best use of resources in the Constabulary to deliver performance outcomes as measured by the Police Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF). Outcomes may include options on how the Constabulary should be structured (staffing and infrastructure), organised (management arrangements) and resourced to deliver these performance outcomes.

1.3 *Explanation of the reviews' history*

The Empowered BCU review began in June 2004. At the same time, Review 2004 was initiated, with the objective of identifying and assessing the options for streamlining back office functions. The two reviews shared research analysis, consultation, benchmarking and process mapping.

In September 2004 and with the approval of the Police Authority, the Operational Support review started.

Review 2004 reported in October 2004. The decisions regarding back office functions, made within Review 2004 for good reasons, did not involve the Police Authority, which is counter to the requirements of a Best Value review.

Agreement for this approach and a way forward for the Best Value review were sought from the Police Authority.

The Police Authority agreed to the removal of structure and staffing issues from the Empowered BCU Terms of Reference in January 2005. The review would continue to meet its original terms of reference, i.e. the development of an operating framework, but within the constraints of centralised control and coordination of support functions.

- The stakeholders for the OS Review have agreed to recognise the unique characteristics of the communications centre. The Communications Centre review has its own terms of reference and will report separately.

1.4 *The methodology used.*

The reviews were carried out according to the methodology defined in the Best Value Policy & Strategy Handbook, version 2.0, dated May 2003.

Application of the 4Cs (challenge, consult, compare and compete) was undertaken as defined in the agreed terms of reference.

The major stakeholder group was responsible for monitoring, approving, challenging and making decisions based on the evidence presented. The group comprised of the following:

- Business Owner, *ACC Operations*, Graham Sunderland
- *Police Authority Designated Members*
C Egan (North), J. Manners-Armstrong (South) S. Donnelly and M. Johnson (West)
- *Key Stakeholders, OS and BCU Commanders for North, South and West.*
Jon Rush to January 2005, then John Taylor (OS), Garry Horlacher (South), Brian Horn to March 2005, then Andy Davidson(North), Ron Smith (West)
- *Key Stakeholders, Business Management Board Representative*, Director of Personnel & Development ,Graham Noble.
- *Key stakeholders, Organisational Development & Partnerships Board Representative*, Brian Horn from March 2005
- Best Value, Jane Sauntson, Mark Graham, Andy Christopherson

2. MAIN FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

These reviews are strategic, not tactical, and the findings and options for change generally reflect this.

The review findings can be divided into two categories-

- BCU operating frameworks and
- Structure and management arrangements for Operational Support

2.1 Operating Frameworks

2.1.1 Findings


Research carried out by, amongst others, the Audit Commission and Police Standards Unit (PSU) has identified that devolution alone is not necessarily the solution to improving the performance and effectiveness of police services. The research has recognised an empowerment framework model, which identifies three clear factors which are necessary to provide successful devolution. These factors are accountability, leadership and a clear operating framework.

Devolution is not 'all or nothing'; rather, there is a continuum ranging from total central control to total local autonomy. The review research has shown that there is no identified best practice model and so the Constabulary must determine where it wishes to sit on this continuum – that is, the position of 'devolution within a corporate framework' - in order to deliver improved performance.

Through consultation, benchmarking and process mapping, the review identified the major theme within the Constabulary of a lack of mutual understanding between BCUs and HQ, which is driven by different cultures. This is shown in Diagram 1 on page 5, overleaf.

The Constabulary has a comprehensive policy framework of 439 policies, procedures, guidance and protocols (at January 2005) and agreed policing targets. However, it does not have documented service agreements and their related performance indicators, showing how headquarters' functions, including centralised policing functions, will support the BCUs. .

Diagram 1- The diverse working culture and needs of BCUs and Headquarters



The Constabulary does not have a dedicated quality assurance department to monitor compliance with policy and procedure. This has already been identified and addressed in previous reviews, so will not be repeated here.

2.1.2 Purpose of an Operating Framework

A clear operating framework will manage down the risks of loss of corporacy, resilience, performance and efficiency which may be associated with devolution. It will maintain corporate standards whilst enabling local flexibility to improve performance. By providing clarity, an operating framework will be able to:

- give a clear understanding of boundaries of authority and expectations of service for BCU Commanders, business and policing support departments and Chief Officers;
- have structures which help achieve the Constabulary objectives;
- maximise the benefits of working to the National Intelligence Model;
- have the capacity and capability to meet corporate needs and national commitments.

The framework should be jointly drafted between HQ and commanders, and be continually reviewed in the light of performance management meetings.

2.1.3 *Definition of an Operating Framework*

The characteristics of a successful operating framework have been identified by the Home Office PSU and include:

- I. minimum staffing requirements for specific functions
- II. minimum functions which BCUs must carry out
- III. delegation of authority levels (responsibilities and freedom to make decisions)
- IV. support services commitment, including service level agreements to ensure BCUs have confidence in HQ capacity to support BCUs in achieving targets
- V. process for performance targets
- VI. process for staffing and budget share for HQ/BCU (resource allocation formula)
- VII. total staffing resources
- VIII. how BCUs will provide support to other BCUs
- IX. BCU service level agreements to Level 2 policing
- X. how NIM will be used
- XI. framework for managing finance and HR, such as limits on adjustments to staffing, virement between budget heads
- XII. relevant policy framework policy (agreed with input from commanders) on issues which constrain commander decision making, eg health and safety, diversity, compatibility, procurement procedures

The continuing role of the Chief Officer Group will be:

- I. to formulate force policy, with input from commanders and directors;
- II. setting objectives, targets and minimum standards that are to apply across the Constabulary;
- III. monitoring local performance and holding commanders and directors to account;
- IV. coordination between the BCUs;
- V. involvement in short term operational decision making when exceptional circumstances arise and protocols dictate.

2.1.4 *BCU and OS Operating Frameworks*

The operating frameworks for BCUs and Operational Support have been developed through comprehensive consultation with all relevant parties. The final decision on content has been agreed at the Stakeholder Group (as

identified in Section 1.4, page 3) and then submitted to the Chief Officer Group for approval. The documents are separate to this report.

There are two frameworks, each containing the following:

- I. BCU or OS Officer Levels, as appropriate
- II. Process for Resource Allocation for BCUs
- III. Process for Target Setting
- IV. BCU or OS Structure, as appropriate
- V. Mandatory elements of structure
- VI. Mandatory functions which must be carried out to corporate standards and according to local needs
- VII. Mandatory skills and knowledge which must be maintained within a BCU
- VIII. Minimum commitments for BCU and/or HQ support functions
- IX. Specific responsibilities
- X. The relevant policy framework
- XI. The relevant performance management framework - targets or service levels where agreed, or a statement identifying that service levels are being developed.

The frameworks are dynamic documents and reflect the current situation – they do not take into account any recommendations which may be adopted from the reviews.

2.1.5 Framework ownership, use and process

- I. As the operating frameworks are active documents, they will constantly evolve. They require ownership and processes to enable updating and change. Based on best practice and the experience of forces who already work with operating frameworks, the following approach is recommended:
- II. Chief Officers should have ownership of the operating frameworks, which reflects and supports their responsibilities (identified in section 2.1.3),
- III. Chief Officers, BCU Commanders and Directors jointly agree the Operating Framework. This agreement is required at the outset and at time of any change, using the Constabulary decision making boards.
- IV. The frameworks will be a regular agenda item on constabulary boards to maintain their relevance.

- V. Major stakeholders (Chief Officers, BCU Commanders and Directors) may request changes to the framework, either through the boards' decision making structure or through performance review. Requests for change should be accompanied by a reasoned explanation.
- VI. Through the Operating Framework, BCUs will have their structures and staffing levels agreed during the annual planning process.

Recommendation 1

That the Constabulary adopts an operating framework for BCUs:

- a. With clear chief officer ownership
- b. Based on corporate agreement with commanders and directors
- c. Regularly reviewed via the Boards
- d. Kept up to date by a nominated point of contact
- e. Commanders and Directors can request changes
- f. BCUs will have their structure and staffing levels agreed during the annual planning process.

As the revised services for support functions are being developed and refined, work is underway by the relevant departments to make the necessary changes to the Devolved Resource Management Protocols to reflect these changes. The next stage is to develop the performance indicators for service level agreements, to include them in the operating frameworks and to use them in performance review to improve services.

Recommendation 2

That the effectiveness of the service levels identified in the operating frameworks will be monitored as part of performance review process.

2.1.6 Resource Allocation Formula

The Resource Allocation Formula (RAF) is a process used for sharing staff and budget between Headquarters and BCUs. Like Cumbria, benchmarking identified that not all forces utilise a formula and for those that do, there are a number of methods used. Formulae can be extremely complex and time

consuming to apply. Best practice indicates that resource allocation methods should reflect relative need and strategic priorities in order to impact on performance, and that the allocation should be reviewed annually.

Following consultation with the stakeholder group and Management Information Services (MIS), the review recommends adopting a simple approach for the first application of resource allocation to BCUs, with the stated intention to develop and refine the process.

Recommendation 3

That a simple resource allocation model be piloted in July 2005, refined and implemented as appropriate:

- a. Minimum staffing and supervisory levels identified in the Operating Framework will be considered.
- b. Operations Board will consider other variables to ensure adequate resource to achieve required performance. Variables include:
 - impact of sparsity and crime figures (figures provided by Management Information Services)
 - impact of strategic priorities
 - impact of government initiatives
 - impact of inspection/assessment results
 - comparative performance in BCU families
 - availability of external funding
 - affect on staff motivation if resources require significant reallocation.
- c. Operations Board will recommend the final allocation to Chief Officers Group.
- d. The formula will be applied by Management Information Services and will be reviewed annually.
- e. The formula will be applied annually. Operations Board will look at the results for the preceding three years to identify trends and to even out minor fluctuations (thereby avoiding unnecessary changes).

Recommendation 4

Each BCU will develop a patrol plan based on the Merseyside Model. The model factors in time for crime investigation, visibility and response to calls for service.

2.1.7 Target setting process

The current process for target setting supports the responsibilities of both the Chief Officers and the Police Authority

Following consultation with the stakeholder group the review recommends that the current process remains as it is, with the addition of a statement to reflect the impact of targets determined by Crime and Disorder Partnerships. The current target setting process is as follows:

- I. The Chief Officers determine the targets for the Constabulary and these are driven by national priorities and targets.
- II. The Chief Officers decide the headline targets for the forthcoming year and demonstrate the methodology behind each headline target, including how it might align with the Community and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) targets.
- III. The details of these targets at Constabulary and BCU levels are then calculated (using a formula agreed in 2000), showing alignment with CDRP targets where appropriate.
- IV. The Police Authority agrees these final targets.
- V. BCU Commanders accept the targets determined by this process.

Recommendation 5

That the Constabulary's target setting process should remain as it is and that, during BCU performance review, Chief Officers will take into account the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership and Local Strategic Partnership performance targets, as some of these may not be aligned with the BCUs' targets

2.1.8 Effectiveness of the Operating Frameworks

In order that the operating frameworks deliver the benefits identified – ensuring that corporate standards are maintained whilst enabling local flexibility to achieve performance, efficiency and resilience, and building the relationship between headquarters and BCUS – the review recommends:

Recommendation 6

That the operating frameworks' effectiveness should be reviewed after twelve months.

2.2 Structures and management arrangements for Operational Support**2.2.1 Structure and leadership of Operational Support (OS)**

The review looked at current best practice regarding which organisational structure might:


- best support the BCUs to improve their performance and,
- best place OS to improve its performance

The current structure of OS reports to the ACC Operations through a Chief Superintendent and is organised to deliver:

- centralised uniform operations (mobile support, tactical support, dogs, firearms, contingency planning, and the communications centre) .
- central provision of level 2 intelligence
- central support and non uniformed operations for criminal investigation, including scientific support and
- corporate policy and strategy for these portfolios

A detailed structure chart can be seen overleaf and detailed information on services delivered, which has been consulted and agreed with BCU Commanders and OS management, and can be found in the OS Operating Framework.

Diagram 2- Current Structure of Operational Support



There is little evidence to link BCU size, force size or the internal location of particular departments to improved performance. Structure is not the only, nor the most important factor, in achieving objectives.

The review compared Cumbria’s operational policing support structures with its most similar forces (MSF) and Lancashire, graded excellent by HMIC Baseline Assessment. The table overleaf shows the results.

As can be seen, all of the MSF are structured in the same way as Cumbria, with the exception of Lancashire which has devolved uniform operations to BCUs.

Structures of OS in Similar Forces

MSF	No. officer	Population	Recorded crimes	Recorded Crimes Detected (A)	Detected as % of Recorded Crime	Devolved Uniform Operations	Central Uniform Ops	Central Non uniformed operations (as Cumbria)	Detective Chief Superintendent and 'Head of CID'
Cumbria	1,241	487,804	39,539	12,609	32	No	Yes	Yes	No
Devon and Cornwall	3,311	1,595,092	131,453	38,550	29	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
North Yorkshire	1,531	753,205	71,751	19,835	24	No	Yes	Yes	N/A
Suffolk	1,314	671,153	53,443	17,445	33	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cheshire	2,204	988,439	92,221	24,764	27	No	Yes	Yes	n/A
Wiltshire	1,225	618,354	42,953	11,872	28	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kent	3,621	1,592,896	137,313	33,964	25	No	Yes	Yes	N/A
Norfolk						No	Yes	Yes	Yes
*Lancashire	3,579	1,424,489	151,835	40,270	27	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Figures are from 2003/4

Examination of the HMIC Flanagan report (*Investigation by Cambridgeshire Constabulary into the murders of Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells at Soham on 4 August 2002*) highlighted a concern about aspects of the devolved structure in Cambridgeshire. In particular, the decision to abolish the post of detective chief superintendent, the consequence of which was no 'head of profession'. However, this was not a recommendation of the HMIC report.

Of the MSF that responded to this question (3 out of 6) all had a Detective Chief Superintendent responsible for non-uniformed operations (centralised).

Recommendation 7i – Overall OS Structure

The Head of Operational Support should remain as Chief Superintendent.

The National Intelligence Model (NIM) recognises as best practice a separation of intelligence and operations, the so-called 'sterile corridor', which the current OS structure does not provide.

Options were developed to consider whether different structures would better enable improved performance and reduce risk, and meet the requirements of NIM. The risks and benefits of these options can be found in Section 3 of this report. The review did not find any potential for efficiencies.

Recommendation 7ii – Overall OS Structure

Operational Support should remain as one directorate, but functions within Crime Support and Crime Operations should be restructured to have intelligence separate from Operations.

Other specific issues raised within the review by stakeholders were:

- The location of the Firearms Unit and whether it should be within the training department. Consensus, determined through consultation, indicated that the unit should be managed within one department (OS). Provision of operational firearms resource ensures that a central decision making capability provides flexibility to maintain the force response.

- The value of the Dog Section. This section keeps detailed management information, which compares favourably with other forces in terms of benefits.
- Whether uniformed operations should be centralised or devolved to BCUS. The size of the Constabulary dictates that in order to provide economies of scale, the current model is more beneficial to performance, although performance indicators should be developed to enable effective monitoring. This was confirmed through consultation with both BCU commanders and OS management, and compares favourably with the models utilised by MSFs.

2.2.2 Management arrangements for Child and Adult Protection Units (CAPU).

The current arrangements for vulnerable people within the Constabulary are based on the devolved model – that is, BCU based units with devolved operational accountability and control; force strategy and policy responsibility retained centrally within OS, Support.

BCU CAPU's duties are:

- identification of repeat victims and vulnerable persons to achieve multi agency problem solving (adults and children)
- supporting/investigating cases involving vulnerable persons
- auditing hate crime incidents/investigations according to Constabulary policy

The background data shows that issues relating to vulnerable people are increasing in number. For example, Violent Crime with a Domestic Violence Marker is as follows:

Violent Crime	Constabulary Statistics		
	2003/4	2004/5	% Change
S20 & more serious violent crime	57	71	+24.6
S20 & more serious violent crime (ex Treats to kill)	34	36	+5.9
ABH	649	888	+36.8
GBH	25	21	-16.0
Sexual Offences	18	11	-38.9
Robbery	2	0	-100

Source: MIS

Data from West CAPU shows that the number of CID1s (start point for some CAPU activity) has increased from 2,100 in the year 2000, to 3,250 in the last twelve months.

Whilst performance is improving - for example, the percentage of reported domestic violence incidents that involved victims of a reported domestic violence incident in the previous 12 months (Old BVPI 154) , has reduced by 16% since 2003-4; this still remains a high risk area for the Constabulary should things go wrong.

All BCU commanders have recognised the importance of the units and there appears to be strong support for their work. All CAPUs contribute to the daily Tasking and Coordination in BCUs. Consultation with BCU CAPUs and with OS highlighted a number of issues:

- I. lack of corporacy - for example, the types of incidents/investigations that CAPUS are responsible for and deal with, differed across the areas (different terms of reference);
- II. impact of major investigations (not necessarily CAPU related) on continuity of line management;
- III. knowledge of findings from Serious Case Reviews
- IV. difficulty in resourcing the units (equipment, training and development of staff) when competing with other BCU priorities;
- V. level of attendance at the multi-agency problem solving meetings- for example, sergeants often represent the Constabulary but are unable to commit resource/make decisions on behalf of the organisation;
- VI. accountability and problem solving is seen as being within OS, but the Detective Superintendent has no control over resourcing;
- VII. increasing workloads;
- VIII. limited performance management information and lack of knowledge in BCUs regarding Constabulary targets.

This area is also increasingly being subject to new guidelines and inspections, which will impact on how these services are delivered. Best practice regarding child protection and domestic violence, amongst others, are gradually being introduced through the statutory ACPO National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) guidance and the Constabulary will be inspected against these standards.

A recent HMIC inspection, *Keeping Safe, Staying Safe*, which concentrated on child protection issues, has not identified a single structure as being the most effective in influencing performance and service delivery. However, their findings showed that a common issue was lack of corporacy – evidence showed a potential for local variations and practices developing, with particular note being placed on staffing levels and interpretation of force policy.

The three models identified by the HMIC are:

- *Centralised*: A single, fully centralised unit servicing the whole force having strategic operational accountability and control.
- *Centralised with devolved units*: Centralised strategic and operational accountability and control, but units sited on BCUs.
- *Devolved*: BCU based units with devolved operational accountability and control. Force strategic responsibility retained centrally. (Current Cumbria model.)

The benchmarking survey has also noted these variations in structures across a number of forces.

Recommendation 8 – Management of CAPUs

Produce a business case to Chief Officers Group for CAPUs to be managed by Operational Support, (retaining locally sited units).

A separate issue identified by HMIC was the lack of a clear accountability framework. The Operating Framework will address some of these issues, especially once performance indicators have been developed for this area.

2.2.3 Major investigations

Conducting major investigations is a key specialist skill which is not readily available elsewhere. The successful handling of such cases makes a significant contribution to public confidence in the police and therefore will impact on public reassurance.

The negative impact of major investigations on volume crime performance has been cited by BCU commanders, including during performance conference.

Major investigations work includes murder, manslaughter, unexplained deaths, some missing persons, violent robberies, stranger rape. Categories stem from the major crime definitions and are :

- A a major crime of grave public concern where the identity of the offender is not apparent or ample evidence has yet to be secured.

- B a major crime where the identity of the offender is not apparent or ample evidence has yet to be secured.
- C a major crime of where the identity of the offender is apparent and ample evidence can easily be secured.

Further categories of D and E have been developed by some forces and include any matters not falling within the above classification, but which would require special staffing and possibly finance.

The Constabulary has seven qualified Senior Investigating officers (SIO). The number of major investigations, requiring an SIO that have taken place over the past years is as follows:

BCU	2002	2003	2004	Total
North	n/a	n/a	6	n/a
South	3	4	3	10
West	-	-	-	15


Source: BCUs - Year offence occurred.

Note – West figures were not split by year.

The distribution of the investigations over time is not consistent, for example, the table below shows North (**red text**) and South (**blue text**):

Year 2003												Year 2004											
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12
															1	1	2	1		1			
1			1				1				1						1			1	1		

Whilst the distribution for South is consistent, Operation Junction in April 2003 utilised up to 40 officers over a lengthy period. Consultation with SIOs in the force indicated that the average major investigation would require 12 officers. The majority of major investigations in North all occurred within a four month period, over the summer.



Source: MIS

The graph above shows the impact of these major investigations on detection rates for volume crime in the North during 2004.

Yet again, there is no best practice model to conform to. Although 13 out of the 14 forces benchmarked against either already had, or were in the process of introducing a major investigations unit, all the major stakeholders were of the opinion that the Constabulary is not large enough to resource a permanent central unit, given the current demand profile for these investigations.

This is despite any potential benefits that a central unit may bring to volume crime by 'flattening the demand' placed on BCU CIDs. In practice, whatever model is utilised, the BCU will deal with all major investigations in the initial stages, until its seriousness and resource requirements have been determined by the SIO. Rigorous criteria would be required about which investigations could be undertaken by a central unit. Unless the unit was large enough to handle all cases, a protocol would need to be developed for handing over investigations should a more serious case appear. This would potentially be detrimental to the quality and outcome of the investigation.

Consultation with SIOs in the force highlighted a number of other issues which have a bearing on the options developed:

- I. Any centralisation model will require resources to come from BCUs to set up, or require substantial organisational growth with limited benefits.
- II. Centralising the SIO role would still require that resources from BCU CID were utilised, so still affect volume crime performance.
- III. Any centralisation model may potentially de-skill BCU staff providing difficulties for succession planning.

- IV. Any centralisation model will remove the flexibility of the BCU CID Chief Inspector to scale up or down the resources required for the investigation to accommodate BCU volume crime issues.
- V. Any centralisation model would result in the BCU CID Chief Inspector not being available for the Constabulary rota.

All the major stakeholders and BCU Chief Inspectors were of the opinion that the current system is satisfactory and provides successful major investigation outcomes, but requires further refinement to reduce its impact on BCU volume crime issues. A more robust policy, with pre-determined criteria for deciding on what will be investigated by BCU and by HQ, coupled with a force rota for SIOs and BCU mutual aid arrangements facilitated by the ACC Operations, would provide a solution.

Recommendation 9 – Major Crimes

Corporate decisions will be made on the allocation of SIOs to major investigations and the resource criteria will be managed through Operational Support.

The review also assessed major investigations against the Protective Services Capability criteria and found that the organisation has no capability for witness protection, kidnap or extortion response and review of investigations to ensure lessons learned are disseminated. The review will refer this to the Constabulary's Collaboration Project for further work.

2.2.4 Crime Scene Investigators

With the exception of Crime Scene Investigators (CSI), all Scientific Support services are provided by OS and are managed by an expert police staff manager. Force strategic and policy responsibilities are retained centrally, and this includes the professional management (quality and professional accreditation) of CSIs.

CSIs are part of the BCU and are locally managed by a CSI Manager (police staff), reporting to the Detective Inspector Crime Intelligence. The manager provides advice and guidance to the BCU Senior Management Team and BCU Tasking and Coordination Group (TCG) on all matters relating to scenes of crime. BCU CSIs are responsible for recovering all possible evidential samples and intelligence from scenes of crime as directed by the DI for crime intelligence and or TCG.

Consideration has been raised in consultation regarding whether centralising the CSI function would improve performance of BCUS. Issues raised during consultation on this issue include:

- I. Artificial boundaries regarding delivery of service have developed (interest of local DIs is in local investigation, the reality is that volume crime is a Constabulary objective, as evidenced in the Force Strategic Assessment and Intelligence Requirement)
- II. Centralisation would provide a strategic overview of scientific support service delivery
- III. Preference of CSI staff for centralisation and devolved functions is evenly split; de-motivation of some CSI staff will occur whatever option is recommended
- IV. Centralisation would provide flexibility for deployment e.g. cover for unexpected under- resourced periods would be easier to manage and a force rota for CSI cover would be more efficient
- V. Easier to maintain corporate practices (same decisions applying to all CSI staff and services)
- VI. Tasking by the BCU is essential whichever option is recommended.
- VII. Options need to incorporate video units for completeness and to ensure a strategic overview.
- VIII. Centralisation would improve effectiveness and efficiency of line and performance management. Currently, the Scientific Support Manager based in OS often deals with escalated staff issues, negotiating with three BCU DIs, but with no authority.
- IX. The centralisation model is preferred by only one BCU commander.
- X. The centralisation model would enable commanders to expect a service with agreed performance indicators
- XI. The centralisation model would free up BCU time from line managing staff and shifting emphasis to dealing with volume crime.

No best practice model has been identified during the review as having a positive impact on performance and service delivery. Benchmarking with other forces reinforces this view.

Recommendation 10 – Management of CSIs


The corporate management of CSIs will be from Operational Support with CSIs being locally based.

2.2.5 Mobile Support Group Inspectors

Consultation at the start of the review indicated that little formal tasking of MSG resources appeared to take place. Officers appeared to deploy to self identified priorities which may have had little regard for local or force priorities.

BCUs do not perceive a need for OS (MSG) staff to become BCU resources – they do however recognise that improved performance is likely to arise from a more structured approach to tasking, which will enable MSG to integrate more effectively with BCU operations and priorities.

This BCU tasking now takes place, with MSG Inspectors or their representative (usually a sergeant) attending all fortnightly BCU TCG meetings:



However, resilience issues exist with the number of Inspectors:

- I. There are 2 Inspectors and 10 Sergeants (excluding Collision Investigation Unit) – large span of control, with North MSG Inspector having 60 constables plus the Collision Investigation Unit staff.
- II. All carry a high workload – for example., one MSG sergeant was carrying 9 fatal road traffic collision enquiries at the time of consultation.
- III. MSG Inspectors often act as SIO due to non availability or workload of sergeants.
- IV. The North Wales enquiry into the death at Ulverston of an Authorised Firearms Officer may have supervisory implications for Inspectors and sergeants.

- V. The timing of the BCU TCGs is awkward, being fortnightly on Thursdays – North Cumbria is held in the morning, South and West in the afternoon. Two Inspectors makes consistent attendance problematic.

Consultation with the OS Senior Management Team and the MSG Inspectors highlighted an increased workload within MSG, mainly due to the introduction of the Roads Death Manual and professionalisation of investigating road deaths.

The impact of the changes to the Highways Agency terms of reference are unknown at this stage as the changes are not implemented fully.

The review has developed two options for change:

Recommendation 11 – Management of MSG

Produce a business case to COG to increase the number of MSG Inspectors by one within constabulary resources, to ensure that there is one for each geographical area – North, South and West.

In order to ensure effectiveness, performance indicators will need to be developed for services provided to BCUs (see Operating Framework).

2.2.6 Collision Investigation Unit (CIU)

The options for change developed for CIU involve workloads and staffing, internal structure and management arrangements.

The current unit has one full time sergeant, 3 Collision Investigators and 3 Vehicle Examiners. The budget is for a sergeant and four officer. Two officers currently in post are seconded from MSG and have been funded for 3 – 4 years, from within the OS budget to meet demand.

There have been a number of previous reviews into CIU, all of which identified issues surrounding workloads. Consultation, examination of these reviews and benchmarking with other forces has highlighted the following issues:

- I. High rate of long term sick leave.
- II. Lack of resilience and regular visits to the welfare department. This is a potential high risk to the organisation.
- III. Lack of opportunity for training and development of existing staff.

- IV. Capacity does not enable best practice. 10% of time cannot follow best practice by having an investigator and a vehicle examiner at the scene (ACPO Road Death Investigation Manual)
- V. Lack of proactive work (e.g. training, including probationers, professional updating and best practice)
- VI. Removal of plan drawing from the service provided by CIU to free up time.
- VII. Existing staff length of service (3 due for retirement)
- VIII. The only trained officers in force are already in the unit so it is difficult to implement succession planning in the way it has been (6 monthly periods).
- IX. Die to the stress and workload, it is difficult to encourage recruitment into the unit
- X. Can only provide 24 hour cover with officers on call, sometimes on rest days (at beginning of review) which is not best practice.
- XI. Not enough staff to provide shift working – although demand would indicate that full 24 hour cover would not be required, most accidents happen in the afternoon.
- XII. Workload is 29% higher than other forces per officer.

Currently, Collision Investigation generates approximately £60,000 of income for the Constabulary each year. Much of this goes towards providing resource within Business Support to administer collision enquiries from insurance companies. CIU currently charge minimum rates for their plans and reports - £50 per file plus £2 per page for every page over 24

Benchmarking has identified that other forces charge up to £500 per report for fatal accident reports. If the Constabulary adopted these charges, £25,000 of income could be invested in the CIU to increase the number of staff. No contra-indications from Freedom of Information have been identified.

Recommendation 12 – Ensuring CIU Resources meet Workload

12i A business case to be submitted to COG to consider an increase in staff together with a succession plan to form a cadre of individuals to be available in case of emergencies.

12ii Increase standard charges for files and reinvest in staff.

Other options considered to improve the current situation include removing the sergeant post to release additional funds and increase the availability of on call staff. Risks identified by stakeholders for this approach included consistency in decision making and reducing the likelihood of improvements in the future, as well as increasing the reporting lines to MSG Inspectors.

Stakeholders identified the possible option for moving CIU to Scientific Support. Consultation with the superintendent for uniformed operations, the CIU sergeant and the Scientific Support Manager indicated that this move would:

- I. Provide expert police staff management (rather than police management changing at regular intervals), leading to consistency of approach and issues being dealt with effectively.
- II. Facilitate all forensic professionals within one department (all CIU staff will require Accreditation for Forensic Practitioners);
- III. Enable improved performance management by expert managers
- IV. Realise the potential to reallocate workload within one department (similar skills sets for some CIU activity e.g. photography)
- V. Enable effective evaluation of working practices through long term management
- VI. Currently, CIU staff do not perceive any benefits from this change

Recommendation 13 – CIU Management

Maintain the status quo in CIU management.

3. OPTION APPRAISAL

This section includes:

- An options matrix for each improvement issues considered - identifying benefits, risks and critical success factors.
- An options appraisal table to help identify optimal recommendations and prioritise the options.

In each case, the option recommended by Best Value Board is highlighted. This provides an audit trail for the recommendations made by Best Value Board.

The benefits assessment is based on the Best Value Benefits Strategy (developed from CIPFA recognised benefits) and the benefits identified in the terms of reference for the reviews. A high score is good.

The risk score is based on the risk of not implementing the option, using corporate risk assessment matrix. Again, a high score is good.

Scores are totalled to give the best option and stakeholders have indicated in the summary which is their preferred option.

Please note that all costs/efficiencies identified are indicative estimates only and not all are available at the time of writing this report. Detailed costs will be part of the Improvement Action Plan and SMARTS recommendations for options which are taken forward.

Risks are identified at this option stage. Actions to mitigate and/or manage risks will be factored into the Improvement Action Plan. Risks are not listed in any particular order.

Option	Benefit	Risk	Other Comments
Operational Support Structure			
<p>Option 6A Head of Operational Support should remain as Chief Superintendent.</p> <p>RECOMMENDED BY BVB</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increases the number of suitable internal candidates and so provides more internal career progression 2. No additional costs 3. No change therefore no negative perception of staff 4. Reduces likelihood that department may split in future (uniform & non-uniform) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Does not meet the concerns noted in the Flanagan report on Soham regarding 'head of profession' for CID 2. No impact on performance 3. No evidence that this would improve support to BCUs 	
<p>Option 6B Head of Operational Support should be either a Detective Chief Superintendent OR a Chief Superintendent with SIO experience.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Meets the concerns noted in the Flanagan report on Soham regarding 'head of profession' for CID 2. No additional costs 3. Appropriate skill set to deal with 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Limits the number of internal candidates and therefore internal career progression 2. Time may be more directed to CID activities 3. Possible negative perception uniformed operational staff 4. Increase likelihood of future split of department – increased costs 5. No impact on performance 6. No evidence that this would improve support to BCUs 	<p>Consider that if have Detective Superintendent, than the Gold Command Cadre to reduce to six.</p>

Option	Benefit	Risk	Other Comments
<p>Option 6C Spilt Operational Support into two separate support directorates - uniform and non-uniform. (see Structure Chart 6C)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Clear distinction between uniform and non – uniform 2. Common practice in other forces to split uniformed operations and CID activities 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No evidence that this would impact positively on OS or BCU performance 2. No evidence that this would improve support to BCUs 3. Increases the likelihood for growth and increased cost (e.g. Chief Superintendent, additional Chief Inspectors, increased administration staff, increased performance/financial/ personnel posts due to potentially increased workload) 4. Management Unit within OS, would sit within one department, which may result in conflict of interest & disproportionate time servicing owning department 5. Organisationally, likely to be seen as change for change's sake for limited benefits, at time of financial constraints 6. Will cause disruption and uncertainty to OS staff 7. Cost in time to implement successfully 8. Does not enable a 'sterile corridor' between operations and intelligence 9. Reduces flexibility of management arrangements within OS 10. Increased risk of working in isolation and not being mutually supportive to detriment of organisation 	<p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need to develop service level agreements to ensure consistent administration support to all departments

Option	Benefit	Risk	Other Comments
<p>Option 6D Spilt Operational Support into three separate support directorates – uniform, non-uniform and Communications Centre (see Structure Chart 6D)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Clear distinction between uniform and non – uniform 2. Possibly raise the profile of the Communications Centre 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No evidence that this would impact positively on OS or BCU performance 2. No evidence that this would improve support to BCUs 3. Increases the likelihood for growth and increased cost (e.g. Superintendent rank, additional Chief Inspectors, increased administration staff, increased performance/financial/ personnel posts due to potentially increased workload) 4. Need to develop service levels agreements 5. Organisationally, likely to be seen as change for change's sake for limited benefits, at time of financial constraints 6. Will cause disruption and uncertainty to OS staff 7. Cost in time to implement successfully 8. Chief Inspector reporting directly to Chief Officer 9. Does not enable a 'sterile corridor' between operations and intelligence 10. Reduces flexibility of management arrangements within OS 11. Increased risk of working in isolation and not being mutually supportive to detriment of organisation 	<p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Communications Centre would include Management Unit (all administration and resource management) to service 2. Need to develop service level agreements to ensure consistent administration support to all departments
<p>Option 6E Status Quo (ref Structure Chart 6E)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No disruption to current management arrangements 2. No consequential loss of performance 3. No additional costs incurred 4. Maintains flexibility of management arrangements within OS 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No evidence that this would impact positively on OS or BCU performance 2. No evidence that this would improve support to BCUs without other initiatives in place 3. Does not enable a 'sterile corridor' between operations and intelligence 	<p>The model of devolved uniform operations to BCUs (TSG, MSG, Firearms, Dogs) has not been put forward as an option as it would require more resources to maintain the same level of service.</p>
<p>Option 6F Remain as one directorate, but reallocate functions within Support and Crime Operations to provide sterile corridor. RECOMMENDED BY BVB</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Limited disruption to current management arrangements 2. No consequential loss of performance 3. No additional costs incurred 4. Maintains flexibility of management arrangements within OS 5. Provides a sterile corridor between operations and intelligence, which is identified good practice in NIM 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No evidence that this would impact positively on OS or BCU performance 2. No evidence that this would improve support to BCUs 3. Organisationally, likely to be seen as change for change's sake for limited benefits, at time of financial constraints Will cause disruption and uncertainty to OS staff 4. Cost in time to implement successfully 	<p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy and strategy development would be the responsibility of the portfolio holder

Option 6 Appraisal Scores

Rating used for this benefits assessment are: 4 = completely enables benefit to be achieved; 3 = partly enables; 2=barely enables; 1= makes no difference

Will the option deliver:	Option 6A Chief Supt RECOMMENDED BY BVB	Option 6B Det Chief Supt	Option 6C Split 2-way	Option 6D Split 3-way	Option 6E Status Quo	Option 6F Sterile Corridor RECOMMENDED BY BVB
Improved performance	1	1	1	1	1	1
Corporacy in management arrangements	3	3	1	1	3	3
Improved quality & effectiveness of decision making	3	3	1	1	3	4
Same standard of service to the public across the county	3	3	1	1	3	3
Sustainability (better prepared for the future)	4	3	1	1	3	3
Conformity to best practice	4	4	1	1	1	4
Compliance with legal requirements	1	1	1	1	1	4
Minimised risk of growth in the future	4	3	1	1	3	3
Rate the cost of the option (high cost = low score)	4	4	4	4	4	4
Within current budget for the department/force (self financing)	4	4	4	4	4	4
With implementation costs (high cost = low score)	4	4	3	2	4	3
Efficiencies (high efficiency = high score)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Increased motivation	2	2	2	2	1	2
Ability to enable benefits of other initiatives to be achieved	1	1	1	1	1	2
TOTAL BENEFITS ASSESSMENT (high score = most benefits)	39	37	23	22	33	39
RISK – if the option is NOT implemented	Marginal/ Reason Probable 6	Marginal/ Reason Probable 6	Negligible/ Remote 2	Negligible/ Remote 2	Critical/ Reason Probable 9	Critical/ Probable 12
TOTAL SCORE	45	43	25	24	42	53
COST	None	Implementation time	Implementation time	Implementation time	None	Implementation time

Option	Benefit	Risk	Other Comments
Management Arrangements for Child and Adult Protection Units			
<p>Option 7A Status Quo (Devolved model) BCU based units with devolved operational accountability and control. Force strategic and policy responsibility retained centrally.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Potential for easier accessibility to supervision 2. Ensures link with daily tasking in BCUs 3. BCU Commander and management team can have degree of influence over services which require local delivery and contact with local people 4. Preferred model of all 3 BCU Commanders 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Significant local variations and practices to develop in a high risk area– difficulty in applying corporate policy, leading to ... 2. Inconsistent standards of response and service delivery 3. CAPU issues have to compete with other BCU priorities in areas such as development, training, performance, equipment, representation at partnership meetings etc 4. Centre is seen as accountable for issues/problems arising, but has no control over resources and tasking 5. Line management of CAPU activities requires specialist knowledge 	<p>HMIC report (Keeping Safe Staying Safe, 2005) recognised that no single structure was identified as being the most effective in influencing performance and service delivery.</p> <p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Results of the activity analysis of CAPU (end June 2005) to be taken into account to determine minimum appropriate staffing levels 2. Develop a protocol to ensure clarity of responsibilities between No Witness No Justice Units and CAPUs 3. Requires quality assurance role to ensure compliance with corporate policy
<p>Option 7B Create CAPU Inspectors in BCUs with responsibility for BCU units, with devolved operational accountability and control. Force strategic and policy responsibility retained centrally.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Raises profile of CAPU in BCU 2. Representation of the Constabulary who can commit resource etc at partnership meetings 3. Provide dedicated management cover for DS 4. Frees up time of DS to allow for more proactive supervision and development of staff 5. Ensures links with daily tasking in BCUs 6. BCU Commander and management team can have degree of influence over services which require local delivery and contact with local people 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Potential for growth bids in future - too many dedicated inspector roles to allow this 2. Training and skills of inspectors – potential to incur additional costs for training 3. Conflict with 24/7 Inspector cover 4. Potential for local variations to continue in high risk area 5. CAPU issues would still have to compete with other BCU priorities for resources 6. Consultation raised questions regarding whether there was adequate workload for three additional Inspectors 	<p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Results of the activity analysis of CAPU (end June 2005) to be taken into account to determine minimum appropriate staffing levels • Develop a protocol to ensure clarity of responsibilities between No Witness No Justice Units and CAPUs
<p>Option 7C Centralised. Centralised strategic and operational accountability and control, but units sited on BCUs.</p> <p>RECOMMENDED BY BVB</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Consistent standard of delivery and response in a potentially high risk area 2. Responsibility and accountability for the function are clear 3. Appropriate representation at partnership meetings 4. Enables suitable performance management – for unit targets and individual performance development 5. Raises profile of issues 6. Units locally based so ensures continued link with daily tasking in BCUs 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Would require additional minimum of Inspector post within OS, to line manage the CAPU Sergeants and units (may be able to be reallocated from within OS, depending on other options chosen) 2. Ideally also a Detective Chief Inspector 3. Loss of BCU staff will reduce BCU flexibility for resource management 4. Option not favoured by any of the BCU Commanders 	<p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Must increase central resource otherwise workload will be unmanageable 2. Results of the activity analysis of CAPU (end June 2005) to be taken into account to determine minimum appropriate staffing levels 3. Staffing and other budgets need to be transferred. 4. Develop a protocol to ensure clarity of responsibilities between No Witness No Justice Units and CAPUs 5. Published service level agreements for CAPU arrangements required

CAPU Option 7 Appraisal Scores

Rating used for this benefits assessment are: 4 = completely enables benefit to be achieved; 3 = partly enables; 2=barely enables; 1= makes no difference

Will the option deliver:	Option 7A Status Quo	Option 7B BCU Inspectors	Option 7C Centralisation RECOMMENDED BY BVB
Improved performance	1	3	4
Corporacy in management arrangements	2	2	4
Improved quality & effectiveness of decision making	1	2	4
Same standard of service to the public across the county	1	2	3
Sustainability (better prepared for the future)	1	2	4
Conformity to best practice	1	1	1
Compliance with legal requirements	4	4	4
Minimised risk of growth in the future	1	1	4
Rate the cost of the option (high cost = low score)	4	1	3
Within current budget for the department/force (self financing)	1	1	1
With implementation costs (high cost = low score)	4	2	3
Efficiencies (high efficiency = high score)	1	1	1
Increased motivation	1	2	3
Ability to enable benefits of other initiatives to be achieved	2	3	4
TOTAL BENEFITS ASSESSMENT (high score = most benefits)	25	27	43
RISK – if the option is NOT implemented	Catastrophic/ Remote 4	Catastrophic/ Reason Probable 12	Catastrophic / Probable 16
TOTAL SCORE	29	39	59
COST	Implementation time	£171,500 Implementation time	£57,000 to £118,800 Implementation time

CAPUs are a high risk area for the Constabulary.

Option	Benefit	Risk	Other Comments
Major Investigations			
<p>Option 8A Devolved management with support through mutual aid on agreed criteria. Including a rota for SIOs.</p> <p>ACC Operations, in discussion with the SIO, decides additional BCU resource required for major investigations and the support to be provided by HQ.</p> <p>RECOMMENDED BY BVB</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Consistent success rate for major investigations consistent 2. High profile investigations which are successful instil public confidence & reassurance in the Constabulary 3. Allocation by ACC Operations ensures minimal impact on individual BCUs (compared to coping with everything) 4. Maintains investigation skills levels across the organisation 5. Rota for SIOs for dealing with incidents in the first place will limit impact on BCU volume crime issues 6. Policy will need to be developed to determine which types of major investigations will be dealt with in BCUs and which by HQ 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Major investigations divert resources from BCU CID volume crime activities, which has a negative impact on performance of BCUs 2. Potential for some de-motivation of BCU SIOs 	<p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Chief Officers take into account the number of ongoing major investigations within a BCU and their impact on volume crime performance, when carrying out performance review 2. Agreed policy about which types of major investigations will be dealt with in BCUs and which by HQ 3. Published service levels and protocols for these arrangements required 4. Alternative volume crime strategies should be developed 5. NIM compliance
<p>Option 8B Centralised Major Investigations Unit. Consultation has indicated that a unit of 12 officers would be appropriate.</p> <p>(1 x D Supt, 1 x DCI, 1 x DI, 2 x DS, 7 x DCs)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Some impact on BCU volume crime performance (the unit would have to be resourced from BCU staff on set up) 2. Limits the effect of fluctuations in BCU resources (although would not eliminate them) 3. Enable BCUs to develop effective local strategies for dealing with volume crime 4. Should improve performance of volume crime within BCU to some extent 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Periods of downtime and the use of the unit in that time 2. The unit would need to be resourced from BCU staff, initially 3. Additional cost within OS (although no organisational growth) at £ 4. If simultaneous/additional major investigations are necessary, would still require BCU resource 5. May de-skill BCU staff providing difficulties for succession planning 6. Still requires commitment from BCU for HOLMES staff 	<p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Published service levels and protocols for arrangements 2. Detailed criteria and terms of reference 3. Detailed terms of reference for periods of no investigations 4. Contingency planning for when more than one high level investigation is required 5. NIM compliance

Option	Benefit	Risk	Other Comments
<p>Option 8C Central SIO team. Resources allocated from BCUs for individual investigations. (Minimum 4 x SIOs)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. BCU DCI will be available for volume crime issues 2. Should improve performance of volume crime 3. Specialist pool of skilled resources 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Major investigations will still divert resources from BCU CID volume crime activities, which has a negative impact on performance of BCUs 2. Removes the flexibility of the BCU DCI to scale up/down the resources required for the investigation to accommodate BCU volume crime issues. DCI will have the responsibility but not the investigative resources for volume crime. 3. BCU DCIs not available for the Constabulary rota 4. Require additional SIOs at HQ, resulting in element of organisational growth. 5. May de-skill BCU staff providing difficulties for succession planning 6. De-motivation of BCU staff 	<p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Chief Officers take into account the number of ongoing major investigations within a BCU and their impact on volume crime performance, when carrying out performance review 2. Published service levels and protocols for these arrangements 3. Published rotas 4. Alternative strategies for dealing with volume crime 5. NIM compliance

Option 8 Appraisal Scores

Rating used for this benefits assessment are: 4 = completely enables benefit to be achieved; 3 = partly enables; 2=barely enables; 1= makes no difference

Will the option deliver:	Option 8A Devolved, criteria & SIO rota RECOMMENDED BY BVB	Option 8B Centralised	Option 8C Central SIO team
Improved performance*	1	2	2
Corporacy in management arrangements	3	4	3
Improved quality & effectiveness of decision making	3	3	3
Same standard of service to the public across the county	3	3	2
Sustainability (better prepared for the future)	2	3	1
Conformity to best practice	2	3	2
Compliance with legal requirements	4	4	4
Minimised risk of growth in the future	1	3	1
Rate the cost of the option (high cost = low score)	4	1	4
Within current budget for the department/force (self financing)	4	1	4
With implementation costs (high cost = low score)	4	2	4
Efficiencies (high efficiency = high score)	1	2	1
Increased motivation	3	3	1
Ability to enable benefits of other initiatives to be achieved	1	2	1
TOTAL BENEFITS ASSESSMENT (high score = most benefits)	36	36	33
RISK – if the option is NOT implemented	Marginal/ Reason probable 6	Critical/ Remote 6	Critical/ Reason probable 9
TOTAL SCORE	42	42	42
COST	Implementation time	£554,665 plus time	£281,094 plus time

* In both major investigations and volume crime.

Option	Benefit	Risk	Other Comments
Scientific Support - Crime Scene Investigators Management Arrangements			
<p>Option 9A Status Quo (Devolved model) BCU based units with devolved operational accountability and control. Force strategic and policy responsibility retained centrally, including professional management (quality & professional accreditation) by Scientific Support Manager.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tasking carried out by BCU – addressing local intelligence issues 2. Preferred model of 2 out of 3 BCU Commanders 3. No implementation cost 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Minimal influence of SS Manager over BCU tasking 2. Artificial boundaries regarding delivery of service have developed (interest of local DIs is in local investigation, reality that volume crime is a Constabulary objective) 3. No strategic overview of scientific support service delivery 4. De-motivation of some CSI staff 	<p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Individual PDRs of the BCU CSI Manager should be carried out jointly by BCI DI and SS Manager 2. Regular meetings between SSU Manager and BCU CSI managers should continue 3. NIM compliance
<p>Option 9B Centralised model, CSI units would become part of Operational Support, line managed by Scientific Support Manager</p> <p>RECOMMENDED BY BVB</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Flexibility for deployment e.g. cover for unexpected under- resourced periods would be easier to manage, force rota more efficient 2. Easier to maintain corporate practices (same decisions applying to all CSI staff and services) 3. Locally based resource ensures that tasking carried out by BCU – addressing local performance issues regarding volume crime at same time ensuring corporate strategy is complied with. 4. Needs to incorporate video units for completeness and to ensure strategic overview 5. Improves effectiveness and efficiency of line and performance management. (Currently, the SSM often deals with escalated issues with 3 DIs, but with no authority) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Change may not make a major difference to performance 2. Minimal risk to negatively affect BCU performance on volume crime – level 2 issues may receive greater priority 3. Potential increased workload - capacity of OS to undertake line management responsibilities for all CSIs (especially second level PDR, escalation of personnel issues etc). 4. Time to implement 5. De-motivation of some CSI staff 	<p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Communication links with BCU Intelligence unit need to be robust. CSI would still be I tasked in BCUs and integrated with Intelligence Units. 2. Service level agreements need to be developed and monitored 3. Numbers of staff and working practices for video units need to be clarified 4. Commitment from BCU Commanders 5. Staffing and other budgets need to be transferred. 6. NIM compliance

Option 9 Appraisal Scores

Rating used for this benefits assessment are: 4 = completely enables benefit to be achieved; 3 = partly enables; 2=barely enables; 1= makes no difference

Will the option deliver:	Option 9A Status Quo	Option 9B Centralised RECOMMENDED BY BVB
Improved performance	3	4
Corporacy in management arrangements	2	4
Improved quality & effectiveness of decision making	3	4
Same standard of service to the public across the county	1	3
Sustainability (better prepared for the future)	3	3
Conformity to best practice	3	4
Compliance with legal requirements	4	4
Minimised risk of growth in the future	3	2
Rate the cost of the option (high cost = low score)	4	4
Within current budget for the department/force (self financing)	4	4
With implementation costs (high cost = low score)	4	3
Efficiencies (high efficiency = high score)	1	2
Increased motivation	2	3
Ability to enable benefits of other initiatives to be achieved	3	4
TOTAL BENEFITS ASSESSMENT (high score = most benefits)	40	48
RISK – if the option is NOT implemented	Negligible/ Remote 4	Marginal/ Reason probable 6
TOTAL SCORE	44	54
COST	None	Implementation time

Option	Benefit	Risk	Other Comments
Mobile Support Group			
Option 10A Status Quo – two inspectors, one North and one South.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No cost implications 2. Other initiatives may free up time of Inspectors (see other comments) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Limited ability to service BCU tasking (sending resources able to commit on behalf of MSG) – impact on performance 2. Increased workload within MSG due to Road Death Investigation Manual. 3. Does not minimise risk of growth 	Unknown impact of Highways agency on MSG time – needs time to bed in and evaluate. Reduced risk if Collision Investigation Unit is transferred to Scientific Support. Critical Success Factors <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Effective performance management 2. Service level agreements with BCUs developed and monitored 3. NIM compliance 4. Delegated authority to Sergeants to commit resources
Option 10B Increase the number of MSG Inspectors by one, to ensure that there is one for each geographical area – North, South and West. RECOMMENDED BY BVB	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. May improve level 1 performance 2. Reduces span of control and therefore workload of MSG Inspectors 3. Improved NIM tasking at Level 1 4. Improved visible leadership and direction 5. May increase patrol cover and number of proactive initiatives 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Any resulting performance improvement in BCUs is difficult to measure (lack of current indicators) and likely to be minimal 2. Increases direct reports to Superintendent Uniform Operations, increasing that workload 3. May require Inspector external to OS to implement, depending on other options adopted 4. May negatively affect level 2 priorities and performance 	Critical Success Factors <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Effective performance management 2. Service level agreements with BCUs developed and monitored 3. NIM compliance

Option 10 Appraisal Scores

Rating used for this benefits assessment are: 4 = completely enables benefit to be achieved; 3 = partly enables; 2=barely enables; 1= makes no difference

Will the option deliver:	Option 10A Status Quo	Option 10B Increase inspector RECOMMENDED BY BVB
Improved performance	2	3
Corporacy in management arrangements	3	3
Improved quality & effectiveness of decision making	1	2
Same standard of service to the public across the county	2	3
Sustainability (better prepared for the future)	1	2
Conformity to best practice	1	3
Compliance with legal requirements	4	4
Minimised risk of growth in the future	1	2
Rate the cost of the option (high cost = low score)	1	2
Within current budget for the department/force (self financing)	4	2
With implementation costs (high cost = low score)	1	2
Efficiencies (high efficiency = high score)	1	1
Increased motivation	1	3
Ability to enable benefits of other initiatives to be achieved	1	3
TOTAL BENEFITS ASSESSMENT (high score = most benefits)	24	34
RISK – if the option is NOT implemented	Marginal/ Remote 4	Marginal/ Reason probable 6
TOTAL SCORE	28	40
COST	None	£57,250 plus time

Option	Benefit	Risk	Other Comments
Collision Investigation Unit – Workloads and Staffing			
<p>Option 11A Status Quo</p> <p>1x Sergeant 3x Collision Investigators 3x Vehicle Examiners</p> <p>(Note: budget is Sergeant and 4. Two officers above are seconded from MSG and have been funded for 3 – 4 years, from within the OS budget to meet demand.)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No cost implications 2. Supervisor is dedicated role (no investigation except in certain circumstances, small amount of on call duties) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. High sick leave (long term) 2. Lack of resilience 3. Lack of opportunity for training and development of existing staff 4. Capacity does not enable best practice 5. Lack of proactive work (e.g. training, including probationers, professional updating and best practice) 6. Existing staff length of service (due for retirement) 7. The only trained officers in force are already in the unit so difficult to implement succession planning 8. Can only provide 24 hour cover with officers on call which is not best practice (shift working) 9. Unlikely to improve performance 10. 10% of time cannot follow best practice by having an investigator and a vehicle examiner at the scene (ACPO Road Death Investigation Manual) 11. Workload 29% higher than other forces per officer 12. High risk to the organisation - staff welfare issues 	<p>There have been a number of previous reviews which have all highlighted these issues.</p>
<p>Option 11B Police officer succession planning</p> <p>Officers from out side the department to be trained with the understanding that they would join the department for a minimum of 5 years when needed.</p> <p>Secondments of the trainee officers to the department.</p> <p>RECOMMENDED BY BVB</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opportunity to improve performance (HMIC Assessment Framework Roads policing (providing assistance) – 5C07, 5C10, 5C11) 2. Minimum cost to the constabulary (training costs) 3. Constant 'bank' of officers to step in when needed. (Future proofing) 4. Provides robust succession planning 5. Trainees would ease work load when on secondment (reducing stress and sick leave within department) 6. Trained officers in the department for a minimum of 5 years 7. Would allow time for training and development of existing staff 8. Morale boost for department 9. Opportunity to carry out more proactive work 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Training costs (travel and accommodation are estimated) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Collision Investigator £4,600 including accommodation and travel 2. - Vehicle Examiner £3,300 including accommodation and travel 3. Trainee officers would need to be released from BCUs /MSG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Currently no succession planning in what is a highly specialised department • Takes 18 months to 2 years to fully train replacements

Option	Benefit	Risk	Other Comments
Collision Investigation Unit – Workloads and Staffing			
<p>Option 11C Police staff succession planning</p> <p>Recruit police staff to the department as vacancies arise.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opportunity to improve performance 2. HMIC Assessment Framework Roads policing (providing assistance) – 5C07, 5C10, 5C11 3. Phased in approach 4. Staff recruited would already be fully trained 5. Morale boost for department 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cost / growth 2. Vehicle examiners salary £23,000 to £27,000 3. Collision Investigators salary £30,000 to £40,000 4. (Average PC salary including on costs is £38,869) 5. Retention of staff 6. Does not fully address current resilience issues 7. Could take a long time to recruit to the required skill level (future as well as inception) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No police powers used in the department so police staff could be used • Takes 18 months to 2 years to fully train replacements <p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pay market rate for job to reduce staff turnover OR accept that staff will leave when trained and experienced
<p>Option 11D Collaborate with neighbouring force/s to provide service</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opportunity to improve performance 2. HMIC Assessment Framework Roads policing (providing assistance) – 5C07, 5C10, 5C11 3. BVPI – 132 number of RTC involving death or serious injury per 1,000 population 4. Provide ability to follow best practice by having an investigator and a vehicle examiner at the scene (ACPO Road Death Investigation Manual) 5. Addresses resilience issues and may prevent future growth 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cost implications 2. Logistics of travelling from another county or additional time to implement to use two forces 3. Trial over one weekend with Lancashire proved ineffective due to geography. 4. Potential for loss of skills within force 5. Other forces may not be willing to collaborate 6. Time and cost to implement 7. Unlikely to reduce current costs 	
<p>Option 11E Increase standard charges and reinvest in staff.</p> <p>Currently charge</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ £50 per file plus £2 per page for every page over 24 ▪ Plans £21 ▪ Income generated 2003/4 £60,297 (target £64912) <p>RECOMMENDED BY BVB</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased staff for minimal additional cost 2. Increased performance 3. Charges would be increased for the more complicated files which include a vehicle examiners report 4. Potential increase to £500 per file, in line with other forces, could produce additional income of £25,000 per annum. 5. Provide ability to follow best practice 100% of the time by having an investigator and a vehicle examiner at the scene (ACPO Road Death Investigation Manual) 6. Reduce stress and sickness within department 7. Increased ability to cope with workload within department 8. Morale/motivation boost for department, thereby improving performance and reducing corporate risk 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased income may not be 'fed' back into the departmental improvements • Customer satisfaction / acceptance of new charges <p>Police Staff Cost / growth</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Vehicle examiners salary £23,000 to £27,000 ▪ Collision Investigators salary £30,000 to £40,000 	<p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires change to financial arrangements (precedent in Scientific Support)

Option 11 Appraisal Scores

Rating used for this benefits assessment are: 4 = completely enables benefit to be achieved; 3 = partly enables; 2=barely enables; 1= makes no difference

Will the option deliver:	Option 11A Status Quo	Option 11B Police Officer Succession RECOMMENDED BY BVB	Option 11C Police Staff succession	Option 11D Collaboration	Option 11E Increase charging & reinvest in staff RECOMMENDED BY BVB
Improved performance	1	3	3	2	3
Corporacy in management arrangements	4	4	4	3	4
Improved quality & effectiveness of decision making	1	3	3	3	3
Same standard of service to the public across the county	3	4	4	3	4
Sustainability (better prepared for the future)	1	4	4	3	4
Conformity to best practice	2	3	3	3	3
Compliance with legal requirements	4	4	4	4	4
Minimised risk of growth in the future	1	3	3	3	4
Rate the cost of the option (high cost = low score)	4	2	1	1	3
Within current budget for the department/force (self financing)	4	2	2	2	3
With implementation costs (high cost = low score)	4	2	2	2	2
Efficiencies (high efficiency = high score)	1	1	1	1	2
Increased motivation	1	3	3	2	3
Ability to enable benefits of other initiatives to be achieved	1	2	2	2	2
TOTAL BENEFITS ASSESSMENT (high score = most benefits)	32	40	39	34	44
RISK – if the option is NOT implemented	Marginal/ Remote 2	Critical/ Probable 12	Critical/ Probable 12	Marginal/ Remote 2	Critical/ Reason Probable 9
TOTAL SCORE	34	52	51	36	53
COST	None	£8,900 plus implementation time	£67,000 Max plus implementation	Implementation time	Implementation time

Option	Benefit	Risk	Other Comments
Collision Investigation Unit – Internal Structure and Management arrangements			
<p>Option 12 A Status Quo. Sergeant within MSG Structure 1 Sergeant 3 Collision Investigators 3 Vehicle examiners</p> <p>RECOMMENDED BY BVB</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close supervision of officers 2. No disruption for staff 3. Consistency in decision making 4. Improved management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost of supervision within department - PS average salary £46,746 (including on costs) 	
<p>Option 12 B Unit supervised by MSG (no sergeant)</p> <p>Within MSG Structure 3 Collision Investigators 3 Vehicle examiners</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Interdepartmental links may forge improved working relationship 2. Free up £7,000 per annum funding for the unit, contributing to new post 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Department morale 2. Less effective supervision 3. Increased reporting lines to MSG Inspectors reducing their effectiveness 	
<p>Option 13 Transfer Collision Investigation Unit to Scientific Support.</p> <p>Managed by Scientific Support Manager (SSM)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Expert police staff management (rather than police management changing at regular intervals) leading to consistency of approach and issues being dealt with 2. All forensic professionals within one department (all CIU staff will require Accreditation for Forensic Practitioners) 3. Improved performance management by expert managers 4. Potential to reallocate workload within one department (similar skills sets for some CIU activity e.g. photography) 5. Longer term management will enable effective evaluation of working practices 6. CIU staff do not perceive any benefits from this change 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased workload for SSM 2. May reduce effectiveness of links with MSG SIOs 	<p>Not similar to other forces CIU structure and links</p> <p>Critical Success Factors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transfer of staff and related budgets • Service level agreements with MSG SIOs to be developed • Effective communications and consultation with CIU staff

Options 12 and 13 Appraisal Scores

Rating used for this benefits assessment are: 4 = completely enables benefit to be achieved; 3 = partly enables; 2=barely enables; 1= makes no difference

Will the option deliver:	Option 12A Status Quo RECOMMENDED BY BVB	Option 12B No sergeant	Option 13 Move to Scientific Support
Improved performance	3	1	3
Corporacy in management arrangements	4	3	3
Improved quality & effectiveness of decision making	3	2	3
Same standard of service to the public across the county	4	4	4
Sustainability (better prepared for the future)	3	2	3
Conformity to best practice	N/a	N/a	N/a
Compliance with legal requirements	4	4	4
Minimised risk of growth in the future	3	2	2
Rate the cost of the option (high cost = low score)	4	4	2
Within current budget for the department/force (self financing)	4	4	3
With implementation costs (high cost = low score)	4	3	3
Efficiencies (high efficiency = high score)	1	2	3
Increased motivation	3	1	2
Ability to enable benefits of other initiatives to be achieved	3	3	4
TOTAL BENEFITS ASSESSMENT (high score = most benefits)	43	35	39
RISK – if the option is NOT implemented	Marginal/ Reason probable 6	Negligible/ Remote 2	Marginal/ Probable 8
TOTAL SCORE	49	37	47
COST	None	Implementation time	Implementation time

3.2 Summary of Option Appraisal Scores

Area for Improvement	Option	Score	Risk of NOT implementing	Improves performance	Additional Cost (excluding implementation)	Recommended by BVB
Operational Support Structure	6A Chief Supt	45	Low	No	No	✓
	6B Det Chief Supt	43	Low	No	No	-
	6C Split 2 way	25	Low	No	No	-
	6D Split 3 way	22	Low	No	No	-
	6E Status quo	42	Medium	No	No	-
	6F Sterile corridor	53	High	No	No	✓
CAPU	7A Status quo	29	Low	No	No	-
	7B BCU Inspectors	39	Medium	Yes	£171,500 (not organisational growth)	-
	7C Centralisation	59	High	Yes	£57,000 (not organisational growth) to £118,800 (includes DCI post, which is organisational growth)	✓
Major Investigation	8A Devolved, criteria & SIO	42	Low	Yes	No (not organisational growth)	✓
	8B Centralised	42	Low	Yes	£554,665 (not organisational growth)	-
	8C Central SIO	42	Medium	Yes	£281,094 (organisational growth)	-

Area for Improvement	Option	Score	Risk of NOT implementing	Improves performance	Additional Cost (excluding implementation)	Recommended by BVB
Scientific Support	9A Status quo	44	Low	Yes	No	-
	9B Centralise	54	Low	Yes	No	✓
MOBILE Support Group	10A Status quo	28	Low	Yes	No	-
	10B Increase Insp	40	Low	Yes	£57,250 (not organisational growth)	✓
Collision Investigation Unit – Staffing Issues	11A Status quo	34	Low	No	No	-
	11B PO succession	52	High	Yes	£8,900 (Additional training costs)	✓
	11C Police staff succession	51	High	Yes	£67,000 max (Organisational growth)	-
	11D Collaboration	36	Low	No	No	-
	11E Increase charge & reinvest	53	Medium	Yes	No (self funding)	✓
CIU - Structure & management	12A Status quo - Sgt	49	Low	Yes	No	✓
	12B No sergeant	37	Low	No	No	-
	13 Transfer to SS	47	Low	Yes	No	-